

Workshop on New Directions in Mechanism Design
Stony Brook, July 13–14, 2019

Saturday, July 13

8:10–8:40		Coffee and registration
8:40–8:45	Gabriel Carroll	Opening remarks
8:45–9:30	Alex Frankel	Improving Information in Manipulable Data
9:30–10:15	Matt Weinberg	Selling to a No-Regret Buyer
10:15–10:45		Coffee break
10:45–11:30	Tilman Börgers	Strategically Simple Mechanisms
11:30–12:15	Tim Roughgarden	Complexity-Theoretic Barriers in Economics
12:15–1:30		Lunch break
1:30–2:15	Takuro Yamashita	Optimal Student Allocation with Peer Effects
2:15–3:00	Xianwen Shi	Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multi-Dimensional Voting
3:00–3:30		Coffee break
3:30–4:15	Yiling Chen	Surrogate Scoring Rules and a Uniform Dominant Truth Serum
4:15–5:00	Ashish Goel	Mechanisms for Public Decision Making
5:00–5:45	Tymofiy Mylovanov	Auction Design Subject to Political and Populist Constraints
5:45–6:30		Break
6:30–9:00		Conference dinner

Sunday, July 14

8:30–9:00		Coffee
9:00–9:45	Dirk Bergemann	Progressive Participation
9:45–10:30	Sarah Auster	Robust Bidding and Revenue in Descending Price Auctions
10:30–11:00		Coffee break
11:00–11:45	Shengwu Li	Credible Mechanisms
11:45–12:30	Vasiliki Skreta	Optimal Mechanism for the Sale of a Durable Good
12:30–1:45		Lunch break
1:45–2:30	Songzi Du	Optimal Auction Design with Common Values: An Informationally-Robust Approach
2:30–3:15	Antonio Penta	Implementation via Transfers with Identical but Unknown Distributions
3:15–3:45		Coffee break
3:45–4:30	Daniel Garrett	Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting