

International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 16 - 20, 2018

Schedule of Talks

Monday, July 16						
9:30 - 10:15	Bernhard Von Stengel (London School of Economics) <i>Algorithms for Rank-1 Bimatrix Games</i>					
10:15 - 11:00	Nicolas Stier Moses (Facebook Research) <i>Pacing Mechanisms For Ad Auctions</i>					
11:00 - 11:30	Coffee Break					
	LH1: Bargaining	LH2: Incomplete Information	101: Auctions	102: Social and Political Models	201: Knowledge and Expectations	Chapel: Fairness
11:30 - 11:50	Deepal Basak (Indian School of Business) <i>Gambling over Public Opinion</i>	Cedric Wasser (University of Bonn) <i>Buyer-Optimal Robust Information Structures</i>	Daniel Graydon Stephenson (Chapman University) <i>Multi-battle rent seeking contests over complementary battlefields`</i>	Steven Brams (New York University) <i>Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in Two-Person Games: Theory and Cases</i>	Ziv Hellman (Bar Ilan University) <i>No Trade and Yes Trade Theorems for Heterogeneous Priors</i>	Xingwei Hu (IMF) <i>A Dichotomous Analysis of Unemployment Welfare</i>
11:50 - 12:10	Zizhen Ma (University of Rochester) <i>Majority Bargaining and Reputation</i>	Alejandro Melo Ponce (Stony Brook University) <i>Information Design in Contests</i>	Pulkit Kumar Nigam (University of South Carolina) <i>Asymmetric Contests and the Effects of a Cap on Bids</i>	Haldun Evrenk (Istanbul Sehir University) <i>War and Fiscal Centralization</i>	Aaron Bodoh-Creed (University of California) <i>Base-Rate Neglect: Foundations and Implications</i>	Mehmet Ismail (King's College London) <i>Catch-Up: A Rule That Makes Service Sports More Competitive</i>
12:10 - 12:30	Mantas Radzvilas (Sidney M. Edelstein Center, Hebrew University of Jerusalem) <i>Dynamic Offer Proportional Beliefs in Sequential Bargaining with Uncertain Offer-Relative Values of Outside Options</i>	Alfonso Montes (Ecole Polytechnique) <i>A Purification Result for Games with Endogenous Information Structures</i>	Chih-Chun Yang (Academia Sinica) <i>Rationality and Common Strong Belief of Rationality in Second-price Auction and English Auction</i>	Liuchun Deng (Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH)) <i>A Tale of Two Decentralizations: Volatility and Economic Regimes</i>	Jian Li (McGill University) <i>Information order in monotone decision problems under ambiguity</i>	Alessandro Del Ponte (Stony Brook University) <i>Spending Too Little in Hard Times</i>

