International Conference on Game Theory

Charles B. Wang Center, Stony Brook University

July 15 - 19, 2019

Monday, July 15

 

Theater

LH1

LH2

9:30 - 10:15

Gabriel Carroll  (Stanford University)
Information Games and Robust Trading Mechanisms  

Scott Kominers  (Harvard University)
Redistribution Through Markets  

Yann Bramoullé  (Aix-Marseille University)
Informal Transfers in Networks  

10:15 - 11:00

Tim Roughgarden  (Stanford University)
Data-Driven Optimal Auction Theory  

Assaf Romm  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
The Law of One Price for Heterogeneous Goods  

Sushil Bikhchandani  (University of California, Los Angeles)
Intermediated Surge Pricing  

11:00 - 11:30

Coffee Break

 

Theater: Refinement & Rationality

LH1: Networks

LH2: Dynamic Games

Chapel: Mechanism Design

101: Auctions

102: Contracts

201: Fairness

11:30 - 11:50

Łukasz Balbus  (University of Zielona Góra)
Interim Correlated Rationalizability in Large Games  

Wayne Yuan Gao  (University of Pennsylvania)
Informal Risk Sharing with Local Information  

Isaias Chaves  (Northwestern University, Kellogg)
Privacy in Bargaining: The Case of Endogenous Entry  

Tao Zhang  (New York University)
On Incentive Compatibility in Dynamic Mechanism Design with Exit Option in a Markovian Environment  

Soham Banerjee  (International Institute of Information Technology, Pune)
Resolving Deadlocks using All-Pay Auctions  

Francesc Dilme  (University of Bonn)
Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings  

Alexander Matros  (University of South Carolina)
Fair and Square Contests  

11:50 - 12:10

Tarun Sabarwal  (University of Kansas)
Monotone Global Games  

Ming Li  (Yale University)
Logical Differencing in Network Formation Models under Non-Transferable Utilities  

Andrew McClellan  (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
Dynamic Project Standards with Adverse Selection  

Ali Kamranzadeh  (University of Western Ontario)
Fairness versus Favoritism in Conflict Mediation  

Idione Meneghel  (Australian National University)
On the existence of equilibrium in Bayesian games without complementarities  

Matthias Fahn  (JKU Linz)
The Norm of Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships  

Anay Mehrotra  (Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur)
Toward Controlling Discrimination in Online Ad Auctions  

12:10 - 12:30

Asha Sadanand  (University of Guelph)
Selten's Horse: an Experiment on Sequential Rationality  

 

Hyunjae Kang  (Stony Brook University)
Dynamic Tournament Model of Private Tutoring Expenditure  

Mingshi Kang  (UWO)
Knitting and Ironing: Reducing Inequalities via Auctions  

Pulkit Kumar Nigam  (University of South Carolina)
Asymmetric Contests and the Effects of a Cap on Bids  

Aniko Oery  (Yale)
Aiming for the goal: contribution dynamics of crowdfunding  

Hendrik Rommeswinkel  (National Taiwan University)
Measuring Freedom in Games  

12:30 - 14:00

Lunch Break

 

Theater

LH1

LH2

14:00 - 14:45

Andrew Postlewaite  (University of Pennsylvania)
A Very Robust Auction Mechanism  

Marina Halac  (Yale University)
Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors  

Qingmin Liu  (Columbia University)
Stability and Belief Consistency of Matching with Incomplete Information  

14:45 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Theater: Cooperative games & Related Topics

LH1: Dynamic Mechanism Design

LH2: Dynamic Games

Chapel: Mechanism Design

101: Auctions

102: Contracts

201: Incomplete Information

15:15 - 15:35

José Manuel Zarzuelo  (The Basque Country University)
Two solutions for bargaining problems with claims  

Nima Haghpanah  (Penn State University)
Sequential Mechanisms With ex post Participation Guarantees  

Sara Shahanaghi  (Columbia University)
A Dynamic Model of Reputation-Driven Media Bias  

