

35th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory

Organized by Federico Echenique (UC Berkeley) & Leeat Yariv (Princeton University)

Location: Charles B. Wang Center - Stony Brook University

Monday, July 15, 2024

8:30 am - 9:00 am

Breakfast & Registration

9:00 am - 9:45 am

Eddie Dekel (Northwestern University and Tel Aviv University):
Sequential Mechanisms for Evidence Acquisition

9:45 am - 10:30 am

Noam Nisan (Hebrew University of Jerusalem):
Serial monopoly on blockchains

10:30 am - 11:00 am

Coffee Break & Registration

	Theater	Lecture Hall 1	Lecture Hall 2	East Hall	Room 201	Room 102
	Games on Networks <i>Organized by: Paolo Pin</i>	Information Acquisition <i>Organized by: Yingkai Li</i>	Matching	Contracts	Mechanism Design	Cooperative Game Theory

11:00 am - 11:20 pm

Matteo Bizzarri (University of Naples Federico II and CSEF): Common ownership in production networks	Yingkai Li (Yale University): Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules	Hanzhe Zhang (Michigan State University): Axiomatic measures of assortative matching	Wade Hann-Caruthers (NYU Abu Dhabi): Optimality of weighted contracts for multi-agent contract design with a budget	Loren Fryxell (University of Oxford): Public Good Provision Re-Examined	Michele Lombardi (University of Liverpool and University of Napoli Federico II): Implementation in vNM stable set
--	---	--	---	---	---

11:20 am - 11:40 pm

Francesca Parise (Cornell University): Learning in Large Network Games with Dynamic Populations	Daniel Luo (MIT): Reputation in Repeated Global Games of Regime Change with Exit	Georgy Artemov (The University of Melbourne): School Choice, Housing, and Inequality	Ahmad Alkhwaja (Stony Brook): Strategic Conflict between Two Groups of Players: Linear vs. Quadratic Cost	Maxim Nikitin (HSE University): Optimal Civil Justice Design	H.W. (Bill) Corley (The University of Texas at Arlington): Scalar Equilibria for Normal-Form Games
---	--	--	---	--	--

11:40 am - 12:00 pm

Melika Liporace (Tilburg University): Persuasion in Random Networks	Fang-Yi Yu (George Mason University): Algorithmic Robust Forecast Aggregation	Salvador Candelas (Penn State): The Equilibrium Effects of Correlated Criteria	Felix Zhiyu Feng (University of Washington): Buying In and Selling Out: The Dynamic Returns to Investing in Expertise	Zihao Li (Columbia University, University of Southern California): The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for Quality	Reinoud Joosten (University of Twente): Inductive Shapley values in cooperative transportation games
---	---	--	---	--	--

12:00 am - 12:20 pm

Paolo Pin (Università di Siena - Italy): How do you know you won't like it if you've never tried it? Preferences discovery and strategic bundling	Eric Gao (Stanford University): Ex-Ante Design of Persuasion Games	Takahiro Moriya (Stony Brook University): Communication Technology Advance and Consequences: Using Two-sided Search Model	Julian Klix (University of Mannheim): Soft-Landing Contracts and Temporal Incompleteness	Nathaniel Neligh (University of Tennessee, Knoxville): A Minimum-Offer Contribution Mechanism for the Provision of Public Goods	Jinglei Huang (Tsinghua University): The Shapley Value and the Nucleolus of a Two-Sided Platform Game
---	--	---	--	---	---

12:20 pm - 2:00 pm

Lunch Break

2:00 pm - 2:45 pm

Shuchi Chawla (University of Texas at Austin):
Revisiting revenue maximization: buy-many mechanisms and sequential posted pricing

2:45 pm - 3:15 pm

Coffee Break

	Theater	Lecture Hall 1	Lecture Hall 2	East Hall	Room 201
	Learning and Information in Networks <i>Organized by: Marcos R. Fernandes</i>	Correlations and Incentives <i>Organized by: Fedor Sandomirskiy</i>	Information Design <i>Organized by: Andrew Ferdowsian</i>	Matching	Communication in Games

