Organized by John Hillas

July 10 to July 14, 2000

Stony Brook, New York



Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
9:00-10:00 R. Anderson: Genericity with Infinitely Many Parameters
Chair: A. Neyman

  1.A: Industrial Organization Theory I
Chair: E. Einy
10:30-10:55 S.-C. Chiang:
Dynamic R&D Competition with Previous-Generation Production Experience
10:30-10:55 R. Axtell:
The Emergence of Firms in a Population of Agents. Local Increasing Returns, Unstable Nash Equilibria, and Skewed Size Distributions
11:30-11:55 P. Dubey:
Competitive Prizes: When Less Scrutiny Induces More Effort (with C.-w. Wu)

  1.B: Repeated Games
Chair: J. Vila
10:30-10:55 K. Abhyankar:
Smale Strategies for Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma Type Games
11:00-11:25 I. Arribas:
Repeated Games with Probabilistic Horizon (with A. Urbano)
11:30-12:00 A. Urbano:
Pseudorandom Processes: Entropy and Automata (with P. Hernandez)

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
2:00-3:00 J. Geanakoplos: Default and Crashes in General Equilibrium
Chair: R. Aumann

  2.A: Contracts
Chair: J. Geanakoplos
3:30-3:55 H.-C. Chen:
The Optimal Dynamic Incentive Contract with no Commitment to Auditing
4:00-4:25 O. Haimanko:
Optimal Scrutiny for Multi-Period Promotion Tournaments (with P. Dubey)

  2.B: Industrial Organization Applications I
Chair: R. Axtell
3:30-3:55 C. Kuo:
Econometric Analysis of Collusive Behaviors in the Long-Distance Telecommunications Industry in the U.S.
4:00-4:25 E. Maasland:
Procuring Universal Telecommunications Services
4:30-5:00 C. Mazón:
E-Commerce, Consumer Search and Cost Reduction (with P. Pereira)

  2.C: Agreements, Groups, and Rationalizability
Chair: M. Burgin
3:30-3:55 E. Diamantoudi:
Binding Agreements
4:00-4:25 I. Milchtaich:
Stability and Segregation in Group Formation (with E. Winter)
4:30-4:55 L. Xue:
A Notion of Consistent Rationalizability: Between Weak and Pearce's Extensive Form Rationalizability


Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
9:00-10:00 K. Bagwell: The Theory of the WTO
Chair: R. Anderson

  3.A: Industrial Organization Theory II
Chair: C. Kuo
10:30-10:55 E. Catilina:
Information Acquisition in Cournot Markets: A Three-Stage Approach
11:00-11:25 I. Linnosmaa:
Competition, Quality and Corporate Structure
11:30-11:55 M. Ryan:
Conditional Strategic Equivalence and Frame Restricted Choice with Applications to Regulatory Risk and Uncertainty

  3.B: Incentives/Mechanism Design I
Chair: O. Haimanko
10:30-10:55 S. Basov:
Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents
11:00-11:25 Z. Forshner:
Agency Spaces
11:30-11:55 G. Giraud:
Universal and Strong Coalition-Proof Nash Implementation of Walras Equilibria

  3.C: Social/Political Models
Chair: D. Wettstein
10:30-10:55 D. Filipovich:
Why Is There So Much Fraud in Transition Economies?
11:00-11:25 R. Harbaugh:
Reputable Discrimination (with T. To)

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
2:00-3:00 C. Harris: Hyperbolic Discounting and Consumption
Chair: D. Samet

  4.A: Complexity and Bounded Rationality
Chair: A. Urbano
3:30-3:55 E. Solan:
Randomization and Simplification (with E. Kalai)
4:00-4:25 J. Vila:
The Complexity of a Strategy (with P. Hernandez and A. Urbano)
4:30-5:00 J. Smith:
Kolmogorov Complexity and the Difficulty of Carrying out Strategies

  4.B: Industrial Organization Theory III
Chair: E. Catilina
3:30-3:55 E. Prado:
Survival of Technologies: An Evolutionary Game Approach (with Décio K. Kadota and Jorge E. de C. Soromenho)
4:00-4:25 D. Herreiner:
The Decision to Seek or to be Sought
4:30-5:00 I. Obara:
Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited


Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
9:00-10:00 D. Samet: Between Liberalism and Democracy
Chair: S. Brams

  5.A: Special Games
Chair: R. Harbaugh
10:30-10:55 S. Brams:
Yankee Trading (with J. Lax and T. Kaplan)
11:00-11:25 I. Luski:
Contests with Variable Rewards (with A. Sela, T. Kaplan, and D. Wettstein)
11:30-11:55 V. Mazalov:
Two-Card Poker Models (with Igor S. Makhankov)