Jingfeng Lu  (National University of Singapore)
Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Buyer Price Search  

Jinsoo Bae  (The Ohio State University)
Selling shares to many budget constrained bidders: Theory and Experiment  

Luis Alvaro Cuba Horna  (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú)
Interactive Epistemology Applied to Drafting Contracts. The Partial Death of Filling The Contractual Gaps  

James Best  (Tepper School of Business, Carnegie mellon university)
Persuasion for the Long Run  

15:35 - 15:55

Dario Paccagnan  (University of California, Santa Barbara)
Computing Optimal Taxes in Atomic Congestion Games  

Ilia Krasikov  (Pennsylvania State University)
On Dynamic Pricing  

Lukasz Patryk Wozny  (Warsaw School of Economics)
Distributional equilibria in dynamic supermodular games with a measure space of players and no aggregate risk  

Jeffrey Mensch  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Screening Inattentive Agents  

Gagan Pratap Ghosh  (California State University Fullerton)
Sequential Auctions with Ambiguity  

Pablo Cuellar Tapia  (Boston University)
Venture Capital Contracts under Disagreement  

Daniel Quigley  (University of Oxford)
Contradiction-Proof Information Design  

15:55 - 16:15

Rajeev Ranjan Tripathi  (Indian Institute of Management Bangalore)
Fair Pricing in a Two-sided Market Game  

Niccolo Lomys  (Toulouse School of Economics)
Learning while Trading: Experimentation and Coasean Dynamics  

Chang Zhao  (Tel Aviv University)
Information as Regulation  

Amnon Schreiber  (Bar Ilan University, Israel)
Voluntary Disclosure of Bad News in a Dynamic Model  

Feng Zhu  (the Pennsylvania State University)
Creative Contests --- Theory and Experiment  

Jihwan Do  (University of Rochester)
Incentives in Equal-Pay-for-Equal-Work Principle  

Denis Shishkin  (Princeton University)
Persuasion via Weak Institutions  

16:15 - 16:35

 

Daniel Garrett  (Toulouse School of Economics)
Robust Predictions in Dynamic Screening  

Beixi Zhou  (Boston University)
Dynamic Coordination with Informational Externalities  

 

 

Nan Zhao  (Boston University)
Optimal Contracts with Learning from Bad News  

Archishman Chakraborty  (Yeshiva University)
Subversive Conversations  

16:35 - 17:00

Coffee Break

17:00 - 17:45

Eric Maskin  (Harvard University)
Elections and Strategic Voting: Condorcet and Borda

 

Tuesday, July 16

 

Theater

LH1

LH2

9:30 - 10:15

Michihiro Kandori  (University of Tokyo)
Misperception and the Evolution of Cooperation  

Mehmet Ekmekci  (Boston College)
Informal Elections With Dispersed Information  

Eric Budish  (University of Chicago)
Will the Market Fix the Market? A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation  

10:15 - 11:00

Jeffrey Ely  (Northwestern University)
Feedback Design in Dynamic Contests  

Itai Ashlagi  (Stanford University)
Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations  

Satoru Takahashi  (National University of Singapore)
Optimal Stress Tests: Information Design with Adversarial Equilibrium Selection in Supermodular Games  

11:00 - 11:30

Coffee Break

 

Theater: Implementation

LH1: Strategic Communication

LH2: Matching

Chapel: Mechanism Design

101: Knowledge & Information

102: Experimental Economics

11:30 - 11:50

Chun-Ting Chen  (National Taiwan University)
Correlation with Forwarding  

David Rahman  (University of Minnesota)
Contractual Pricing with Incentive Constraints  

Marilda Sotomayor  (EPGE-FGV & USP-SP, Brazil)
Conflict-free and Pareto-optimal allocations in matching markets: A solution concept weaker than the core  

Andres Perlroth  (Stanford University)
Revenue maximization with heterogeneous discounting: Auctions and pricing  

Dean Jens  (University of Central Florida)
Risk Dominance, Beliefs, and Equilibrium  

Jordan Adamson  (Chapman University)
Agglomeration and the Extent of the Market  

 

11:50 - 12:10

Huiyi Guo  (Texas A&M University)
Coalition-Proof Mechanisms Under Correlated Information  

Tridib Sharma  (ITAM)
Sequential Expert Advice: Superiority of Closed Door Meetings.  