3:15 pm - 3:35 pm

Omer Tamuz (California Institute of Technology): Network and Timing Effects in Social Learning	Deniz Kattwinkel (UCL): Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents	Christoph Schlom (UC Davis): Concavification Bounds and Mechanism Simplicity	Naomi Utgoff (United States Naval Academy): Service Assignment at the United States Naval Academy	Alistair Barton (New York University): Robust Communication Between Parties with Nearly Independent Preferences
--	--	--	---	---

3:35 pm - 3:55 pm

Nicole Tabasso (Ca' Foscari University of Venice): Optimal Verification of Rumors in Networks	Renato Paes Leme (Google Research): Winner-Pays-Bid Auctions Minimize Variance	Martin Vaeth (Princeton University): Voter Learning, Unidimensional Ideology, and Polarization	Di Feng (Dongbei University of Finance and Economics): Informative Simplicity in Matching	Heng Liu (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute): The limits of repeated price discrimination
---	--	--	---	--

3:55 pm - 4:15 pm

James Siderius (Dartmouth College): A Theory of Ghosting	Fedor Sandomirskiy (Princeton University): Extreme Equilibria	Andrew Ferdowsian (University of Notre Dame): Evident Competition	Alex Sam (University of Calgary): Monotone Equilibrium Design for Matching Markets with Signaling	Shuo Xu (Beijing Foreign Studies University): Cheap Talk with Transparent Motives in Broker Games: An Experimental Analysis
--	---	---	---	---

4:15 pm - 4:35 pm

Marcos R. Fernandes (University of São Paulo): Combining Combined Forecasts: a Network Approach		Run Li (Southern University of Science and Technology): Communication of Expertise before Disclosure	David Bishop (Yale University): Necessarily Unfair Matching with Concave Costs	Asha Sadanand (University of Guelph): Selten's Horse: An experiment on Sequential Rationality
---	--	--	--	---

4:35 pm - 5:00 pm

Coffee Break

5:00 pm - 5:45 pm

Sevgi Yuksel (University of California, Santa Barbara):
Beliefs in Repeated Games: An Experiment

35th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory

Tuesday, July 16, 2024

8:30 am - 9:00 am

Breakfast

9:00 am - 9:45 am

Omer Tamuz (California Institute of Technology):
Logit responses in stochastic choice and games

9:45 am - 10:30 am

Philip Reny (University of Chicago):
Natural Language Equilibrium: Signaling Games

10:30 am - 11:00 am

Coffee Break

Theater	Lecture Hall 1	Lecture Hall 2	East Hall	Room 201	Room 102	Room 101
Strategic Uncertainty	Political Economy	Mechanism Design	Mathematical Methods in Game Theory	Information Design	Finance	Bargaining
<i>Organized by:</i> Tan Gan	<i>Organized by:</i> Laura Karpuska					

11:00 am - 11:20 pm

Marek Weretka (UW Madison): Contracts with Interdependent Preferences	Anubhav Jha (Princeton University): Screening for Influence: Latent Effects of Campaigning and Institutional Design	Jiasun Li (George Mason University): ALL-WAY STOPS	Tarun Sabarwal (University of Kansas): General theory of equilibrium in models with complementarities	Ce Li (Boston University): Information Design Beyond Prior and State	Cheng Peng (Stony Brook University): Risk Quadrangle and Robust Optimization based on phi-divergence	Cao Lorecchio (Universitat de Barcelona): Multilateral Bargaining with Information Spillovers
---	---	--	---	--	--	---

11:20 am - 11:40 pm

Dihan Zou (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill): Managing Information Production in Teams	Yuhan Zheng (Princeton University): Beyond Your Municipio: An Empirical Test of Inequality Preferences in Brazil	Felix Feng (University of Washington): Progress, Delays, and the Timeliness of Reporting	Arthur Paul Pedersen (The City University of New York): Two-Person Adversarial Games are Zero-Sum: An Elaboration on a Folk Theorem	Fedor Sandomirskiy (Princeton University): Maximal Blackwell Theorem	Saara Hämäläinen (University of Helsinki): Information requirement for efficient decentralized screening	Qiang Fu (National University of Singapore): Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn meet Tullock
---	--	--	---	--	--	---