12:30 - 14:00	Lunch Break					
14:00 - 14:45	Xavier Venel (Paris School of Economics and Université Paris 1) <i>Uniform Value in Stochastic Games</i>					
14:45 - 15:15	Coffee Break					
	LH1: <i>Industrial Organization</i>	LH2: <i>Mechanism Design</i>	101: <i>Experimental Economics</i>	102: <i>Learning and Evolution</i>	201: <i>Applications</i>	Chapel: <i>Coalitional Games</i>
15:15 - 15:35	Yong Chao (University of Louisville) <i>Nonlinear Pricing under Competition</i>	Brian Baisa (Amherst College) <i>Efficient Ex Post Implementable Auctions and English Auctions for Bidders with Non-Quasilinear Preferences</i>	Heinrich Harald Nax (ETH Zurich) <i>Nash Equilibria of Dictator Games: a New Perspective</i>	Anastas Tenev (Maastricht University) <i>Naive Imitation and Partial Cooperation in a Local Public Good Model</i>	Peter Coughlin (University of Maryland) <i>What if a figure skating team event had been held at past Winter Olympic Games?</i>	Liang Dai (Shanghai Jiao Tong University and SIIFE) <i>Organizations and Coordination in a Diverse Population</i>
15:35 - 15:55	Adriana Gama (El Colegio de México) <i>On Cournot's theory of oligopoly with perfect complements</i>	Yi Chen (Cornell University) <i>Dynamic Communication with Commitment</i>	Duk Gyoo Kim (University of Mannheim) <i>Multilateral Bargaining with Proposer Selection Contest</i>	Soham Rajesh Phade (UC Berkeley) <i>Learning in Games with Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Preferences</i>	Miguel Vargas (CIMAT) <i>Profit-Sharing and Efficient Time Allocation</i>	Elena Inarra (University of the Basque Country) <i>Rationing rules and stable coalition structures</i>
15:55 - 16:15	Sang-Ha Yoon (Stony brook University) <i>Firm Entry Decline and Market Structure</i>	Artur Gorokh (Cornell University) <i>When Bribes are Harmless: The Power and Limits of Collusion-Resilient Mechanism Design</i>	Quyên Nguyen (Utah State University) <i>Bayesian Persuasion: Evidence from the Laboratory</i>	Antonio Carlos Mercer (Pontifical Catholic University of Parana) <i>Analyzing selfish and altruistic behaviors in an ultimatum game with asymmetric information</i>	Michael Kramm (Technical University Dortmund) <i>Information Design in Multi-Task Contests - Whom to Inform When the Importance of Tasks Is Uncertain</i>	Dominik Karos (Maastricht University) <i>Farsighted Rationality and the Equilibrium Stable Set</i>
16:15 - 16:35	Ken C. Ho (University of Washington, Seattle) <i>Dynamic Price Competition for Supply</i>	Siyu Ma (Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya) <i>Patent Licensing of a Differentiated Product Innovation with a Hotelling- Cournot Setting</i>	Foteini Tzachrista (University of South Carolina) <i>Sequential Contests: Theory and Experimental Evidence</i>		Jan Auerbach (University of Exeter) <i>Preordered Service in Contract Enforcement</i>	Xiao Luo (National University of Singapore) <i>Bayesian Coalitional Rationality</i>
16:35 - 17:00	Coffee Break					
17:00 - 17:45	Michal Feldman (Tel-Aviv University) <i>Interdependent Values without Single Crossing</i>					

Tuesday, July 17

9:30 - 10:15	Vasiliki Skreta (UT Austin and University College London) <i>Sequentially Rational Mechanism Design</i>				
10:15 - 11:00	Jose Rafael Correa (Universidad de Chile) <i>Posted Price Mechanisms and Prophet Inequalities</i>				
11:00 - 11:30	Coffee Break				
	LH1: <i>Industrial Organization</i>	LH2: <i>Auctions</i>	102: <i>Bounded Rationality</i>	201: <i>Voting</i>	Chapel: <i>Dynamic Games</i>
11:30 - 11:50	Kyungmin Kim (University of Miami) <i>Competitive Advertising and Pricing</i>	Dan Levin (The Ohio State University) <i>Misbehavior in Common-Value Auctions</i>	Hee Chun Kim (Korea Information Society Development Institute) <i>Mixing Propensity and Strategic Decision Making</i>	Jinhee Jo (Kyung Hee University) <i>Why polls can be wrong but still informative</i>	Philippe Bich (Paris 1 and Paris School of economics) <i>On the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in discontinuous perfect information games</i>
11:50 - 12:10	Joaquin Coleff (Universidad Nacional de La Plata) <i>Can Consumer Complaints Reduce Product Reliability? Should We Worry?</i>	Andre Speit (University of Bonn) <i>Common-Value Auctions With an Uncertain Number of Bidders</i>	Laurent Mathevet (New York University) <i>Attention Management</i>	Jamie Tucker-Foltz (Amherst College) <i>A Cut-And-Choose Mechanism to Prevent Gerrymandering</i>	Tarun Sabarwal (University of Kansas) <i>Strategic Complements in Two Stage, 2x2 Games</i>
12:10 - 12:30	Yangguang Huang (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) <i>Supervisory Efficiency, Collusion, and Contract Design</i>	David Wettstein (Ben-Gurion University) <i>Two-Stage Contests with Preferences over Style</i>	Jeevant Rampal (Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad) <i>Limited Foresight Equilibrium</i>		
12:30 - 14:00	Lunch Break				

