

Location: Charles B. Wang Center - Stony Brook University

All times are in Eastern Daylight Time (GMT-4)

For the latest version of the schedule, you can scan the QR codes in the handout

Organizer: Joel Watson (University of California, San Diego)

Monday, July 18, 2022

8:30 am - 9:00 am

Breakfast

Theater

9:00 am - 9:45 am

Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern University): Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms

9:45 am - 10:30 am

Renee Bowen (University of California San Diego): Learning from Shared News: When Abundant Information Leads to Belief Polarization

10:30 am - 11:00 am

Coffee Break

Theater - Political Economy	Lecture Hall 1 - Information Acquisition and Markets	Lecture Hall 2 - Law and Economics: Evidence and Procedure	Room 201 - Industrial Organization 1	Connections - Cooperative Games 1	Jasmine - Information and Networks 1	Room 103 - Voting	Room 104 - Auctions 1
<i>Organized by: Renee Bowen</i>	<i>Organized by: Can Urgun</i>	<i>Organized by: Jesse Bull</i>					

11:00 am - 11:20 am

Chanjoo Lee (Seoul National University): A Theory of Anti-Pandering

Joao Thereze (Princeton University): Adverse Selection and Information Acquisition

Johannes Schneider (U Carlos III de Madrid & U Mannheim): The Wrong Kind of Information

Jorge Vasquez (Smith College): Misinformation in social media: The role of verification incentives

Elena Inarra (University of the Basque Country): Stable decompositions of coalition formation games

Abhinaba Nandy (Virginia Tech): Sanctions in directed networks

Alice Gindin (University of Pennsylvania): Dynamic Investigations

Simon Jantschgi (University of Zurich): On market prices in double auctions

11:20 am - 11:40 am

Alex Bloedel (UCLA): Agenda Control in Real Time

Dakang Huang (toulouse school of economics): Market Structure and Adverse Selection

Claude Fluet (Laval University): Cross-Examination

Joaquin Coleff (Universidad Nacional de La Plata): Collusion Stability and the Number of Firms, Revisited

Cheng-Zhong Qin (UCSB): Unifications of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem

Yutian Chen (California State University, Long Beach): Voluntary Data Preservation Mechanism in Base Station-less Sensor Networks

Michael Hasday (Massachusetts School of Law): Randomly Selected Representative Committees

Bo Chen (Southern Methodist University): Optimal Disclosure in All-pay Auctions with Interdependent Valuations

11:40 am - 12:00 pm

Danil Dmitriev (University of California, San Diego): Downside of Transparency in Delegated Experimentation with Costly Switching

Andrew Ferdowsian (Princeton University): Learning Through Transient Matching

Alex Lundberg (Northwestern University): A Theory of Charge Bargaining

Jingwen Tian (The University of Iowa): Commitment, Firm and Industry Effects in Strategic Divisionalization

Mehmet Ismail (King's College London): The strategy of conflict and cooperation

Tarun Sabarwal (University of Kansas): Control and spread of contagion in networks with global effects

Dean Jens (University of Central Florida): Incentive Compatibility, Condorcet, and Borda

Fedor Sandomirskiy (Caltech): Beckmann's approach to multi-item multi-bidder auctions

12:00 pm - 12:20 pm

Renee Bowen (University of California San Diego): Dynamics of Risky Agreements

Can Urgun (Princeton University): Costly Verification and Money Burning

Jesse Bull (Florida International University): What do jurors infer from a defendant's race or ethnicity?

Deepanshu Vasal (Northwestern University):  $\alpha$ -tolerant Nash equilibria in network games

Jingyu Fan (UCLA): Corruption Networks

12:20 pm - 2:00 pm

Break

Theater

2:00 pm - 2:45 pm

Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford Graduate School of Business): Prices versus Rationing: Inequality-aware market design

2:45 pm - 3:15 pm

Coffee Break

Theater - Costly Information	Lecture Hall 1 - Bounded Rationality	Lecture Hall 2 - Evidence and Persuasion	Room 201 - Matching Applications	Connections - Dynamic Games	Jasmine - Bargaining and Applications	Room 103 - Disclosure and Persuasion 1	Room 104 - Experimental Economics
<i>Organized by: Denis Shishkin</i>							

3:15 pm - 3:35 pm

Weijie Zhong (Stanford University): The Cost of Optimally Acquired Information

Carlo Maria Cusumano (Yale University): Competing to Commit: Markets with Rational Inattention

