

Location: Charles B. Wang Center - Stony Brook University
 All times are in Eastern Daylight Time (GMT-4)

Organizers: Yannai Gonczarowski (Harvard University), Stephen Morris (MIT)

Monday, July 24, 2023

8:30 am - 9:00 am	Breakfast					
	Theater					
9:00 am - 9:45 am	Matt Weinberg (Princeton University): Mechanism Design for Blockchain: An Overview					
9:45 am - 10:30 am	Shengwu Li (Harvard University): Sequential Cursed Equilibrium					
10:30 am - 11:00 am	Coffee Break					
	Theater - Finance	Lecture Hall 1 - Experimental Economics 1	Lecture Hall 2 - Social and Economic Networks	Room 102 - Bargaining 1	East Hall - Contracts 1	Room 201- Information Economics 1
11:00 am - 11:20 am	Sajid Chaudhry (Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom): Do Females Perform Better During Crises: An Analysis of Bank Performance After Bailouts	Shih-Wen Liu (Washington University in St. Louis): Decentralized Matching Markets with Partially Negotiable Surplus: An Experimental Study	Norma Olaizola (University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU): A simple connections model with heterogeneity in nodes and linking technologies	Laura Karpuska (Inspser and Shanghai University of Finance and Economics): Inequality and Fiscal Rules in a Political Economy	Xueying Zhao (University of Warwick): contracting with heterogeneous biases	Toygar T. Kerman (Corvinus University of Budapest): Persuading Communicating Voters
11:20 am - 11:40 am	Deepal Basak (Kelley School of Business, Indiana University): Stress Tests: Frequency vs. Strength	Ming-Hung Weng (Department of Economics, National Cheng-Kung University): Dynamic Dependency during the Price Competition, a Hyperscan fMRI Study	Bahri Hacıbrahimoglu (Long Island University): Data Analytics for Crisis Management: A Case Study of Sharing Economy Services in the COVID-19 Pandemic	Rohit Parikh (CUNY): Nash bargaining and strategising in simultaneous games	Yu Fu Wong (Columbia University): Dynamic Monitoring Design	Daniel Monte (University of Turin): Post-Conflict History Writing
11:40 am - 12:00 pm	Noam Tanner (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston): Supervisory Range of Practice Design and Guidance: An Application to Capital and Liquidity Stress Testing	Weixuan Zhou (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology): Knowing More Can Hurt: An Experiment	Kevin He (University of Pennsylvania): Learning from Viral Content	Papatya Duman (Paderborn University): Nash Smoothing on the Test Bench: H ₀ -Essential Equilibria		Tetsuya Hoshino (ITAM): Rational Inattention and Endogenous Volatility in Games: A Large Deviation Approach
12:00 pm - 12:20 pm	Salah Salimian (Urmia University and Tax Administration Organization): The Role of Investment in the Equilibrium of International Political Economy (Game Theory Approach)	Alejandro Caparros (University of Durham): Institution Formation in Weakest-Link Games with Fixed Neighborhoods	Marc Claveria Mayol (Stony Brook University): Moral Hazard and Networks	Emiel Awad (Princeton University): Persuasive Lobbying and the Value of Connections		Eun-Seok (Ian) Lee (Duke University): Rational Inattention with Volatility Shocks
12:20 pm - 2:00 pm	Break					
	Theater					
2:00 pm - 2:45 pm	Marina Halac (Yale University): Pricing for Coordination					
2:45 pm - 3:15 pm	Coffee Break					
	Theater - Applications 1	Lecture Hall 1 - Experimental Economics 2	Lecture Hall 2 - Cooperative Games 1	Room 102 - Solution Concepts	East Hall - Social choice	Room 201- Learning
3:15 pm - 3:35 pm	Nicolás Riquelme (Universidad de los Andes, Chile): Discretion to Encourage Information Acquisition	Sulagna Dasgupta (The University of Chicago, University of Bergen, University of Amsterdam): Information Design in Object Allocation Problems	Dorothea Herreiner (Loyola Marymount University): Coalition Formation and Difference of Opinion	Enrico Mattia Salonia (Toulouse School of Economics): A foundation for universalisation in games	Shiladitya Kumar (University of Houston): Electoral Competition with Credible Promises and Strategic Voters	Wenji Xu (City University of Hong Kong): Social Learning through Action-Signals
3:35 pm - 3:55 pm	Kiril Evdokimov (Princeton University): Entry barriers, reform, and growth	Chanjoo Lee (Seoul National University): Lying and Deception in Repeated Communication: An Experimental Analysis	Ricardo Nieva (Universidad de Lima): Free-Riding-Free Corrupt Coalition Formation	Mehmet S. Ismail (King's College London): Human and Machine Intelligence in n-Person Games with Partial Knowledge	Salvador Candelas (Penn State): The Revealed Preference of Mutual Influence	Yihang Zhou (The University of Texas at Austin): Strategic Experimentation with Two-sided Private Information
3:55 pm - 4:15 pm	Jorge Vasquez (Smith College): Optimal Policing with Criminal Search	Changkuk Im (The Ohio State University): Multiple Price List Elicitation Methods for Attribute Models	Michele Lombardi (University of Liverpool): Implementation in vNM stable set	Morgan Patty (Université Paris-Saclay, ENS Paris-Saclay): Root Dominance		Rodica Ioana Lung (Babes-Bolyai University): A Game Theoretic Framework for Binary Classification
4:15 pm - 5:00 pm	Theater					
	Ben Golub (Northwestern University): Equity Pay in Networked Teams					
5:00 pm - 5:45 pm	Ran Shorrer (Penn State University): To Infinity and Beyond: A General Framework for Scaling Economic Theories					

Tuesday, July 25, 2023

8:30 am - 9:00 am	Breakfast						
	Theater						
9:00 am - 9:45 am	Asu Ozdaglar (MIT): Independent Learning Dynamics for Stochastic Games: Convergence and Finite-Time Analysis						
9:45 am - 10:30 am	Vijay Vazirani (UC Irvine): LP-Duality Theory and the Cores of Games						
10:30 am - 11:00 am	Coffee Break						
	Theater - Experimental Economics 3	Lecture Hall 1 - Fairness	Lecture Hall 2 - Social and Political Models 1	Room 102 - Bargaining 2	East Hall - Incomplete Information	Room 201- Information Economics 2	Room 101- Miscellaneous
11:00 am - 11:20 am	Barsha Saha (Jindal Global Business School (JGBS)): A behavioural model of duopolistic price competition under consumer inertia in mobile telecommunications market	Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University, Germany): Blend-in fairness and equal split	Ephraim Shimko (Princeton University): Cheap (Talk) Shots: Discrediting the Media to Stay in Office	Jangwoo Lee (The Chinese University of Hong Kong): Confidentiality and Competition in Concurrent Bargaining	Ori Haimanko (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev): Pure-strategy Equilibrium in Bayesian Potential Games with Absolutely Continuous Information	Caio Lorecchio (Universitat de Barcelona School of Economics, EESP-FGV and Inspir): Misguided voters: the impact of political misinformation on effective accountability and electoral selection	Luciana Garbayo (University of Central Florida; University of North Carolina Charlotte; CUNY Graduate Center & Brooklyn College): Modal Preferential Logic Breast Cancer Guidelines Disagreement: An Algorithmic Topological Game Analysis
11:20 am - 11:40 am	Andreas Ziegler (University of Amsterdam): Persuading an audience. Testing information design in the laboratory	Zeming Ma (Department of Economics, University of Rochester): Fair Allocations in Order-Augmented Revenue-Sharing Problems	Alice Gindin (University of Pennsylvania): Dynamic Political Investigations: Obstruction and the Optimal Timing of Accusations	Wenhao Li (Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University): Full Discretion is Inevitable	Igal Milchtaich (Bar-Ilan University): Quantum Advantage in Bayesian Games	Nicolas Pastrian (University of Pittsburgh): Monopolistic screening with buyers who sample	H.W. Corley (University of Texas at Arlington): Modeling Degrees of Player Selfishness and Altruism in Normal Form Games
11:40 am - 12:00 pm	Asha Sadanand (University of Guelph): Selten's Horse: An Experiment on Sequential Rationality	Steven J. Brams (King's College, London, and Wilfrid Laurier University (Canada)): Fairer Penalty Shootouts in Soccer: The m-n Rule	Miguel Sanchez Villalba (University of Concepción, Chile): Entry in Generalized Beauty Contests	Duoze Li (Chinese University of Hong Kong): Gamsorn's Law in Dynamic Legislative Bargaining	Michal Szkup (University of British Columbia): Sequential Learning and Coordination	Sulagna Dasgupta (The University of Chicago): Optimal Test Design for Knowledge-based Screening	Xihao Song (University of Glasgow): Dominated Strategy in Random Game
12:00 pm - 12:20 pm		Neil Hwang: Purbita Jana (Bronx Community College, City University of New York): Ethical agents	Gengyi Zhou (New York University): Global Media Bias Caused by Propaganda and Censorship	Xuancheng Qian (Princeton University): The Madman Choice: Delegation in Reputational Bargaining	Stepan Aleksenko (UCLA): Consumer Reviews and Dynamic Price Signaling	Terrence Adam Rooney (Western University): Perceptiveness in a Market Entry Setting	
12:20 pm - 2:00 pm	Break						
	Theater						
2:00 pm - 2:45 pm	George Mailath (University of Pennsylvania and Australian National University): Trust in Risk Sharing						
2:45 pm - 3:15 pm	Coffee Break						
	Theater - Cooperative Games 2	Lecture Hall 1 - Contracts 2	Lecture Hall 2 - Signaling	Room 102 - Social and Political Models 2	East Hall - Applications 2	Room 201- Information Economics 3	
3:15 pm - 3:35 pm	Joongsan Hwang (University of Colorado Boulder): Discrete Rendezvous Games and Their Departure and Wait Times	Danil Dmitriev (UC San Diego): Motivating Creativity	Olivier Massicot (Coordinated Science Lab, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign): Almost-Bayesian Persuasion	Rein van Alebeek (Radboud University Nijmegen): Grand Scale Opinion Dynamics	Jinge Liu (City University of Hong Kong): Content Bias and Information Compression	Archishman Chakraborty (Yeshiva University): Selected Facts	
3:35 pm - 3:55 pm	Matteo Triossi (Ca' Foscari University of Venice): Expectations, cores, and strategy proofness for allocation problems with externalities	Alexander Rodvilov (School of Business, Stevens Institute of Technology): Optimal task design: production and learning with moral hazard and adverse selection	Mingyi Niu (Rice University): Competing Signaling Providers	Subhadra Vadlamannati (Oberlin College): Mexico and U.S. Responses to the Central American Refugee Crisis - a Game Theoretical Perspective	Mats Köster (Central European University): Conversations	Raj Kiriti Velicheti (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign): Value of Information in the Presence of Multiple Strategic Information Providers	
3:55 pm - 4:15 pm	Rohit Parikh (CUNY): Freedom, Groups and a measure of coordination	Chang Liu (Harvard University): Robust Contracts with Exploration	Sivakorn Sanguanmoo (MIT): Multiple signaling channels in the college admissions problem	Seung Han Yoo (Korea University): On the Origin of Polarization	Fikri Pitsuwan (ETH Zurich): Decentralized Attack Search and the Design of Bug Bounty Schemes	Yunus C. Aybas (Stanford University): Efficient Cheap Talk in Complex Environments	
4:15 pm - 4:35 pm	Xianglian Li (Nankai University): The Cooperation Problem	Tan Gan (Yale University): Unique Implementation with Optimal Monitoring	Younghwan In (Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)): Signal Exaggeration in Bayesian Persuasion	Paola Moscarello (Princeton University): Redistricting with Endogenous Policies		Kun Zhang (Arizona State University): Withholding Verifiable Information	
4:35 pm - 5:00 pm	Coffee Break						
	Theater						
5:00 pm - 5:45 pm	Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Israel Institute of Technology): Contract Design: Approximation and Learning						

Wednesday, July 26, 2023

8:30 am - 9:00 am	Breakfast					
	Theater					
9:00 am - 9:45 am	Annie Liang (Northwestern University): The Transfer Performance of Economic Models					
9:45 am - 10:30 am	Laura Doval (Columbia Business School): The Core of Bayesian Persuasion					
10:30 am - 11:00 am	Coffee Break					
	Theater - Learning and Evolution 1	Lecture Hall 1 - Mechanism Design 1	Lecture Hall 2 - Industrial Organization 1	Room 102 - Information Economics 4	East Hall - Auctions	Room 201- Dynamic Games 1
11:00 am - 11:20 am	Brandon Collins (University at Colorado Colorado Springs): A Coupling Approach to Analyzing Games with Dynamic Environments	Andrew Ferdowsian (Princeton University): Build to Order: Endogenous Supply in Centralized Mechanisms	Ricky Li (MIT): Competition and Social Learning	Shuo Xu (Beijing Foreign Studies University): Entrant-Optimal Learning in a Contest Game	Frank Rosar (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)): Collusive and Predatory Bidding in Uniform-Price Auctions with Complementary Values	Aleksandra L. Grinikh (Saint Petersburg State University, National Research University "Higher school of economics"): N-person prisoner's dilemma with bounded punishment
11:20 am - 11:40 am	Ziv Hellman (Bar-Ilan University): Game Changing Mutation	Jiasun Li (George Mason University): Bayesian Implementation with Contingent Schedules	Daehong Min (New York University Abu Dhabi): How Marketing Strategies Shape Price Competition	Majid Mahzoon (University of Central Florida): Indicator Choice in Pay-for-Performance	Manpreet Singh (Paris School of Economics): Procurement with rationing of capacity constrained suppliers	Eugene A. Feinberg (Stony Brook University): CVaR Games
11:40 am - 12:00 pm		Xiaoyun Qiu (Northwestern University): Contests as Optimal Mechanisms under Signal Manipulation	Camilo Rubbini (Florida State University): Licensing sequential innovations	Anastas P. Tenev (Corvinus University of Budapest): Information Design for Weighted Voting	Elnaz Bajoori (University of Bath): Security auctions with cash- and equity-bids: An experimental study	Francesco Fabbri (Princeton University): Trembling Hand and Markov Perfect Equilibrium in Stochastic Games with Informational Asymmetries
12:00 pm - 12:20 pm		Zoe Hitzig (Harvard, Department of Economics, MIT, Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory): Contextually Private Mechanisms		Qianjun Lyu (University of Bonn): Information Design in Cheap Talk		
12:20 pm - 2:00 pm	Break					
	Theater					
2:00 pm - 2:45 pm	Yakov Babichenko (Israel Institute of Technology): Quantile Shares					
2:45 pm - 3:15 pm	Coffee Break					
	Theater - Learning and Evolution 2	Lecture Hall 1 - Mechanism Design 2	Lecture Hall 2 - Industrial Organization 2	Room 102 - Information Economics 5	East Hall - Bounded Rationality 1	Room 201- Matching 1
3:15 pm - 3:35 pm	Sarah A. Toonsi (University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign): Higher-Order Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium – Except When They Do	Mengjia Xia (U Penn): Mechanism Design Approach to the Organization of Scientific Research	Marcos R. Fernandes (University of São Paulo): Patent Licensing and Tariff setting in Product Variety Networks	Peter Wagner (University of York): Information Intermediaries in Monopoly Pricing	Benjamin Matta (University of Pittsburgh): Heuristic Games	Georgy Artemov (The University of Melbourne): Improving Information Acquisition in School Choice
3:35 pm - 3:55 pm	Aniruddha Ghosh (Johns Hopkins University): On Existence of Berk-Nash Equilibria in Misspecified Markov Decision Processes with Infinite Spaces	Giacomo Rubbini (Brown University): Mechanism Design without Rational Expectations	Matteo Broso (Collegio Carlo Alberto, University of Turin): Privatization under Political Connections	Margarita KIRNEVA (CREST, Ecole Polytechnique): Informing to Divert Attention	Wei Tang (Columbia University): Rationality-Robust Information Design: Bayesian Persuasion under Quantal Response	Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University, Germany): Incomplete information and the matching of likes
3:55 pm - 4:15 pm	Kaiwei Zhang (Peking University): Optimal Pricing Schemes in the Presence of Social Learning and Costly Reporting	Dhruva Bhaskar (Baruch College): Regulating Dynamic Contracts	Andrea Canales (Universidad de O'Higgins): Regulating Vertical Markets through Delegation	Panagiotis Kyriazis (Northwestern University): It's Not Always the Leader's Fault: How Informed Followers Can Undermine Efficient Leadership	Zichang Wang (Duke University): Regret and Information Avoidance	Scott Paiement (North Carolina State University): Major Switching at Selective Colleges
4:15 pm - 4:35 pm		Andreas Haupt (MIT): Certification Design for a Competitive Market	Ting Liu (Stony Brook University): Search in Credence Goods Markets	Yifan Dai (MIT): Mediated Communication with Transparent Motives	Jurek Preker (Bielefeld University): Strategic News Selection in Social Media	Kym Pram (University of Nevada, Reno): Matching and Disclosure
4:35 pm - 5:00 pm	Coffee Break					
	Theater					
5:00 pm - 5:45 pm	Faruk Gul (Princeton University): TBD					
6:00 pm - 9:00 pm	Reception Dinner at Curry Club at SaGhar					