14:00 - 14:45	Renato Paes Leme (Google Research) <i>Contextual Search via Intrinsic Volumes</i>					
14:45 - 15:15	Coffee Break					
	LH1: <i>Cooperative Games</i>	LH2: <i>Incomplete Information</i>	101: <i>Matching and Search</i>	102: <i>Social and Political Models</i>	201: <i>Applications</i>	Chapel: <i>Other</i>
15:15 - 15:35	Ori Haimanko (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) <i>Composition Independence in Compound Games: a Characterization of the Banzhaf Power Index and the Banzhaf Value</i>	Andrew Kosenko (University of Pittsburgh) <i>Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information</i>	Mark Whitmeyer (University of Texas at Austin) <i>Information Provision in a Sequential Search Setting</i>	Pedro Jara-Moroni (Universidad de Santiago de Chile) <i>Social Movements in Democratic Regimes</i>	Itai Agur (International Monetary Fund) <i>Monetary and Macroeprudential Policy Coordination Among Multiple Equilibria</i>	Alexey Kushnir (Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business) <i>Optimal Income Taxation with Endogenous Prices</i>
15:35 - 15:55	Satoshi Masuya (Daito Bunka University) <i>An Extension of the Shapley Value for Partially Defined Cooperative Games</i>	Miklos Pinter (University of Pécs) <i>Which belief hierarchies are important?</i>	Ashwin Kambhampati (University of Pennsylvania) <i>Matching to Produce Information</i>	Kirill Rivkin <i>Historical dynamics and country size in geopolitical model.</i>	Cheng-Kuang Wu (Zhejiang Industry & Trade Vocational College, China) <i>A Game Theory Approach for Assessing Threat Value and Deploying MAS Resources against Multiple Coordinated Attacks</i>	Sonali Sen Gupta (Lancaster University) <i>Tax Evasion, Embezzlement and Public Good Provision</i>
15:55 - 16:15	Satoshi Nakada (Tokyo University of Science) <i>Generalized Potentials, Value, and Core</i>	Daehong Min (Korea Information Society Development Institute (KISDI)) <i>Screening for Experiments</i>	Miho Maylyn Hong (Yonsei University) <i>Core and Top Trading Cycles in a Market with Indivisible Goods and Externalities</i>	Manuela Mischitelli (La Sapienza University of Rome) <i>Unconventional policies in the EMU: a policy game approach</i>	Haiyun (Kevin) Chen (Grinnell College) <i>Cooperation, Competition and Linguistic Diversity</i>	Youngseok Park (Colby College) <i>The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict: Comment</i>
16:15 - 16:35	Nobusumi Sagara (Hosei University) <i>Coalitional Preferences in Large Economies with an Infinite-Dimensional Commodity Spaces</i>	Rafael Veiel (Ecole Polytechnique) <i>Strategic Type Spaces</i>	Ming Yang (Duke University) <i>The Coordination of Intermediation</i>	Yiman Sun (University of Texas at Austin) <i>A Dynamic Model of Censorship</i>	Tadashi Hashimoto (Yeshiva University) <i>Aggressive Boards and CEO Turnover</i>	Zhe Yang (University of Alabama) <i>Free Riders and Public Good Provision in Morgan's Lottery</i>
16:35 - 17:00	Coffee Break					
17:00 - 17:45	Federico Echenique (California Institute of Technology) <i>Fairness and Efficiency for Probabilistic Allocations with Endowments</i>					