Raj Kiriti Velicheti (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign): Mediated Bayesian Persuasion

Tyler Maxey (Princeton University): School Choice with Costly Information Acquisition

Yonggyun Kim (Duke University): Disclosing Technological Breakthroughs in Innovation Races

Kirill Evdokimov (Rice University): The Coase Conjecture and Agreement Rules in Policy Bargaining

Mantas Radzvilas (University of Konstanz): Incentives for Research Effort: An Evolutionary Model of Publication Markets with Double-Blind and Open Review

Prithvijit Mukherjee (Bryn Mawr College): Cost Sharing in Public Goods Game in Networks

3:35 pm - 3:55 pm

Tommaso Denti (Cornell University): Experimental Cost of Information

Sanket Patil (Northwestern University): Strategic Justifications

Shaofei Jiang (The University of Texas at Austin): Costly Persuasion by a Partially Informed Sender

Bobby Pakzad-Hurson (Brown University): Do Peer Preferences Matter in School Choice Market Design?

Niko Jaakkola (University of Bologna): Differential games of public investment: Markovian best responses in the general case

Ismail Saglam (TOBB University of Economics and Technology): Bridging Bargaining Theory with the Regulation of a Natural Monopoly

Frank Yang (Stanford University): Dynamic Pricing with Limited Commitment

Sakshi Upadhyay (Washington and Lee University): Coalition Formation in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence

3:55 pm - 4:15 pm

Tetsuya Hoshino (ITAM): Recursive Rational Inattention Is Entropic

Luyao Zhang (Duke Kunshan University): On Blockchain We Cooperate: An Evolutionary Game Approach

Ying Gao (MIT): Inference with Selectively Disclosed Data

Rémi Castera (Université Grenoble Alpes - LIG): Statistical Discrimination in Stable Matchings

Zhen Zhou (Tsinghua University): Individual delays, learning, and aggregate coordination with payoff complementarities

Mingzi Niu (Rice University): Multilateral War of Attrition with Majority Rule

Beixi Zhou (Boston University): (Doubly) Irreversible Disclosure

Mir Adnan Mahmood (The Ohio State University): An Experimental Investigation of Global Games with Strategic Substitutes

4:15 pm - 4:35 pm

Doron Ravid (University of Chicago): Predicting Choice from Information Costs

Yunus Aybas (Stanford University): Persuasion with Coarse Communication

Bertan Turhan (Iowa State University): How to De-reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India

Deepanshu Vasal (Northwestern University): Master equation for discrete time Stackelberg mean field games

Inbar Fass (University of Bath): An Evaluation of Agency in Game-Theoretic Models of Integrative Divorce-Bargaining

Yihang Zhou (The University of Texas at Austin): Persuading a Manipulative Agent

Jason Tayawa (Ohio State University): To follow the herd or break away? Overconfidence and Social Learning

4:35 pm - 5:00 pm

Coffee Break

Theater

5:00 pm - 5:45 pm

Dirk Bergemann (Yale University): Screening with Persuasion

Tuesday, July 19, 2022

8:30 am - 9:00 am

Breakfast

Theater

9:00 am - 9:45 am

Alexander Wolitzky (MIT): Informational Requirements for Cooperation

9:45 am - 10:30 am

Ehud Kalai (Northwestern University): Critical Mass Reasoning and Equilibrium

10:30 am - 11:00 am

Coffee Break

Theater - Bargaining!	Lecture Hall 1 - Fairness and Design	Lecture Hall 2 - Incentive schemes in organizations	Room 201 - Solution Concepts	Connections - Information Disclosure, Signaling, and Learning	Jasmine - Contracts and Policy	Room 103 - Mechanism Design 1	Room 104 - Applications of Repeated Games
<i>Organized by: Jack Fanning</i>		<i>Organized by: Erik Madsen and Basil Williams</i>		<i>Organized by: Jesse Bull</i>			

11:00 am - 11:20 am

Alexander Wolitzky (MIT): Unobserved-Offers Bargaining	Steven Brams (New York University): Piecemeal: A Step-by-Step Algorithm for the Two-Person Allocation of Indivisible Items	Felix Feng (University of Washington): In Search of a Unicorn	Adam Tauman Kalai (Microsoft Research New England): Best-response reasoning leads to critical-mass equilibria	Dong Wei (University of California, Santa Cruz): Learning from Manipulable Signals	Daniel Habermacher (Universidad de los Andes (Chile)): Policy-advising competition and endogenous lobbies	Yifan Wu (Northwestern University): Optimal Scoring Rules for Multi-dimensional Effort	Manuel Staab (Aix-Marseille University): Dynamic Sharing in Social Dilemmas
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11:20 am - 11:40 am