  5.B: Industrial Organization Applications II
Chair: C. Mazón
10:30-10:55 H. Benchekroun:
On the Effects of Unilateral Quotas on the Harvesting of a Renewable Resource
11:00-11:25 X. Más-Mańez:
Leader-Follower Equilibria in a Two-Stage Model
11:30-11:55 R. McKelvey:
Fish-Wars on the High Seas: Erecting Economic Barriers to Entry

  5.C: Incentives/Mechanism Design II
Chair: Z. Forshner
10:30-10:55 S. Severinov:
Sustaining Cooperation Through Delegation
11:00-11:25 V. Skreta:
Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
2:00-3:00 P. Dubey: Inside and Outside Money, Gains to Trade and IS-LM
Chair: A. Brandenburger

  6.A: Industrial Organization Applications III Chair: I. Linnosmaa
3:30-3:55 S. Mahuteau:
On the Reliability of Reciprocal Behaviors in a Wage Setting Game. Econometric Analysis on a French Firm Survey
4:00-4:25 O. Richard:
An Empirical Model of Entry for Multimarket Industries with Incomplete Information and Demand Synergies (with O. Armantier)
4:30-5:00 J. Voola:
Game Theory and Reality: An Explanation of the Structure of the Petroleum Industry

  6.B: Noncooperative Solution Concepts I
Chair: J. Hillas
3:30-3:55 O. Armantier:
Nash Equilibrium Approximation in Games of Incomplete Information (with J.-P. Florens and J.-F. Richard)
4:00-4:25 A. Brandenburger:
Epistemic Conditions for Iterated Admissibility (with H. J. Keisler)
4:30-4:55 P. Brown:
Influence Diagrams to Model and Classify Game Theoretic Problems

  6.C: Cooperative Games I
Chair: L. Kóczy
3:30-3:55 R. Bhattacharjee:
Polytope Games (with F. Thuijsman and O.J. Vrieze)
4:00-4:25 M. Jones:
The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions (with S. Brams and M. Kilgour)
4:30-4:55 M. Burgin:
Axiomatic Representation of the Enhanced Banzhaf Power Index (with L. Shapley)


Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
9:00-10:00 B. Nalebuff: Business Strategy and Game Theory
Chair: Y. Tauman

  7.A: Experiments and Tests
Chair: S. Mahuteau
10:30-10:55 A. Simon:
11:00-11:25 M. Walker:
Minimax Play at Wimbledon (with J. Wooders)

  7.B: Learning
Chair: A. Matros
10:30-10:55 T. Fujiwara-Greve:
Learning to Coordinate by Forward Looking Players (with C. Krabbe Nielsen)
11:00-11:25 M. Shor:
Learning in Limited Information Environments
11:30-11:55 E. Einy:
Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly (with D. Moreno and B. Shitovitz)

  7.C: Auctions I
Chair: B. Lebrun
10:30-10:55 A. Chakraborty:
First Impression in a Sequential Auction (with R. Harbaugh and N. Gupta)
11:00-11:25 K.-S. Chung:
Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Values (with J. Ely)
11:30-11:55 F. Menezes:
Synergies and Price Trends in Sequntial Auctions (with P. Monteiro)

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
2:00-3:00 R. Rob: Product Innovation by a Durable Good Monopoly
Chair: R. McLean

  8.A: Cooperative Games II
Chair: E. Friedman
3:30-3:55 L. Kóczy:
Consistent Refinements of the Core of a Partition Function Game
4:00-4:25 R. McLean:
Informational Size Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information (with A. Postlewaite)
4:30-4:55 M. Widgren:
Inferior Players in Simple Games (with S. Napel)

  8.B: Learning/Evolution
Chair: T. Fujiwara-Greve
3:30-3:55 A. Matros:
Stochastic Imitation in Extensive Form Games

  8.C: Auctions II
Chair: A. Chakraborty
3:30-3:55 B. Lebrun:
First Price Auctions in the Independent Private Value Model
4:00-4:25 C.-L. Chen:
Collusion in One-Shot Second-Price Auctions: The Simultaneous Offers Case (with Y. Tauman)
4:30-4:55 R. Orzach:
Dominance Solvability of Second-Price Auctions with Differential Information (with E. Einy and A. Sela)


Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
9:00-10:00 L. Shapley: Discrete Cournot
Chair: P. Dubey

  9.A: Value Theory and Cost Allocation
Chair: R. Bhattacharjee
10:30-10:55 E. Friedman:
Strategic Properties of Heterogeneous Serial Cost Sharing
11:00-11:25 D. Wettstein:
Bidding for the Surplus: A Non-Cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value (with D. Perez Castrillo)

  9.B: Political Topics and Auctions III
Chair: R. Orzach
10:30-10:55 J. Lax:
Supreme Strategy: Signaling and Compliance in the U.S. Supreme Court
11:00-11:30 B. de Otto:
Bidding in a Pool Mechanism with Contract Management

Earth and Space Sciences -- Room 001
2:00-3:00 D. Abreu: Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games
Chair: C. Harris

Last updated on July 17, 2002 by Hakan Timbil.