Wednesday, July 18

9:30 - 10:15	Alexander Wolitzky (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) <i>The Revelation Principle in Multistage Games</i>					
10:15 - 11:00	Ozan Candogan (The University of Chicago) <i>Optimal Signaling of Content Accuracy: Engagement vs. Misinformation</i>					
11:00 - 11:30	Coffee Break					
	<i>LH1: Industrial Organization</i>	<i>LH2: Incomplete Information</i>	<i>101: Experimental Economics</i>	<i>102: Social Choice</i>	<i>201: Information and Networks</i>	<i>Chapel: Solution Concepts</i>
11:30 - 11:50	Benjamin Casner (The Ohio State University) <i>Going the Last Mile: Access Regulation and Vertical Integration</i>	Raghul Srinivasan Venkatesh (Aix-Marseille University) <i>Communication and Commitment with Resource Constraints</i>	Flora Li (Virginia Tech) <i>Promises and Punishment</i>	Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University) <i>Fair Competition Design</i>	Marcos Fernandes (Stony Brook University) <i>Categorization in Social Networks and the Folly of Crowds</i>	Oscar Volij (Ben Gurion University and Iowa State University) <i>The Measurement of Income Segregation</i>
11:50 - 12:10	Estefania Vergara (Stony Brook University) <i>Disappearance of the multiple equilibria problem in entry models</i>	Meichen Chen (Washington University in St. Louis) <i>Global Games with Interim Information Acquisition</i>	Talbot M Andrews (Stony Brook University) <i>High Risk and High Reward Decision-Making for Climate Change Mitigation</i>	Zehra Valencia (University of South Carolina) <i>New Type of Contests</i>	Tatiana Mayskaya (Higher School of Economics) <i>Cognitive Hierarchical Model in Networks</i>	Helene Mass (Centre for European Economic Research) <i>Strategies under distributional and strategic uncertainty</i>
12:10 - 12:30	Mian Farrukh Raza (Kansas State University) <i>Dumping on Free Trade, Optimal Antidumping Duties, and Price Undertakings: Welfare Implications in a Two-Market Equilibrium Analysis</i>	Francesc Dilme (University of Bonn) <i>Skewed Communication</i>		David Rietzke (Lancaster University) <i>Robust Comparative Statics in Contests</i>	Norma Olaizola (University of the Basque Country) <i>Efficiency in a generalized connections model</i>	Asha Sadanand (University of Guelph) <i>Ideal Reactive Equilibrium</i>
12:30 - 14:00	Lunch Break					

14:00 - 14:45	Anna Karlin (University of Washington) <i>Simple Pricing Schemes for Consumers with Evolving Values</i>					
14:45 - 15:15	Coffee Break					
	LH1: <i>Contracts</i>	LH2: <i>Mechanism Design</i>	101: <i>Signalling</i>	102: <i>Learning and Evolution</i>	201: <i>Repeated Games</i>	Chapel: <i>Other</i>
15:15 - 15:35	Alexander Rodivilov (School of Business, Stevens Institute of Technology) <i>Learning from Failures</i>	Toomas Hinnosaar (Collegio Carlo Alberto) <i>Robust pricing with refunds</i>	Aditya Aradhya (Maastricht University) <i>Sender-receiver stopping games with finite horizon</i>	George Loginov (UW Madison) <i>Ordinal Imitative Dynamics</i>	Kimmo Berg (Aalto University School of Science) <i>Computing all the mixed-strategy equilibria in the repeated prisoner's dilemma</i>	Itay Kavalier (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology) <i>On Comparison of Experts</i>
15:35 - 15:55	Eloisa Campioni (University of Rome Tor Vergata) <i>On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition</i>	Xiaosheng Mu (Harvard University) <i>Informational Robustness in Intertemporal Pricing</i>	Calvin Thomas Cochran (University of California-Irvine) <i>Hierarchical Models for the Evolution of Compositional Language</i>	Brian Swenson (Carnegie Mellon University) <i>On best-response dynamics in potential games</i>	Ghislain Herman Demeze Joutsa (University of Bielefeld) <i>A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games</i>	Marco Lambrecht (University of Heidelberg) <i>Measuring skill and chance in games</i>
15:55 - 16:15	Byeong-Hak Choe (University of Wyoming) <i>Climate Finance under Conflicts and Renegotiations: A Dynamic Contract Approach</i>	Kai Hao Yang (University of Chicago) <i>Selling Advertisement: Non-linear Pricing on Information Structure</i>	Nicolas Riquelme (University of Rochester) <i>Competing Auctions with Informed Sellers</i>	Weijie Zhong (Columbia University) <i>Time preference and dynamic learning</i>	Lars Peter Metzger (Dortmund University) <i>Repeated Contests With Draws</i>	David Lagziel (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) <i>Reputation and Cycles</i>
16:15 - 16:35		Omer Tamuz (California Institute of Technology) <i>Stochastic Dominance Under Independent Noise</i>	Alexandros Rigos (Lund University) <i>Broken Tyres and Flat Engines: Signalling Expertise in Markets for Credence Goods</i>	Zhijian Wang (Zhejiang University) <i>Algorithmic Collusion in Cournot Duopoly Market: Evidence from Experimental Economics</i>	Anna Zseleva (Higher School of Economics) <i>On the equivalence of mixed and behavior strategies in finitely additive decision problems</i>	Sneha Bakshi <i>Monopoly Pricing in Meta-Cycles</i>
16:35 - 17:00	Coffee Break					
17:00 - 17:45	Yaron Azrieli (Ohio State University) <i>Monitoring Experts</i>					
18:30 - 22:00	Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)					