Kalyan Chatterjee (Penn State): Bargaining and the timing of information acquisition	Marina Nunez (University of Barcelona): Axioms for optimal rules and fair division rules in the multiple-partners job market	Andrea Buffa (University of Colorado Boulder): Providing Incentives with Private Contracts	Ehud Kalai (Northwestern University): Stability in n-person games	Raphael Boleslavsky (Indiana University): Make It Til You Fake It	Svetlana Boyarchenko (University of Texas at Austin): Life cycle of startup financing	Seung Han Yoo (Korea University): Informed Principal and Screening Problem	Yu Fu Wong (Columbia University): Dynamic Monitoring Design
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11:40 am - 12:00 pm

Deepal Basak (Indiana University, Kelley school of business): Political Bargaining under Incomplete Information about Public Reaction	Ismail Saglam (TOBB University of Economics and Technology): Pareto Gains of Pre-Donation in Monopoly Regulation	Beatrice Michaeli (UCLA): Boards and Executive Compensation: Another Look	Tes Raghavan (University of Illinois at Chicago): A note on linear complementarity via zero sum two person matrix games	Aditi Sengupta (Auburn University): Signaling Quality through Prices in a Durable Good Market	Kun Zhang (Arizona State University): Buying Opinions	Jeffrey Mensch (Hebrew University): Monopoly, Product Quality, and Flexible Learning	Marco Schwarz (Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) at University of Düsseldorf, CESifo): A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture
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12:00 pm - 12:20 pm

Jack Fanning (Brown University): Outside options, reputations, and the partial success of the Coase conjecture	Rajeev R Tripathi (Indian Institute of Management Bangalore): Fair pricing on a platform with heterogeneous sellers: A cooperative game approach	Basil Williams (New York University): Incentive Design for Talent Discovery	Martin Cerny (Charles University): Multi-point solution concepts of incomplete games	Kym Pram (University of Nevada, Reno): Learning and evidence in insurance markets		Niccolò Lomys (Toulouse School of Economics): A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment	Chang "Davidson" Cheng (Colorado College): Asymmetric Equilibria in Symmetric Multiplayer Prisoners' Dilemma Supergames
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12:20 pm - 1:45 pm

Break

Theater

Vincent Crawford (University of Oxford): Cognitive Forensics: Using Information Search to Model Strategic Thinking in Two-Person Guessing Game Experiments

1:45 pm - 2:30 pm

2:30 pm - 2:40 pm

Transition

Theater - Strategic Communication	Lecture Hall 1 - Incomplete Information Dynamics	Lecture Hall 2 - Robust Mechanism and Contract.	Room 201 - Finance 1	Connections - Information and Estimation	Jasmine - Mechanism Design 2	Room 103 - Higher-order Uncertainty	Room 104 - Incomplete Information
<i>Organized by: Attila Ambrus</i>		<i>Organized by: Songzi Du and Alexander Teytelboym</i>		<i>Organized by: Alexander Teytelboym</i>		<i>Organized by: Yu Aways</i>	

2:40 pm - 3:00 pm

Maxim Ivanov (McMaster University): Perfect Robust Implementation by Private Information Design	Moran Koren (Tel Aviv University): The Gatekeeper's Effect	Tangren Feng (Bocconi University): Interim Strategy-Proof Mechanisms	Eiichiro Kazumori (University of Massachusetts): On the Virtue of Being Regular and Predictable: A Structural Model of United States Treasury Auctions	Bernhard Kasberger (Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf): An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics	Tiantian Gong (Purdue University): Secret-Shared Secret Guessing Game and Its Applications	Yaron Azrieli (Ohio State University): Unobservable stochastic choice	Junze Sun (European University Institute): Public Persuasion in Elections: Single-Crossing Property and the Optimality of Censorship
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3:00 pm - 3:20 pm