Kentaro Tomoeda  (University of Technology Sydney)
Sophistication and Cautiousness in College Applications  

Ady Pauzner  (Tel Aviv University)
Bilateral Trade With a Benevolent Intermediary  

Rohit Parikh  (City University of New York)
To What Extent is a Group an Individual?  

Paul J Healy  (The Ohio State University)
Epistemic Experiments: Utilities, Beliefs, and Irrational Play  

 

12:10 - 12:30

Xuesong Huang  (Rutgers University)
Incentive Compatible Self-fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations  

Isaac Swift  (University of Minnesota)
Reputation for Persuasion  

Akhil Vohra  (Stanford University)
Unraveling in the Presence of a Secondary Market  

Mihai Manea  (Stony Brook University)
Resource Destruction in Optimal Mechanisms for Bilateral Trade  

Peio Zuazo-Garin  (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Rationalizability, Observability and Common Knowledge  

Rene Levinsky  (Economics Institute of the Czech Academy od Sciences)
Preferences, Beliefs, and Strategic Plays in Games  

 

12:30 - 14:00

Lunch Break

 

Theater

LH1

LH2

14:00 - 14:45

Dilip Abreu  (New York University)
Equilibrium selection in Repeated Games with Patient Players  

Ran Shorrer  (Penn State University)
Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes  

Ehud Kalai  (Northwestern University)
Viable Nash Equilibria I  

14:45 - 15:15

Coffee Break

 

Theater: Matching & Cooperative Games

LH1: Bias & Polarization in Opinion Formation

LH2: Dynamic Games & Reputations

Chapel: Mechanism Design

101: Bounded Rationality & Computation

102: Experimental Economics

201: Incomplete Information

15:15 - 15:35

Satoshi Masuya  (Daito Bunka University)
The Shapley Value of the Lower Game for Partially Defined Cooperative Games  

Krishna Dasaratha  (Harvard University)
Belief Polarization and News on Social Media  

Daniel Clark  (MIT)
Robust Cooperation with First-Order Information  

Shurojit Chatterji  (Singapore Management University)
Probabilistic Generalized Median Voter Schemes: A Robust Characterization  

Mengke Wang  (Duke University, University of Sydney)
Self-Similar Beliefs in Games with Strategic Substitutes  

Kirby Nielsen  (Stanford University)
A Systematic Test of the Independence Axiom  

Siyu Ma  (Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya)
Attacking a nuclear facility with a noisy intelligence and Bayesian agents  

15:35 - 15:55

T.E.S. Raghaven  (University of Illinois at Chicago)
Measuring the power of the dominant partner among married couple  

Rahmi Ilkilic  (Universidad de Chile)
Opinion Polarization under Search for Peers  

Mehmet Ekmekci  (Boston College)
Reputation and Screening in a Noisy Environment with Irreversible Actions  

Arthur Dolgopolov  (George Mason University)
Mechanism Design with Memory and no Money  

Sakshi Upadhyay  (Virginia Polytechnic Institute)
To Join or not to Join: Coalition Formation in Public Good Games  

Chloe Tergiman  (PSU)
Preferences for Power  

Yuehui Wang  (University of California San Diego)
Cheaper Talk  

15:55 - 16:15

Isa Hafalir  (UTS)
Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment  

Suraj Malladi  (Stanford University)
Learning Through the Grapevine: The Impact of Message Mutation, Transmission Failure, and Deliberate Bias  

Harry Pei  (Northwestern University)
Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment  

Eiichiro Kazumori  (The University of Massachusetts)
Games Where Players Offers Games to Play: A Foundation of Market Design  