Thursday, July 19

9:30 - 10:15	Omer Tamuz (California Institute of Technology) <i>Social Learning Equilibria</i>					
10:15 - 11:00	Ben Golub (Harvard University) <i>Social Learning in a Dynamic Environment</i>					
11:00 - 11:30	Coffee Break					
	LH1: <i>Industrial Organization</i>	LH2: <i>Incomplete Information</i>	101: <i>Auctions</i>	102: <i>Social and Political Models</i>	201: <i>Information and Networks</i>	Chapel: <i>Dynamic Games</i>
11:30 - 11:50	Ting Liu (Stony Brook University) <i>Optimal Licensing in Markets with Quality Innovation</i>	David Ruiz (University of Minnesota) <i>Critical Types in Dynamic Games</i>	Eiichiro Kazumori (The University of Massachusetts) <i>On the Virtue of Being Regular and Predictable: A Structural Analysis of the Primary Dealer System in the United States Treasury Auctions</i>	Noam Tanner (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston) <i>Screening Bias with Discretion</i>	Simon Schopohl (Saint-Louis University - Brussels and CORE, University of Louvain) <i>Who matters in coordination problems on networks?</i>	Svetlana Boyarchenko (University of Texas, Austin) <i>Strategic experimentation with humped bandits</i>
11:50 - 12:10	Hodaya Lampert (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) <i>Fees versus Royalties: The Case of a Product Improvement</i>	Svetlana Kosterina (Princeton University) <i>Persuasion with Unknown Beliefs</i>	Alexander Heczko (RWTH Aachen University) <i>The Performance of Core-Selecting Auctions: An Experiment</i>	Friederike Bloennigen (TU Dortmund) <i>Club Good Provision and Nested Contests</i>	Egor Starkov (Northwestern University) <i>Bad News Turned Good: Reversal Under Censorship</i>	Senran Lin (University of Arizona) <i>Regret Games</i>
12:10 - 12:30	Anzhou Zhang (Stony Brook University) <i>R&D Race, Patent Licensing and the Social Value of Innovation</i>	Paul Muench (US Army) <i>Game of Timing with Detection Uncertainty</i>			Basak Horowitz (Stony Brook University) <i>A Strategic Model of Network Formation with Endogenous Link Strength</i>	Jin Hyuk Choi (Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology) <i>To disconnect or not: a cybersecurity game</i>
12:30 - 14:00	Lunch Break					