11:40 am - 12:00 pm

Tan Gan (LSE): Robust Advertisement Pricing	Laura Karpuska (Insper Business School): Do Protests Induce Accountability? Evidence and theory from Brazil's 2013 Mass Protests.	Siyang Xiong (University of California, Riverside): Mechanism Design with Sequential-Move Games: Revelation Principle	Philippe Bich (Paris School of Economics): A Brouwer-Tarski fixed-point theorem with applications to game theory	Jeffrey Mensch (Hebrew University of Jerusalem): Revealed Preference Tests for Bayesian Persuasion	Amnon Schreiber (Bar Ilan University): The Dual Nature of Managerial Disclosures: Revealing Successes and Mitigating Failures	Ilwoo Hwang (Seoul National University): Integrative Negotiation: An Economic Perspective
---	---	---	--	--	---	---

12:00 am - 12:20 pm

		Yaron Azrieli (Ohio State University): Temporary exclusion in repeated contests	John Levy (University of Glasgow): Independence of Existence of Measurable Equilibrium Selections	Tyler Hoppenfeld (UC Davis): Pareto Inefficient Unraveling in a Matching Market		
--	--	---	---	---	--	--

12:20 pm - 2:00 pm

Lunch Break

2:00 pm - 2:45 pm

Fuhito Kojima (University of Tokyo):
Ekkyo matching: how to integrate fragmented matching markets for welfare improvement

2:45 pm - 3:15 pm

Coffee Break

Theater	Lecture Hall 1	Lecture Hall 2	East Hall	Room 201	Room 102	Room 101
Recent Advances in Matching and Market Design	Dynamic Markets and Search	Information Design	Networks and Bargaining	Matching	Dynamic Games	Learning and Evolution
<i>Organized by:</i> Juan Pereyra	<i>Organized by:</i> Can Urgun		<i>Organized by:</i> Selman Erol			

3:15 pm - 3:35 pm

Aram Grigoryan (University of California, San Diego): Market Design for Distributional Objectives in Allocation Problems: An Axiomatic Approach	Can Urgun (Princeton University): When to Stop Thinking and Start Choosing: Timing of Choice in Parallel Search	Xueying Zhao (University of Warwick): Tailoring Consumer Data for Profit	Selman Erol (CMU Tepper): Network Hazard	Yiyang Tan (Princeton University): Rank Guarantees in Matching Markets	Andrew Kosenko (Marist College and University of Tennessee, Knoxville): Utilitarianism and Transfers: Bidding for Efficiency	Wolfgang Spohn (University of Konstanz): Dependency Equilibria: Extending Nash Equilibria to Entangled Belief Systems
---	---	--	--	--	--	---

3:35 pm - 3:55 pm

Jiarui Xie (Tsinghua University): Games under the Tiered Deferred Acceptance Mechanism	Théo Durandard (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign): Robust Contracting for Search	Boaz Zik (Reichman University): Selling Certification to Informed Agents	Krishna Dasaratha (Boston University): Incentive Design with Spillovers	Alexey Kushnir (Carnegie Mellon University): Undergraduate Course Allocation through Competitive Markets	Freddie Papazyan (Texas Tech University): Power Consolidation in Groups	Marilyn Pease (Indiana University, Kelley School of Business): Safety, In Numbers
--	--	--	---	--	---	---

3:55 pm - 4:15 pm

Juan S. Pereyra (Universidad de Montevideo): Locally non-bossiness and preferences over colleagues	Teddy Mekonnen (Brown University): Competition, Persuasion, and Search	Wenxi Xu (City University of Hong Kong): Equivalent Mechanisms for Information Intermediation	Mihai Manea (Stony Brook University): Bargaining Foundations for the Outside Option Principle	Oguzhan Celebi (Stanford University): Diversity Preferences, Affirmative Action, and Choice Rules	Chuangyin Dang (City University of Hong Kong): Computing Perfect Bayesian Equilibria: From a Characterization with Self-Strategy-Independent Consistency to a Differentiable Path-Following Method	Alejandro Robinson-Cortés (University of Exeter): Information Cascades in Strategic Environments
--	--	---	---	---	--	--

4:15 pm - 4:35 pm

Juan Escobar (University of Chile): Search and Information in Centralized School Choice Systems	Bobby Pakzad-Hurson (Brown): Equal Pay for Similar Work	Ting Liu (Stony Brook University): Information Design for Credence Goods		Tianling Luo (Columbia University): School choice with reserved seats	Mathieu V. Leduc (Paris School of Economics (PSE)): On the Power of Reaction Time in Deterring Collective Actions	Nicholas Wu (Yale University): Strategic Idea Management
---	---	--	--	---	---	--

4:35 pm - 5:00 pm

Coffee Break

5:00 pm - 5:45 pm

Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University):
Algorithmic contract design

6:00 pm - 10:30 pm

Conference Dinner
Curry Club at SāGhar

35th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory

Wednesday, July 17, 2024

8:30 am - 9:00 am

Breakfast

9:00 am - 9:45 am

Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania):
Over- and Underreaction to Information

9:45 am - 10:30 am

Nima Haghpunagh (Pennsylvania State University):
Screening Two Types

10:30 am - 11:00 am

Coffee Break

Theater	Lecture Hall 1	Lecture Hall 2	East Hall	Room 201	Room 102
Theater of Communication <i>Organized by: James Best</i>	Matching and Networks <i>Organized by: Kirill Rudov</i>	Industrial Organization	Information Design	Social Choice	Social and Economic Networks

11:00 am - 11:20 pm

Xiao Lin (University of Pennsylvania): Commitment and Randomization in Communication	Clayton Thomas (Microsoft Research): Characterization of Priority-Neutral Matching Lattices	Hongda Zhong (University of Texas at Dallas and CEPR): Market Structure of Intermediation	Renjie Zhong (Renmin University of China): Selling Training Data	Ritesh Jain (University of Liverpool): An Iterative Approach to Rationalizable Implementation	Roi Orzach (MIT): Conformity Concerns: A Dynamic Perspective
--	---	---	--	---	--

11:20 am - 11:40 pm

Elliot Lipnowski (Columbia University): Issue Selection in Constrained Communication	Joseph Root (University of Chicago): Stable Matching as Transport	Kirill S. Evdokimov (Princeton University): Uniqueness of payoffs in coalitional bargaining with transferable utility	Joseph Feffer (Stanford GSB): Coarse Learning Equilibrium	Steven J. Brams (New York University, Wilfrid Laurier University, University of Graz): Fair Division of Indivisible Items: The Incompatibility of Envy-Freeness (Both EF and EFX) and Pareto-Optimality	Changyeop Lee (The Ohio State university): Evaluating Ambiguity and Belief Polarization
--	---	---	---	---	---

11:40 am - 12:00 pm

Archishman Chakraborty (Yeshiva University): Subversive Conversations	Hanzhe Zhang (Michigan State University): Self-enforced job matching	Andrew Mackenzie (Maastricht University): Auctions for a regulated monopolist	Yoav Kolumbus (Cornell University): Auctions between Regret-Minimizing Agents	Rohit Parikh (City University of New ork): A new Issue for Social Choice	Norma Olaizola (University of the Basque Country): Connections models with diminishing marginal rate of substitution link-formation technologies
---	--	---	---	--	--

12:00 am - 12:20 pm

James Best (Carnegie Mellon University): Aggregating Strategic Information	Kirill Rudov (UC Berkeley): Decentralized Foundation for Stability of Supply Chain Networks	Victoria Ziqi Hang (Texas Tech University): Information Design versus Auditing in Mitigating Hold-Up Risks	Ernesto Rivera Mora (Cowles Foundation): Information Selling under Prior Disagreement	Omer Madmon (Technion): Robust Price Discrimination	Steve Yeh (Columbia University): Optimal Task Assignments
--	---	--	---	---	---

12:20 pm - 2:00 pm

Lunch Break

2:00 pm - 2:45 pm

Geoffroy de Clippel (Brown University)

