

Stony Brook Center for Game Theory
Program: Workshop on Law and Economics

Thursday, July 14

9:00-9:25	Welcome and Coffee
9:25-9:30	Opening Remarks
9:30-10:15	William Hubbard, <i>Stalling, Signaling, and Settlement</i>
10:15-11:00	Daniel M. Klerman, <i>Litigation and Selection with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information</i>
11:00-11:15	Coffee Break
11:15-12:00	Shay Lavie, <i>Judgment Contingent Settlements</i>
12:00-13:30	Lunch Break
13:30-14:15	Sergei Severinov, <i>Legal Advice and Disclosure</i>
14:15-15:00	Winand Emons, <i>Strategic Communication with Reporting Costs</i>
15:00-15:15	Coffee Break
15:15-16:00	Alon Klement, <i>The Diffusion of Legal Innovations: A Case Study of Class Actions in Israel</i>
16:00-16:45	Scott Baker, <i>A Theory of Judicial Deference</i>
18:30-22:00	Dinner

Friday, July 15

9:00-9:30	Coffee Break
9:30-10:15	Eric L. Talley, TBA
10:15-11:00	Margherita Saraceno, <i>Optimal Fee Shifting Rules</i>
11:00-11:15	Coffee Break
11:15-12:00	Kathryn Spier, <i>Taking a Financial Position in Your Opponent in Litigation</i>
12:00-13:30	Lunch Break
13:30-14:15	Alex Stein, <i>Constitutional Retroactivity in Criminal Procedure</i>
14:15-15:00	Ron Siegel, <i>Improving Criminal Trials by Reflecting Residual Doubt: Multiple Verdicts and Plea Bargains</i>
15:00-15:15	Coffee Break
15:15-16:00	Ying Chen, <i>Information Acquisition Under Persuasive Precedent versus Binding Precedent</i>
16:00-16:45	Zvika Neeman, <i>How Bayesian Persuasion can Help Reduce Illegal Parking and Other Socially Undesirable Behavior</i>
17:00	Adjourn