Bahman Kalantari  (Rutgers University)
Approximating Nash Equilibrium Via Multilinear Minimax  

Qichao Shi  (Lehigh University)
Shuffling as a Sales Tactics: An Experimental Study of Selling Expert Advice  

Wenhao Wu  (University of Arizona)
Persuasive Disclosure  

16:15 - 16:35

Aram Grigoryan  (Duke University)
Efficient and Envy Minimal Assignment  

Pooya Molavi  (MIT)
Media Capture: A Bayesian Persuasion Perspective  

Jian Sun  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Reputation Concerns Under At-Will Employment  

Andrew Mackenzie  (Maastricht University)
Strategy-proofness and perfect mechanisms  

Chun Leung Lau  (Rutgers University)
The Multilinear Minimax Relaxation of Bimatrix Games and Comparison with Nash Equilibria via Lemke-Howson  

 

Yoshifumi Yokota  (Boston University)
Preference, Rationalizability and Robustness in Games with Incomplete Information  

16:35 - 17:00

Coffee Break

17:00 - 17:45

Al Roth  (Stanford University)
Market Design and Game Theory in a Large World

18:00 - 22:00

Conference Dinner at Three Village Inn

 

Wednesday, July 17

 

Theater

LH1

LH2

9:30 - 10:15

Matthew Jackson  (Stanford University)
Network Structure, Coordination Games, and Behavioral Communities  

Jacob Leshno  (University of Chicago)
An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System  

Annie Liang  (University of Pennsylvania)
Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information  

10:15 - 10:45

Coffee Break

 

Theater: Repeated Games

LH1: Networks

LH2: Matching

Chapel: Knowledge & Information

101: Market Games

102: Industrial Organization & Finance

201: Continuation Session by Ehud Kalai

10:45 - 11:05

Zirou Chen  (University of Rochester)
Middlemen and Reputation  

Krishna Dasaratha  (Harvard University)
Social Learning and Innovation  

Kartik Ahuja  (UCLA)
Dynamic Matching and Allocation of Tasks  

Wioletta Dziuda  (University of Chicago)
Communication with Detectable Deceit  

Heinrich Harald Nax  (ETH Zurich)
Feedback effects in the experimental double auction with private information  

Dana María Pizarro  (Universidad de Chile)
Bounding the Value of Observability in a Dynamic Pricing Problem  

Viable Nash Equilibria II  

11:05 - 11:25

Xin Gao  (University of Mannheim)
Reputational Cheap Talk vs. Reputational Delegation  

Ben Golub  (Harvard University)
Targeting Interventions in Networks  

Ahmet Altinok  (Arizona State University)
May-to-One Dynamic Matching  

Ziv Hellman  (Bar Ilan University)
Valuing Information by Repeated Signals  

Yan Wang  (Stony Brook University)
How the market structure affects the r&d decision when acquisition is possible?  

Ayan Bhattacharya  (City University of New York, Baruch College)
Hardness of Learning in Rich Environments and Some Consequences for Financial Markets  

Viable Nash Equilibria II  

11:25 - 11:45

Mikhail Panov  (New York University)
Observable Actions in Continuous Time: Costly Transfers in Repeated Cooperation  

Pellumb Reshidi  (Princeton University)
Sequencing Naive Social Learning  

Deniz Dizdar  (University of Montreal)
Competing Pre-match Investments Revisited: A Precise Characterization of the Limits of Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Large Markets  

Kohei Iwasaki  (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Rational Bubbles and Middlemen  

Weiwei Zheng  (George Mason University)
Competition with Indivisibilities and Few Traders  

Sang-Ha Yoon  (Stony brook University)
Firm Entry Decline, Market Structure and Dominant Firm’s Productivity  

Viable Nash Equilibria II  

11:45 - 13:15

Lunch Break

 

Theater

LH1

LH2

13:15 - 14:00

Drew Fudenberg  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Player Compatible Equilibrium  