Thursday, July 27, 2023

8:30 am - 9:00 am	Breakfast					
	Theater					
9:00 am - 9:45 am	Doron Ravid (University of Chicago): Flexible Moral Hazard Papers					
9:45 am - 10:30 am	Yuliy Sannikov (Stanford University): Nonrecursive Contracts					
10:30 am - 11:00 am	Coffee Break					
	Theater - Industrial Organization 3	Lecture Hall 1 - Information Economics 6	Lecture Hall 2 - Mechanism Design 3	Room 102 - Dynamic Games 2	East Hall - Matching 2	Room 201- Bounded Rationality 2
11:00 am - 11:20 am	Manuel Foerster (Bielefeld University): Strategic use of social media influencer marketing	Daniel Habermacher (Universidad de los Andes, Chile): Authority and Specialization under Informational Interdependence	Andrew B Choi (University of Chicago): I'll Tell You Tomorrow: Committing to Future Commitments	Benjamin Bernard (University of Wisconsin-Madison): Continuous-Time Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring	Aram Grigoryan (University of California, San Diego): A Continuum Model for Analyzing Large Matching Markets: A Theoretical Justification	Maxim Bakhtin (Stanford University): A Memory Model of Belief Formation
11:20 am - 11:40 am	Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Universidad Pablo de Olavide): Successive Incentives	Mengxi Sun (University of Pittsburgh): Misspecified Persuasion	Wenbo Zhao (National University of Singapore): Intertemporal Bundling	Nicolas Bonneton (University of Mannheim): NonStationary Search and Assortative Matching	Tyler Hoppenfeld (UC Davis): A Little Doubt Goes a Long Way: Market Uncertainty and Unraveling in Matching Markets	Yiran Wang (University of Rochester): Commitment for Thinking with "Go-To" Categorization
11:40 am - 12:00 pm	Matteo Bizzarri (University of Naples Federico II): Supply and demand function competition in input-output networks	Zhen Zhou (PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University): Biased Wisdom from the Crowd	Ce Li (Boston University): Investment Incentives with Limited Cognition	Svetlana Boyarchenko (University of Texas at Austin): On dangers of product competition	Yanning Zhang (North Carolina State University): Chinese High School Admissions under Affirmative Action Policies with Score Constraints	Andy Luchuan LIU (United International College): Consciousness and Rationality: An Interactive Perspective
12:00 pm - 12:20 pm	Thomas Eisfeld (UC Louvain): Unite and Conquer: Seller Collusion in Multi-Sided Markets	Yimeng Zhang (University of Hong Kong): Coarse Information Design			Sara Fish (Harvard University): Stable Menus of Public Goods	
12:20 pm - 2:00 pm	Break					
	Theater					
2:00 pm - 2:45 pm	Muhamet Yildiz (MIT): TBD					
2:45 pm - 3:15 pm	Coffee Break					
	Theater - Mechanism Design 4	Lecture Hall 1 - Information Economics 7	Lecture Hall 2 - Industrial Organization 4	Room 102 - Dynamic Games 3	East Hall - Matching 3	Room 201- Bounded Rationality 3
3:15 pm - 3:35 pm	Yingkai Li (Yale University): Test Design without Commitment	Han Wang (Department of Economics, The Ohio State University): Contracting with Heterogeneous Researchers	Sungmin Park (The Ohio State University): Delegated Cheap Talk: A Theory of Investment Banking	Vasundhara Mallick (Pennsylvania State University): The Art of Waiting	Adam Kapor (Princeton University): College Admissions with Interdependent Values	Chih-Chun Yang (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica): Contingent Dominance in Auctions
3:35 pm - 3:55 pm	Andrew Mackenzie (Maastricht University): Tract housing, the core, and pendulum auctions	Alex Sam (McMaster University): Consumer Privacy Disclosure with Market Competition	Carl-Christian Groh (University of Mannheim/University of Bonn): Search, Data, and Market Power	Parth Parihar (European University Institute (EUI)): When Incumbency Limits Public Good Provision	Diana MacDonald (Banco de Mexico): Designing the Menu of Licenses for Foster Care	Shih En Lu (Simon Fraser University): Credible Strategies for Self Restraint under Present Bias
3:55 pm - 4:15 pm	Tan Gan (Yale University): Trying Lemons: Adverse Selection with Experimentation	Siqi Li (University of Pennsylvania): Costly media investigation and self-regulation under state censorship		Mitchell Watt (Stanford University): Who Gets What and When: Dynamic Incentives in Repeated Matching Markets	Zhuotong Xie (Stony Brook University): How did Assortative Mating on Education change in the U.S. during the past several decades	Jeevant Rampal (IIM Ahmedabad): Heterogeneous Agent Quantal Response Equilibrium
4:15 pm - 4:35 pm		Sophie Kreutzkamp (University of Bonn): Endogenous Information Acquisition in Cheap-Talk Games				
4:35 pm - 5:00 pm	Coffee Break					
	Theater					
5:00 pm - 5:45 pm	Ilya Segal (Stanford University): The Costly Wisdom of Inattentive Crowds					