Heikki Rantakari (University of Rochester): Simon Says? Equilibrium Obedience and the Limits of Authority	Georgy Lukyanov (CREST - Ecole Polytechnique): Delegated Experimentation and Reputation for Learning	Wanchang Zhang (University of California San Diego): Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism	Fei Li (UNC): Transparency at Debt Relief and Startup Loans	Ron Peretz (Bar Ilan University): Asynchronous Degroot Dynamics	Greg Plaxton (University of Texas at Austin): Egalitarian Resource Sharing Over Multiple Rounds	Deepal Basak (Indiana University, Kelley school of business): #Protest	Yunus Aybas (Stanford University): Efficient Cheap Talk in Complex Environments
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3:20 pm - 3:40 pm

Attila Ambrus (Duke University): Cheap Talk with Unbounded State Spaces	Jonathan Libgober (University of Southern California): Coasian Dynamics Under Informational Robustness	Ravi Jagadeesan (Stanford University): Matching and Prices	Pedro Calleja (Universitat de Barcelona): On manipulability in financial systems	Niccolò Lomys (Toulouse School of Economics): Identification and Estimation in Search Models with Social Information	Chenyang Li (Cornell University, Economics Department): Limiting the Communication to Deter Collusion: A Model of Endogenous Equilibrium Selection	Feng Liu (University of Texas at El Paso): A Three-State Rational Greater-Fool Bubble Model With Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing	Wenhao Li (The Pennsylvania State University): Market segmentation through information
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3:40 pm - 4:00 pm

Coffee Break

Theater - Dynamic Incentives	Lecture Hall 1 - Mechanism Design!	Lecture Hall 2 - Biased Beliefs and Incentives	Room 201 - Finance 2	Connections - Implementation	Jasmine - Cooperative Games 3	Room 103 - Experiments and Concepts
<i>Organized by: Juuso Toikka</i>	<i>Organized by: Elliot Lipnowski</i>	<i>Organized by: Matthias Fahn</i>				

4:00 pm - 4:20 pm

Alex Bloedel (UCLA): Persistent Private Information Revisited	Alexey Kushnir (Carnegie Mellon University): Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms	Anja Prummer (JKU Linz, QMUL): Policy Experiences	Linda Schilling (Olin Business School WUSTL): Optimal Forbearance of Bank Resolution	Hector Hermida Rivera (University of East Anglia): A Generalized Implementation Problem	Rohit Parikh (CUNY): A Richer Notion of a State	Mir Adnan Mahmood (The Ohio State University): Understanding Entry Games using Laboratory Experiments
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4:20 pm - 4:40 pm

Laura Doval (Columbia Business School): Optimal Mechanism for the Sale of a Durable Good	Vitor Farinha Luz (University of British Columbia): Risk Classification in Insurance Markets with Risk and Preference Heterogeneity	Franz Ostrizek (University of Bonn): Pioneers and Followers: Innovation with Heterogeneous Beliefs	Lamprini Zarpala (University of Piraeus): A core-selecting auction for portfolio's packages	Tangren Feng (Bocconi University): The Limits of Ex Post Implementation without Transfers	Satoshi Masuya (Daito Bunka University): An Extension of the Shapley Value for Partially Defined Cooperative Games in Partition Function Form	David Kraemer (Stony Brook University): General Forms of Berge's Maximum Theorem and their Applications to Games with Perfect Information
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4:40 pm - 5:00 pm

Rohit Lamba (Pennsylvania State University): Uncertain repeated games	Elliot Lipnowski (Columbia University): Selling to a Group	Matthias Fahn (Johannes Kepler University Linz): Non-Common Priors, Incentives, and Promotions: The Role of Learning	Zeky Murra-Anton (Brown University): Behavioral Real Options, Financial Literacy and Investor's Inertia	Giacomo Rubbini (Brown University): On Necessary Conditions for Implementation of Functions, without Rational Expectations	M. Josune Albizuri (University of the Basque Country): Probabilistic spatial power indices	
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5:00 pm - 5:15 pm

Coffee Break

Theater

5:15 pm - 6:00 pm

Eric Maskin (Harvard University): Arrow's Theorem, May's Axioms, and Borda's Rule

Wednesday, July 20, 2022

8:30 am - 9:00 am

Breakfast

Theater

9:00 am - 9:45 am

Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research): Communicating with Anecdotes

9:45 am - 10:30 am

Konstantin Sonin (University of Chicago): A Theory of Authoritarian Propaganda

10:30 am - 11:00 am

Coffee Break

Theater - Information and Learning in Games. <i>Organized by: Yuhta Ishii</i>	Lecture Hall 1 - Incentives in Information Design <i>Organized by: Denis Shishkin</i>	Lecture Hall 2 - Belief Dynamics <i>Organized by: Ricardo Serrano-Padial</i>	Room 201 - Media and Information in Society	Connections - Mechanism Design 3	Jasmine - Knowledge and Expectations 1	Room 103 - Contracts and Agency	Room 104 - Market Applications
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11:00 am - 11:20 am