Abraham Neyman  (Hebrew University)
Optimization with Limited Memory in Stochastic Games  

Rakesh Vohra  (Northwestern University)
Instability of Centralized Markets  

 

Theater: Applications

LH1: Networks

LH2: Finance

Chapel: Mechanism Design

101: Learning & Evolution

102: Information Economics

14:10 - 14:30

Xingwei Hu  (IMF)
College Ranking by Revealed Preference From Big Data: An Authority-Distribution Analysis  

Anastas Tenev  (Maastricht University)
Stronger bonds with less connected agents in stable resource sharing networks  

Martin Szydlowski  (University of Minnesota)
Monitor Reputation and Transparency  

Yangwei Song  (Humboldt University Berlin)
Efficient Design With Small Informational Size and Maxmin Agents  

Kimberly Gannon  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
An Evolutionary Justification for Overconfidence  

Nasimeh Heydaribeni  (University of Michigan)
Characterizing non-myopic information cascades in Bayesian learning  

 

14:30 - 14:50

Brian Reed Powers  (Arizona State University)
N-Player Final-Offer Arbitration: Harmonic Numbers in Equilibrium  

Wenji Xu  (The University of Chicago)
Social Learning under Information Control  

Zafer Kanik  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Can Rescues by Banks Replace Costly Bail-Outs in Financial Networks?  

Constantine Sorokin  (Glasgow University)
Adverse implementation  

Tatiana Mayskaya  (Higher School of Economics)
When Should We Care About Privacy? Information Collection in Games  

Svetlana Boyarchenko  (University of Texas, Austin)
Strategic exit with information and payoff externalities  

 

14:50 - 15:10

 

Manuel Foerster  (University of Hamburg)
Shadow links  

Hanzhe Zhang  (Michigan State University)
Overcoming Borrowing Stigma: The Design of Lending-of-Last-Resort Policies  

 

Wojciech Olszewski  (Northwestern University)
A result on convergence of sequences of iteration, with applications to best-response dynamics  

Vasudha Jain  (University of Texas at Austin)
Competing to persuade a rationally inattentive agent  

 

15:10 - 15:30

Coffee Break

 

Theater: Voting & Political Models

LH1: Sharing in Networks

LH2: Matching

Chapel: Mechanism Design

101: Learning & Evolution

102: Information Economics

201: Bargaining

15:30 - 15:50

Steven Brams  (New York University)
The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes  

Lining Han  (Wuhan University)
Truthful Intermediation with Monetary Punishment  

Maciej H. Kotowski  (Harvard University)
A Perfectly Robust Approach to Multiperiod Matching Problems  

Qinggong Wu  (Chinese University of Hong Kong)
Getting Information from Your Enemies  

Tao Wang  (Nanjing Audit University)
Strong Stochastic Dominance  

Daniel Monte  (Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV)
Information Design with Recommender Systems  

Heng Liu  (University of Michigan)
Robust Predictions in Bargaining with Incomplete Information  

15:50 - 16:10

Marie Thea How Choon  (Boston University)
Very Biased Political Experts: Cheap Talk, Persuasion and the Political Extremes  

Ruben Juarez  (University of Hawaii)
Incentive-Compatible Simple Mechanisms  

Andy Luchuan Liu  (South University of science & technology)
Multipartite Games And Evolutionary Stable Matching  

Renkun Yang  (Ohio State University)
Termination fee as a sequential screening device  

 

Erik Lillethun  (Colgate University)
Optimal Information Design for Reputation Building  

Jack Anthony Fanning  (Brown University)
Bargaining over Contingent Contracts Under Incomplete Information  

16:10 - 16:30

Guillermo Flores  (Universidad del Pacífico)
Game Theory and the Law: Legal Rationality (Legal Interpretation)  

Juan D. Moreno-Ternero  (Universidad Pablo de Olavide)
Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies  

Ali Polat  (Carnegie Mellon University)
Accommodating Cardinal, Ordinal and Mixed Preferences: An Extended Preference Domain for the Assignment Problem  

Seung Han Yoo  (Korea University)
Membership Mechanism  

Jiabin Wu  (University of Oregon)
Intergenerational Transmission of Preferences and the Marriage Market  

Nikolaus Robalino  (Rochester Institute of Technology)
Selling Reputational Information  

Dominik Karos  (Maastricht University)
The Midpoint Constrained Egalitarian Bargaining Solution  

16:30 - 16:50

Dinko Dimitrov  (Saarland University)
Probabilistic manipulation of sequential voting procedures  

Miguel Vargas  (Santigo de Cali University)
Robust Equilibria in Tournaments with Externalities  

Simon Mauras  (Université Paris Diderot, IRIF)
Incentives in Popularity-based Random Matching Markets  

Mark Whitmeyer  (University of Texas at Austin)
Bayesian Elicitation  

Zibo Xu  (Singapore University of Technology and Design)
Convergence of the Best-response Dynamic in Potential Games  

Alexander Rodivilov  (School of Business, Stevens Institute of Technology)
Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production  

Kirill Evdokimov  (Rice University)
Legislative bargaining with coalition and proposer-dependent surplus  

16:50 - 17:15

Coffee Break

 

Theater

LH1

LH2

17:15 - 18:00

Larry Samuelson  (Yale University)
Model-Based Inference  

Itay Fainmesser  (John Hopkins University)
The Market for Online Influence  

Erik Madsen  (New York University)
Leaks, Sabotage, and Information Design  

 

Thursday, July 18

 

Theater

LH1

LH2

9:30 - 10:15

Peyton Young  (LSE and University of Oxford)
The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks  

Juan Escobar  (University of Chile)
Delegating Learning  

Bryony Reich  (Northwestern University)
Coordination, Communication Networks, and Modular Organization  

10:15 - 10:45

Coffee Break

 

Theater: Finance

LH1: Networks

LH2: Matching & Search

Chapel: Dynamic Games

102: Incomplete Information

201: Industrial Organization

10:45 - 11:05

Michael Gofman  (University of Rochester)
Interbank Trading, Collusion, and Financial Regulation  

George Charlson  (University of Oxford)
Price Competition in Buyer-Seller Networks  

Congyi Zhou  (New York University)
Early Selections and Affirmative Actions in the High School Admission Reform in China  

Yanling Chang  (Texas A&M University)
Worst-Case Analysis for a Leader-follower Partially Observable Stochastic Game  

 

Deepal Basak  (Indian School of Business)
Timely Persuasion  

Benjamin Casner  (The Ohio State University)
Seller Curation in Platforms  

11:05 - 11:25

Kebin Ma  (University of Warwick)
Banking Competition and Stability: The Role of Leverage  

Ezra Einy  
Strong Robustness to Incomplete Information and The Uniqueness of Correlated Equuilibrium  

Naomi M Utgoff  (United States Naval Academy)
What's Love Got To Do With It? Random Search, Optimal Stopping, and Stable Marriage  

Yen-Lin Chiu  (Johns Hopkins University)
Competitive Equilibrium Fraud in Markets for Credence-Goods  

 

Costas Cavounidis  (University of Warwick)
When Does Information Determine Market Size? Search and Rational Inattention  

Daniel Habermacher  (University of Warwick)
Authority and Information Acquisition in Cheap Talk with Informational Interdependence  

11:25 - 11:45

Fenghua Song  (Penn State University)
Ethics and Talent in Banking  

Toomas Hinnosaar  (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
Price Setting on a Network  

Hanzhe Zhang  (Michigan State University)
Pre-Matching Gambles  

Christopher M Li  (Cowles Foundation)
Dynamic Obstruction  

 

Mayuri Chaturvedi  (Columbia University)
A model of rent seeking and inequality  

Shota Ichihashi  (Bank of Canada)
Non-Competing Data Intermediaries  

11:45 - 13:15

Lunch Break

 

Theater

LH1

LH2

13:15 - 14:00

Sergiu Hart  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
An Integral Approach to Calibration  

Joel Watson  (University of California, San Diego)
Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement  

Olivier Gossner  (CNRS- Ecole Polytechnique Paris and LSE)
Attention, please!  

