Intensive Course on Repeated GamesOrganized by Robert J. Aumann, JeanFrançois Mertens, and Abraham NeymanJuly 12 to July 16, 1993
 
Monday, July 12, to Friday, July 16: Earth and Space Sciences
001 Each day there will be four onehour lectures: at 10:00, 11:30, 2:30, and 4:00.  
Part A: Games with Complete Information  
A.1  general model of repeated games, definition of G_{infinity}, G_{n}, G_{lambda}, or generally G_{theta} 
A.2  max min and min max and individually rational payoffs of the repeated game 
A.3  equilibria in G_{n}, G_{lambda}, G_{infinity} 
A.4  subgame perfect equilibria in G_{n}, G_{lambda}, G_{infinity} 
A.5  Blackwell's approachability theorems

Part B: Stochastic Games  
B.1  general motivations and model 
B.2  basic results in the discounted and undiscounted
cases:

B.3  study of the Big Match 
B.4  existence of nu_{infinity} 
B.5  existence of equilibria

Part C: Games with Incomplete Information  
C.1  general motivation and model 
C.2  lack of information on one side: infinite stage game and limit of finitely many stages 
C.3  lack of information on both sides: min max and max min 
C.4  equilibria: characterization and bimartingales, existence theorem 