Jonathan Libgober (University of Southern California): Learning Underspecified Models	Andy Zapechelnuk (University of St Andrews): On the equivalence of information design by uninformed and informed principals	Jaden Chen (Cornell University): Naive Social Learning with Heterogeneous Model Perceptions	Fei Li (UNC): Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation	Andrew McClellan (University of Chicago Booth): Outside Options and Optimal Bargaining Dynamics	Jiasun Li (GMU): An Economic Model of Consensus on Distributed Ledgers	Peymaneh Safaynikoo (EBS University of Business and Law): Incentives and Peer Effects in the Workplace: On the Impact of Inferiority Aversion on Organizational Design	Yuting Gao (Indiana University Bloomington): Lobbying for Trade Liberalization and its Policy Influence
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11:20 am - 11:40 am

Chiara Margaria (Boston State University): A Signaling Approach to Reputation	Ce Liu (Michigan State University): Credible Persuasion	Giacomo Lanzani (MIT): Dynamic Opinion Aggregation: Long-run Stability and Disagreement	Atara Oliver (ESMT): Social Media and News Content	Sungmin Park (The Ohio State University): Finding out who you are: a self-exploration view of education	Sulagna Dasgupta (University of Chicago): Persuasion with Hard and Soft Information	Alexander Rodvilov (School of Business, Stevens Institute of Technology): Incentives for Contract Designers and Contractual Design	Mengyang Chi (Virginia Tech): Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Equity Issuance Reveals Firms' Information to Investors
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11:40 am - 12:00 pm

Tommaso Denti (Cornell University): Costly monitoring in signaling games	Laura Doval (Columbia Business School): Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective	Kevin He (University of Pennsylvania): Evolutionarily Stable (Mis) specifications: Theory and Applications	A. Arda Gitmez (Bilkent University): Polarization and Media Bias	Nathan Hancart (University College London): Optimal menu of tests	Daniel Stephenson (Virginia Commonwealth University): Interest Rates and Price Bubbles in Continuous Time	Han Wang (The Ohio State University): Contracting with Heterogeneous Researchers	Yizhao Wang (Lehigh University): Return Policy and Wardrobing
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12:00 pm - 12:20 pm

Yuhta Ishii (Pennsylvania State University): Robust Merging of Information	Denis Shishkin (UC San Diego): Perfect Bayesian Persuasion	Ricardo Serrano-Padial (Drexel University): Competing Narratives in Action: Belief Cycles throughout the Pandemic	Neil Hwang (City University of New York Bronx Community College): Compliance with Policy Measures and Network Games	Wanchang Zhang (University of California San Diego): Information-Robust Optimal Auctions	Ming Li (Concordia University): Mandatory disclosure of conflicts of interest: Good news or bad news?	Felix Feng (University of Washington): Setbacks, Shutdowns, and Overruns	Manuel Foerster (Bielefeld University): A theory of media bias and disinformation
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12:20 pm - 2:00 pm

Break

Theater

2:00 pm - 2:45 pm

Joel Sobel (University of California, San Diego): On the Relationship between Damage and Deception

2:45 pm - 3:15 pm

Coffee Break

Theater - Experimental Game Theory <i>Organized by: Nagore Iriberr</i>	Lecture Hall 1 - Information in Society and Markets	Lecture Hall 2 - Record Keeping	Room 201 - Information and Dynamic Incentives <i>Organized by: Yingni Guo and Daniel Barron</i>	Connections - Disclosure and Persuasion 2 <i>Organized by: Jesse Bull</i>	Jasmine - Industrial Organization 2	Room 103 - Matching	Room 104 - Trading Mechanism
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3:15 pm - 3:35 pm

Nagore Iriberr (University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU and Ikerbasque Basque Foundation for Science): Naivete and Sophistication in Initial and Repeated Play in Games	Edi Karni (Johns Hopkins University): Preventive Service: Fraud in Credence Good Markets	Abraham Neyman (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem): Stochastic Games with Limited Memory Space	Enrique Ide (IESE Business School): Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Innovator's Dilemma	Majid Mahzoon (Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business): Hierarchical Bayesian Persuasion: Importance of Vice Presidents	Ting Liu (Stony Brook University): Equilibrium Information in Credence Goods	Nathan Yoder (University of Georgia): Matching with Multilateral Contracts	Tan Gan (Yale University): Gacha Game: When Prospect Theory Meets Optimal Pricing
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3:35 pm - 3:55 pm