 

Theater: Solution Concepts

LH1: Networks

LH2: Matching

Chapel: Stochastic Games

101: Finance

102: Incomplete Information

201: Industrial Organization

14:10 - 14:30

Eugene Feinberg  (Stony Brook University)
Solutions for Zero-Sum Two-Player Games with Noncompact Decision Sets  

Shaofei Jiang  (The University of Texas at Austin)
Disclosure of Sequential Evidence  

Jaimie W. Lien  (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
Strategic Post-exam Preference Submission in the School Choice Game  

Georgy Lukyanov  (École Polytechnique)
Reputation and Social Learning  

Ragnar Juelsrud  (Norges Bank)
Dividend Payouts and Rollover Crises  

Wolfgang Kuhle  (University of Economics Prague)
Observing Actions in Bayesian Games  

Jidong Zhou  (Yale University)
Information Structure and Price Competition  

14:30 - 14:50

John Hillas  (University of Auckland)
Strategic Games from an Observer's Perspective  

Sunjin Kim  (Virginia Tech)
Equilibrium configurations in the heterogeneous model of signed network formation  

Zeky Ahmed Murra Anton  (Brown University)
Determinants of the College Early Admissions Market Configuration  

Miquel Oliu-Barton  (University Paris Dauphine)
A solution for stochastic games  

Caio Machado  (PUC Chile)
Optimal investment and capital structure under feedback effects  

Emilien Macault  (HEC Paris)
Learning in Repeated Routing Games with Symmetric Incomplete Information  

Amparo Urbano  (University of Valencia)
Demand for Privacy, selling consumer information, and consumer hiding vs. opt-out.  

14:50 - 15:10

Frank Huettner  (ESMT Berlin)
Marginality, dividends, and the value in games with externalities  

Fen LI  (Bielefeld University; University of Paris 1)
Anti-conformism in the threshold model of collective behavior  

Xingye Wu  (Tsinghua University)
College Admission with Flexible Major Quotas  

Deepanshu Vasal  (University of Texas, Austin)
Signaling in mean-field games  

Juan Passadore  (EIEF)
Robust Predictions in Dynamic Policy Games  

 

 

15:10 - 15:30

Coffee Break

 

Theater: Solution Concepts

LH1: Networks

LH2: Information

Chapel: Industrial Organization

101: Implementation

102: Incomplete Information

15:30 - 15:50

Mehmet Ismail  (King's College London)
One for all, all for one—von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto  

Kota Murayama  (Northwestern University)
Social Value of Information in Networked Economies  

Zhonghong Kuang  (Tsinghua University)
Hierarchical Bayesian Persuasion  

Vladyslav Nora  (Nazarbayev University)
Harmful Screening in Competitive Markets  

Ritesh Jain  (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica)
Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms:Complete information  

Ludmila Matyskova  (University of Bonn)
Bayesian Persuasion With Costly Information Acquisition  

 

15:50 - 16:10

Xiang Sun  (Wuhan University)
Perfect and proper equilibria in large games  

Norma Olaizola  (University of the Basque Country)
Characterization of efficient networks in a connections model with decreasing returns technology  

Jian Li  (McGill University)
Comparative Statics of Product Disclosure Statements  

Sougata Poddar  (Argyros School of Business and Economics & Chapman University)
Innovation, Diffusion and Shelving  

Takashi Kunimoto  (Singapore Management University)
Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima  

Paul Muench  (US Army)
Noisy and Silent Games of Timing with Detection Uncertainty and Numerical Estimates  

 

16:10 - 16:30

Joel Watson  (University of California, San Diego)
Plain Consistency and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium  

Mohammad T. Irfan  (Bowdoin College)
The Power of Context in Game-Theoretic Models of Networks: Ideal Point Models with Social Interactions  