2:45 pm - 3:15 pm

Coffee Break

Theater	Lecture Hall 1	Lecture Hall 2	East Hall	Room 201	Room 102
Aggregative Games: Theory and Applications <i>Organized by: Wilfredo Maldonado</i>	Games with Incomplete Information	Bargaining <i>Organized by: Semih Uslu</i>	Mechanism Design	Assorted Topics	Computer Science and Economics

3:15 pm - 3:35 pm

Luciana C. Fiorini (University of Western Australia): Labor Supply in Pandemic Environments: An Aggregative Games Approach	Abhishek Ray (George Mason University): AI in Journalism: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis	Assa Cohen (Sy Syms School of Business, Yeshiva University): Inventory, Market Making, and Liquidity: Theory and Application to the Corporate Bond Market	Orestis Vravosinos (New York University): Bi-dimensional screening with substitutable attributes	Daniel Habermacher (Universidad de los Andes, Chile): Diversity and Empowerment in Organizations	Andy Luchuan LIU (United International College and IRADS): On Economic Undecidability: Self Reference and Reality
--	--	---	--	--	---

3:35 pm - 3:55 pm

Cheng-Zhong Qin (UCSB): Relative Profits and Competitive Equilibrium	Sumit Goel (NYU Abu Dhabi): Contest design with a finite type-space	Chaojun Wang (The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania): Search in Over-the-Counter Markets	Rene Saran (University of Cincinnati): Robust Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies in General Mechanisms	Xuanheng Qian (Princeton University): The Madman Choice: Delegation in Reputational Bargaining	Linchen Zhang (University of California San Diego): Revenue Guarantee across Bays Coarse Correlated Equilibria
--	---	---	---	--	--

3:55 pm - 4:15 pm

Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado (University of São Paulo): Determinants of Agricultural Fires: An Aggregative Games Approach	Stepan Aleksenko (UCLA): Delegated Recruitment and Statistical Discrimination	Semih Uslu (Johns Hopkins University): Comparing Search and Intermediation Frictions Across Markets	Sebastian Bauer (Stanford University): Exploding Offers, Risk Aversion and Welfare	Po Hyun Sung (Caltech): Narrow Framing in Games	Mingsheng Zhang (Renmin University of China): On the Mechanism Underlying Algorithmic Collusion
---	---	---	--	---	---

4:15 pm - 5:00 pm

Vasiliki Skreta (University of Texas at Austin):
Informed communication

5:00 pm - 5:45 pm

Françoise Forges (Paris Dauphine University):
Converging better response dynamics in sender-receiver games

35th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory

Thursday, July 18, 2024

8:30 am - 9:00 am

Breakfast

9:00 am - 9:45 am

Yannai Gonczarowski (Harvard University):
Common Knowledge, Regained

9:45 am - 10:30 am

Amanda Friedenberg (University of Michigan)

10:30 am - 11:00 am

Coffee Break

Theater	Lecture Hall 1	Lecture Hall 2	East Hall	Room 201	Room 102
Information Economics: Experts & Dynamics	Auctions and Market Structure	Political Economy	Dynamic Games	Bounded Rationality	Search and Experimentation
<i>Organized by:</i> Yunus Can Aybas	<i>Organized by:</i> Pellumb Reshidi & Joao Thereze				

11:00 am - 11:20 pm

Zachary Wojtowicz (Harvard University): Context and Communication	Nima Haghpanah (Penn State): A Theory of Stable Market Segmentations	Paola Moscardelli (Princeton University): Redistricting with Endogenous Policies	Yonggyun Kim (Florida State University): Blackwell-Monotone Information Costs	Davide Bordoli (Yale University): Non-Bayesian updating and value of information	Weicheng Min (Shanghai Jiao Tong University): Information Acquisition with Uncertain Signal Structure
---	--	--	---	--	---

11:20 am - 11:40 pm

Klajdi Hoxha (Stanford GSB): Selling Correlated Information Products	Ellen Muir (MIT): Optimal Hotelling Auctions	Alice Gindin (Middlebury College): Dynamic Political Investigations: Obstruction and the Optimal Timing of Accusations	Andrew Komo (MIT): Shill-Proof Auctions	Toshihiko Hirasawa (UCLA): Consumer Search with Rational Inattention	Byunghoon Kim (University of Pennsylvania): Serial Experimentation and Career Concerns
--	--	--	---	--	--

11:40 am - 12:00 pm

Yijun Liu (Northwestern University): Dynamic Reward Design	Matthew Mitchell (University of Toronto): Pricing and Perpetual Royalties with Repeated Resale	Nicolás Riquelme (Universidad de los Andes, Chile): Learning by Lobbying	Richard Mayr (University of Edinburgh): Strategy Complexity of Buchi Objectives in Concurrent Stochastic Games	Sungmin Park (The Ohio State University): Causality and Causal Misperception in Dynamic Games	Jorge D. Ramos-Mercado (ITESM): Optimal Sequential Experimentation
--	--	--	--	---	--

12:00 am - 12:20 pm

Yunus Aybas (Stanford): Experts & Experiments	Pellumb Reshidi (Duke University): Optimal Licensing: Mechanisms for Replicable Goods with Externalities		Rumen Kostadinov (McMaster University): Regret in Durable-Good Monopoly	Caroline Liqui-Lung (University of Cambridge): Optimal Self-Screening and the Persistence of Identity-Driven Choices	Qiaoxi Zhang (Xiamen University): Optimal Incentive for Innovation Adoption
---	--	--	---	--	---

12:20 pm - 2:00 pm

Lunch Break

2:00 pm - 2:45 pm

Eran Shmaya (Stony Brook University):
Identifying the Deviator

2:45 pm - 3:15 pm

Coffee Break

Theater	Lecture Hall 1	Lecture Hall 2	East Hall	Room 201
Dynamic Games	Industrial Organization	Bargaining	Information Design	Machine Learning
<i>Organized by: Sara Shahanaghi</i>				

3:15 pm - 3:35 pm

Chiara Margaria (Boston University): Knowledge Transfers	Jihwan Do (Yonsei University): Vertical contracting and information spillover in Cournot competition	Siqi Li (the University of Pennsylvania): Bargaining with Partial Commitment	Takuma Habu (Cornell University): Audience Design	Rodica Ioana Lung (Babes-Bolyai University): An Evolutionary Approach to Feature Selection and Classification based on an Equilibrium Decision Tree
--	--	--	---	---

3:35 pm - 3:55 pm

Francisco Poggi (University of Mannheim): The Timing of Complementary Innovations	Haokai Ning (Dongbei University of Finance and Economics): Uncertainty, Market Structure, and Strategic Trade Policy	Péter Puzsai (Corvinus University of Budapest): Bargaining Failures Due to Network Effects	Yiran Wang (University of Rochester): Commitment to Thinking	Shikha Singh (Williams College): Unbalanced Random Matching Markets with Partial Preferences
---	--	--	--	--

3:55 pm - 4:15 pm

Beixi Zhou (University of Pittsburgh): Optimal Disclosure Windows	Siyuan Lyu (Stony Brook University): Knowledge: gift or burden of innovation?	Mikhail Panov (HSE Saint Petersburg): Bargaining as a Coordination Problem	Peiran Xiao (Boston University): Incentivizing Agents through Ratings	Mihai Suciu (Babes-Bolyai University): A game theoretic decision forest for feature selection and classification
---	---	--	---	--

4:15 pm - 4:35 pm

Sara Shahanaghi (Toulouse School of Economics): Investment Timing and Reputation	Maxim Ivanov (McMaster University): Uncertain Costs, Information Design, and Total Surplus	Carlo Maria Cusumano (Yale University): Redistributive Bargaining under the Shadow of Protests	Alfonso Maselli (University of Pennsylvania): Misspecification Averse Preferences	Yuzhao Yang (Boston University): An Axiomatic Model of Cognitive Dissonance
--	--	--	---	---

4:35 pm - 5:00 pm

Coffee Break

5:00 pm - 5:45 pm

Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University):
Predictive Enforcement