Isabel Trevino (UCSD): Uncovering Biases in Information Choice and its Use: The Role of Strategic Uncertainty (substitution TBA)	Takashi Ui (Hitotsubashi University): Impacts of Public Information on Flexible Information Acquisition	Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen (Aarhus University): Stochastic Games with Limited Memory Space	John Zhu (University of Kansas): Implementation with Statistics	Elif Osun (University of Maryland, College Park): Evidence Games: Lying Aversion and Commitment	Ben Casner (Federal Trade Commission): Content-hosting platforms: discovery, membership, or both?	Naomi Utgoff (US Naval Academy): Matching Costs in Centralized and Decentralized Markets	Wenji Xu (City University of Hong Kong): Selling with Product Recommendation and Efficient Below-Cost Pricing
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3:55 pm - 4:15 pm

Sevgi Yuksel (UC Santa Barbara): Beliefs in Repeated Games	Itai Arieli (Technion): A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs	Manvir Schneider (ETH Zurich): Staking Pools on Blockchains	Aniko Oery (Yale SOM): Dynamic Price Competition: Theory and Evidence from Airline Markets	Murat Mungan (George Mason University): Optimal Review of Conduct with Informative Prior Audits	Cole Williams (University of Vienna): Searching Online and Product Returns	Sarah Kühn (Paderborn University): Community Costs in Neighborhood Help Problems	Ariel Schwartzman Cohenca (Rutgers University): Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms are Not Much Better Than Bundling
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4:15 pm - 4:35 pm

Erik Lillethun (Colgate University): Strategic Cyber Warfare	Jiasun Li (GMU): Digital Tokens and Platform Building	Teddy Mekonnen (Brown University): Certification in Search Markets	Jose Antonio Espin-Sanchez (Yale University): Experimental Persuasion	Péter Isztin (Corvinus University of Budapest): Heads in the sand: Information Aversion in a Market Context	Bertan Turhan (Iowa State University): Affirmative Action in India: Restricted Strategy Space, Complex Constraints, and Direct Mechanism Design	Simon Jantschgi (University of Zurich): Fees, Incentives, and Efficiency in Large Double Auctions
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4:35 pm - 5:00 pm

Coffee Break

Theater

5:00 pm - 5:45 pm

Robert Aumann (Hebrew University of Jerusalem): The Centipede Revisited

6:00 pm - 9:00 pm

Reception Dinner at the Three Village Inn

**Thursday, July 21, 2022**

8:30 am - 9:00 am

Breakfast

Theater

9:00 am - 9:45 am

**George Georgiadis (Northwestern University): Optimal Feedback in Contests-**

9:45 am - 10:30 am

**Mira Frick (Yale University): Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures**

10:30 am - 11:00 am

Coffee Break

<b>Theater - Learning in Political Economy!</b>	<b>Lecture Hall 1 - Voting and Participation</b>	<b>Lecture Hall 2 - Networks</b>	<b>Room 201 - Bargaining</b>	<b>Connections - Knowledge and Expectations 2</b>	<b>Jasmine - Mechanism Design 4</b>	<b>Room 103 - Matching Theory</b>	<b>Room 104 - Industrial Organization 3</b>
<small>Organized by: Maria Titova</small>		<small>Organized by: Krishna Dasaratha</small>					

11:00 am - 11:20 am

<b>Federica Izzo (UCSD): Policymaking in Times of Crisis</b>	<b>Hans Gersbach (ETH Zürich): Risky Vote Delegation</b>	<b>Masaki Miyashita (Yale University): An LQG Game on Networks</b>	<b>Peter Puztai (University of Minnesota): Bargaining in Non-Stationary Networks</b>	<b>Kevin He (University of Pennsylvania): Private Private Information</b>	<b>Nicolas Pastrian (University of Pittsburgh): Full Surplus Extraction and Consideration Sets</b>	<b>Ata Atay (University of Barcelona, Barcelona Economic Analysis Team (BEAT)): Many-to-one assignment markets: extreme core allocations</b>	<b>Kun Zhang (Arizona State University): Uncharted Waters: Selling A New Product Robustly</b>
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11:20 am - 11:40 am

<b>Sara Shahanaghi (Columbia University): Competition and Errors in Breaking News</b>	<b>Ravideep Sethi (University of Utah): Identity-based Elections</b>	<b>Suraj Malladi (Cornell University): An Economic Approach to Prior Free Spatial Search</b>	<b>Ruizhi Zhu (University of Toronto): Bargaining with Learning of a Varying Type</b>	<b>Eduardo Faingold (Insper Institute of Education and Research): Statistical Foundations of Common Knowledge</b>	<b>Endre Csóka (Rényi Alfréd Institute of Mathematics, Budapest, Hungary): A Robust Efficient Dynamic Mechanism</b>	<b>Katherine Zhou (Michigan State University): Choosing Sides in a Two-sided Matching Market</b>	<b>Yizhao Wang (Lehigh University): Two Sided Market: Price Competition in the Food Delivery Market</b>
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11:40 am - 12:00 pm

<b>Nina Bobkova (Rice University): Persuading an Informed Committee</b>	<b>Naifeng Liu (CUNY Graduate Center): Information acquisition in voting games</b>	<b>Roberto Corrao (MIT): (Un-)Common Preferences, Ambiguity, and Coordination</b>	<b>Pablo Cuellar Tapia (Utah State University): Posturing and Bluffing in Bargaining</b>	<b>Nicolas Riquelme (Universidad de los Andes, Chile): Information exchange through secret vertical contracts</b>	<b>Mengxi Zhang (University of Bonn): Optimal Contests with Incomplete Information and Convex Effort Costs</b>	<b>Pedro Vaissman Guinsburg (FEA-USP): Price Steering in Two Sided Markets</b>	<b>Pedro Jara-Moroni (Universidad de Santiago de Chile): Efficient Entry in Cournot (Global) Games</b>
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12:00 pm - 12:20 pm

<b>Maria Titova (Vanderbilt): Targeted Advertising in Elections</b>	<b>Siyu Ma (China University of Political Science and Law): Deterrence Game with private signals and updated beliefs</b>	<b>Krishna Dasaratha (Boston University): Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks</b>			<b>Teemu Pekkari (Helsinki Graduate School of Economics): Quality over Quantity</b>	<b>Kirill Rudov (Princeton University): Fragile Stable Matchings</b>	<b>Alan Jaske (Duke University): Exploration and Exploitation in R&amp;D Competition</b>
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12:20 pm - 1:45 pm

Break

Theater

1:45 pm - 2:30 pm

**Mihai Manea (Stony Brook University): Bargaining and Exclusion with Multiple Buyers**

2:30 pm - 2:40 pm

Transition

<b>Theater - Cooperative Games 2</b>	<b>Lecture Hall 1 - Bounded Rationality and Learning</b>	<b>Lecture Hall 2 - Strategic behavior in sovereign debt markets</b>	<b>Room 201 - Stochastic Games</b>	<b>Connections - Repeated Games</b>	<b>Jasmine - Learning and Evolution 1</b>	<b>Room 103 - Mechanism Design 5</b>
<small>Organized by: Mira Frick</small>		<small>Organized by: Bruno Sultanum</small>				

2:40 pm - 3:00 pm

<b>Peter Coughlin (University of Maryland): DanceSport and Power Values</b>	<b>Giacomo Lanzani (MIT): Dynamic Concern for Misspecification</b>	<b>Gaston Chaumont (University of Rochester): Sovereign Default Risk and Economic Activity: The Role of Firm Entry and Exit</b>	<b>Richard Mayr (University of Edinburgh): Strategy Complexity of Reachability in Countable Stochastic 2-Player Games</b>	<b>Xavier Venel (LUISS University): The Feasible Set and Folk Theorems for Repeated Games with Switching Costs</b>	<b>Dean Jens (University of Central Florida): Coordination with Uncertainty</b>	<b>Chang Liu (Harvard University): Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards</b>
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3:00 pm - 3:20 pm

<b>Rohit Parikh (CUNY): Conflict, Belief and Conversation</b>	<b>Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch (Harvard University): Quality is in the Eye of the Beholder: Taste Projection in Markets with Observational Learning</b>	<b>Zachary Stangebye (University of Notre Dame): Sound and Fury: Signaling in Sovereign Debt Markets</b>	<b>Minh Nguyen (University of Hawaii at Manoa): N-agent and mean field games for optimal investment with HARA utility function and the presence of risk-seeking agents</b>	<b>Stephan Waizmann (Yale University): Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Short-Run Players</b>	<b>Cuimin Ba (University of Pennsylvania): Robust Model Misspecification and Paradigm Shifts</b>	<b>Yiding Feng (Microsoft Research): Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utilities</b>
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3:20 pm - 3:40 pm

<b>Juan Tejada (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, SPAIN): The position value as a measure of centrality in social networks.</b>	<b>Evgenii Safonov (Princeton University): Slow and Easy: a Theory of Browsing</b>	<b>Bruno Sultanum (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond): Self-fulfilling debt crises and limits to arbitrage</b>	<b>Roberto Corrao (MIT): Nonlinear Fixed Points and Stationarity: Economic Applications</b>	<b>Marco Serena (Max Planck Institute, Munich): Repeated Contests with Toughness</b>	<b>Joao Thereze (Princeton University): Asymptotic Learning with Ambiguous Information</b>	<b>Yingkai Li (Northwestern University): Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information</b>
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3:40 pm - 4:00 pm

Coffee Break

<b>Theater - Matching Market Design</b>	<b>Lecture Hall 1 - Learning and Evolution 2</b>	<b>Lecture Hall 2 - Social and Political Models</b>	<b>Room 201 - Negotiation and Cooperation</b>	<b>Connections - Information and Networks 2</b>	<b>Jasmine - Stochastic Games and Computation</b>	<b>Room 103 - Mechanism Design 6</b>
<small>Organized by: Alexander Teyfelboym</small>						

4:00 pm - 4:20 pm

<b>Aram Grigoryan (University of California, San Diego): Transparency in Allocation Problems</b>	<b>Eric Hoffmann (West Texas A&amp;M University): k-level Forward-Looking Dynamics in Monotone Games</b>	<b>Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University, Germany): Arena Games</b>	<b>Ramzi Suleiman (University of Haifa): Economic Harmony—A Rational Theory of Fairness and Cooperation in Strategic Interactions</b>	<b>Thomas Wiseman (University of Texas at Austin): Strategic Ignorance and Information Design</b>	<b>David Poensgen (Goethe University Frankfurt): The Logarithmic Stochastic Tracing Procedure: A Homotopy Method for Computing and Selecting Stationary Equilibria of Stochastic Games</b>	<b>Frank Yang (Stanford University): Costly Multidimensional Screening</b>
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4:20 pm - 4:40 pm

<b>Thanh Nguyen (Purdue University): (Near-) Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities</b>	<b>Ziv Hellman (Bar-Ilan University): Mentors and Recombinators: Multi-Dimensional Social Learning</b>	<b>Dominik Karos (Uni Bielefeld): From Prejudice to Racial Profiling and Back</b>	<b>Malachy James Gavan (Universitat Pompeu Fabra): Negotiated Binding Agreements</b>	<b>Norma Olaizola (University of the Basque Country): Efficient networks in connections models with heterogeneous nodes and links</b>	<b>Richard Mayr (University of Edinburgh): Büchi Objectives in Countable MDPs</b>	<b>Edwin Munoz-Rodriguez (El Colegio de Mexico, A. C.): Hurwicz meets Veatch: Rationing deceased-donor transplants under dynamic asymmetric information</b>
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4:40 pm - 5:00 pm

<b>Nick Arnosti (University of Minnesota): A CONTINUUM MODEL OF STABLE MATCHING WITH FINITE CAPACITIES</b>	<b>Tao Li (New York University): The Role of Information Structures in Game-Theoretic Multi-Agent Learning</b>	<b>Benjamin Matta (University of Pittsburgh): Sequential Protest Formation</b>	<b>Gerrit Bauch (Bielefeld University): The Texas Shoot-Out under Knightian Uncertainty</b>	<b>Xuanye Wang (Institute for Advanced Economic Research (IAER) at Dongbei University of Finance and Economics (DUFE)): Fragility of Confounded Learning</b>	<b>Joel Watson (University of California, San Diego): Convergence of Discrete-Time Models with Small Period Lengths</b>	<b>Andrew Kosenko (Marist College): Algebraic Properties of Blackwell's Order and A Cardinal Measure of Informativeness</b>
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5:00 pm - 5:15 pm

Coffee Break

Theater

5:15 pm - 6:00 pm

**Bruno Ziliotto (Paris Dauphine University): Stochastic games with incomplete information and Mertens conjecture**