Hangcheng Zhao  (The University of Chicago)
Perception Bias in Tullock Contest  

Salah Salimian  (Urmia University)
Locating the Sale Agents in Spoke Model through Uniform Distribution of Consumers  

Cheng-Kuang Wu  (School of Computer Science and Software, Zhaoqing University, China)
A Game Theory Approach for Evaluating and Assigning Suppliers in Supply Chain Management  

Rafael Veiel  (Ecole Polytechnique)
Complexity of Strategic Thinking and Robustness of Interim Rationalizability  

 

16:30 - 16:50

 

Fanqi Shi  (Peking University)
Screening with Network Externalities  

Jie Zheng  (Tsinghua University)
Information Design in Simultaneous All-pay Auction Contests  

 

Shuo Xu  (The Ohio State University)
(Cost-of-) Information Design  

Takashi Ui  (Hitotsubashi University)
LQG Information Design  

 

16:50 - 17:15

Coffee Break

 

Theater

LH1

LH2

17:15 - 18:00

Alessandro Pavan  (Northwestern University)
Searching for Arms  

Navin Kartik  (Columbia University)
A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications to Communication Games  

Yash Kanoria  (Columbia University)
Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms  

 

Friday, July 19

 

Theater: Networks

LH1: Persuasion

LH2: Cooperation & Convention

Chapel: Voting

101: Learning & Information Design

102: Information & Institutions

201: Persuasion & Bounded Rationality

9:30 - 9:50

Tim Russo  (National Defense University)
Future Combat Air System Pricing  

Jonas Hedlund  (University of Texas at Dallas)
Signaling through Bayesian persuasion  

Yu Awaya  (University of Rochester)
Collusion under persistent shocks  

Rune Midjord  (Copenhagen Business School)
Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting  

Yujie Qian  (Yale University)
Persuasion through a strategic moderator  

Valeria Burdea  (University of Pittsburgh)
Communication with Partially Verifiable Information: An Experiment  

Gabriel Alberto Martinez  (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Bayesian Persuasion with Hidden Motives  

9:50 - 10:10

Marco Scarsini  (LUISS)
The buck-passing game  

Toygar Tayyar Kerman  (Maastricht University)
Persuading Voters With Private Communication Strategies  

Ce Liu  (Michigan State University)
Convention and Coalitions in Repeated Games  

Joseph McMurray  (Brigham Young University)
Polarization and Pandering in Common Interest Elections  

Yu Fu Wong  (Columbia University)
Strategic Exploration  

German Gieczewski  (Princeton University)
Wars of Attrition with Evolving States

Miklos Pinter  (BME)
Objective ambiguity  

10:10 - 10:30

Cole Randall Williams  (University of Vienna)
Echo Chambers: Social Learning under Unobserved Heterogeneity  

Todd Stambaugh  (Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy)
Lying and Lie-Detection in Bayesian Persuasion Games with Costs and Punishments  

Nathan Yoder  (University of Georgia)
Matching with Complementary Contracts  

Svetlana Kosterina  (Princeton university)
Information Structures and Information Aggregation in Threshold Equilibria in Elections  

Kai Hao Yang  (University of Chicago)
Implications of Consumer Data Monopoly  

Andrew Kosenko  (University of Pittsburgh)
Mediated Persuasion  

 

10:30 - 10:50

 

 

 

Carl Heese  (University Bonn)
Large Elections with Endogenous Information  

Weijie Zhong  (Stanford University)
Time preference and information acquisition  

Richard Van Weelden  (University of Pittsburgh)
Delegation in Veto Bargaining  

 

10:50 - 11:20

Coffee Break

 

Theater

LH1

LH2

11:20 - 12:05

Stephen Morris  (Princeton University)
Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice  

Vijay Krishna  (Penn State University)
Disadvantageous Information  

Shmuel Zamir  (Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Strategic use of seller information in private-value first-price auctions  

 

Adjourn

 

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