14:00 - 14:45	Leeat Yariv (Princeton University) <i>Testing the Waters: Behavior across Participant Pools</i>				
14:45 - 15:15	Coffee Break				
	LH2:Mechanism Design	101:Matching and Search	102:Learning and Evolution	201:Repeated Games	Chapel: Solution Concepts
15:15 - 15:35	Constantine Sorokin (NRU Higher School of Economics) <i>Pure Information Design in Classical Auctions</i>	Ryan Tierney (University of Southern Denmark) <i>Incentives in a Job-market Clearinghouse</i>	Eeva Mauring (University of Vienna) <i>Informational Cycles in Search Markets</i>	Arthur Dolgoplov (George Mason University) <i>Revealed Markov Strategies</i>	Makoto Hagiwara (Tokyo Institute of Technology) <i>Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex Post Equilibria with Private Values</i>
15:35 - 15:55	Alex Smolin (University of Bonn) <i>Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes</i>	Ran Shorrer (Penn State University) <i>Need vs. Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets</i>	Arjada Bardhi (Northwestern University / Duke University) <i>Optimal Discovery and Influence Through Selective Sampling</i>	Lei Gao (Shandong University, China) <i>Equilibrium Characterization of Repeated Games with Private Monitoring</i>	Xinyang Wang (Yale University) <i>Second Order Secret Love</i>
15:55 - 16:15		Anna Bykhovskaya (Yale University) <i>Stability in matching markets with peer effects</i>	Ignacio Monzon (Collegio Carlo Alberto) <i>Observational Learning in Large Anonymous Games</i>	Ayca Ozdogan (TOBB University of Economics and Technology) <i>When is it possible to prevent deception by reputation?</i>	Nikhil Addleman (University of California Irvine) <i>Equilibrium Miscoordination in Coordination Games Played on Metric Spaces</i>
16:15 - 16:35			Ayan Bhattacharya (City University of New York, Baruch College) <i>On Algorithms That Approach Correlated Equilibrium</i>	Geyu Yang (Washington University in St Louis) <i>Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring</i>	
16:35 - 17:00	Coffee Break				
17:00 - 17:45	Simone Cerreia Vioglio (Universita Bocconi) <i>Absolute and Relative Ambiguity Aversion: A Preferential Approach</i>				

Friday, July 20

	LH1:Industrial Organization	LH2:Mechanism Design	101:Experimental Economics	102:Social and Political Models	Chapel: Stochastic Games
9:30 - 9:50	Ichiro Obara (University of California, Los Angeles) <i>Controlling Cultivation of Taste</i>	Jan Knoepfle (University of Bonn) <i>Costly Verification and Correlated Information</i>	Alexander Matros (University of South Carolina) <i>Experimental Test of "Better than Average" Effect and Excess Entry.</i>	Rohit Parikh (City University of New York) <i>Campaigning Strategies</i>	Eugene Feinberg (Stony Brook University) <i>Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Perfect Information, Unbounded Payoffs and Weakly Continuous Transition Probabilities</i>
9:50 - 10:10	Nikhil Vellodi (New York University) <i>Ratings Design and Barriers to Entry</i>	Vi Thi Lan Cao (University of Rochester) <i>Constrained-efficient profit division in a dynamic partnership</i>	Shane Auerbach (University of Wisconsin) <i>Myopia in dynamic spatial games</i>	Laura Karpuska (Stony Brook University) <i>Political Turnover and Property Rights</i>	Jasmine Maes (Maastricht University) <i>Subgame maxmin strategies in zero-sum stochastic games with tolerance levels</i>
10:10 - 10:30	Bart Taub (University of Glasgow) <i>Self-enforcement via strategic investment</i>	James F. Ring (Fair Outcomes, Inc.) <i>A Simple System for Managing & Resolving Monetary Claims</i>	Zahra Gambarova (University of Leicester) <i>Experimental Evidence on the Use of Information in K-beauty Contest Game</i>	Anne Marie Go (University of Bath) <i>Vying for Support: Lobbying a Legislator with Uncertain Preferences</i>	Gijs Schoenmakers (Maastricht University) <i>Dynamic Matrix Games</i>
10:30 - 10:50	Atara Oliver (Rice University) <i>Online News and Editorial Standards</i>				Xiao Zhou (Boston University) <i>Learning in Parrondo's Paradox</i>
10:50 - 11:20	Coffee Break				
11:20 - 12:05	Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi (Universita degli Studi di Milano) <i>Dynamic Pricing with Finitely Many Unknown Valuations</i>				
	Adjourn				