

# Center for Game Theory in Economics



## 24<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Game Theory

60th Anniversary of Lloyd Shapley's Papers on the Value and Stochastic Games  
In memory of Jean-Francois Mertens (Tuesday and Thursday afternoon)

July 08 – July 12, 2013

**Organizers:** Bernard De Meyer (Universite de Paris 1)  
Srihari Govindan (University of Rochester)

### Plenary Speakers:

Robert J. Aumann	Sergiu Hart	Larry Samuelson
Geoffroy de Clippel	Johannes Horner	Eilon Solan
Amrita Dhillon	Ehud Kalai	Sylvain Sorin
Francoise Forges	Rida Laraki	Tristan Tomala
Drew Fudenberg	Abraham Neyman	Nicolas Vieille
Olivier Gossner	Philip J. Reny	Shmuel Zamir
	Alvin Roth	

### Roundtable Discussion

**The Present and Future of Game Theory**

July 10, 2013 (16:30 – 19:45)

### Participants:

Robert J. Aumann	Ehud Kalai	Herakles Polemarchakis
Drew Fudenberg	Eric Maskin	Alvin Roth
John Geneakoplos	John Nash	

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# 24<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Game Theory

## CONFERENCE LOCATION

Charles B. Wang Center

July 08 – 12, 2013

<b>Session</b>	<b>Room</b>	
Plenary	Theater	
Roundtable	Theater	
A	Lecture Hall 1	
B	Lecture Hall 2	
C	301	
	<b>July 8-9</b>	<b>July 10-12</b>
D	101	201
E	102	101
F	103	102

### Local Organizing Committee:

Robert J. Aumann  
Sandro Brusco  
Pradeep Dubey  
Abraham Neyman  
Yair Tauman

### Assistants:

Abhinav Anand, Bruno Badia, Yuanyuan Deng, Yupeng Li, Xin Tang,  
Biligbaatar Tumendemberel, Tao Wang, Zhenning Wang, Chang Zhao

Department of Economics  
Stony Brook University

# International Conference on Game Theory

60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Lloyd Shapley's Papers  
on the Values and Stochastic Games

## Schedule of Talks

**Monday, July 8**

9:00 - 9:45	<b>Geoffroy De Clippel</b> (Brown University) On the Selection of Arbitrators					
9:45 - 10:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
	Session A: <i>Cooperative Games</i>	Session B: <i>Bargaining</i>	Session C: <i>Coalition Formation</i>	Session D: <i>Cost Sharing</i>	Session E: <i>Industrial Organization</i>	Session F: <i>Learning/Evolution</i>
10:15 - 10:45	<b>Ziv Hellman</b> (Tel Aviv University) Spectral Value for Coalitional Games	<b>Alfi Jiménez &amp; Andrés Cendales</b> (Uni. Distrital Francisco José de Caldas Uni. de los Andes) The Dark Side of Clientelism	<b>Dominik Karos</b> (Saarland University) Power and Bargaining	<b>Omer Edhan</b> (The University of Manchester) Cost Sharing with Production Constraints	<b>CANCELLED</b>	<b>Georgy Loginov</b> (UW Madison ) Cyclical Behavior in Two-Speed Evolutionary Game Environments
10:45 - 11:15	<b>Chih-Ru Hsiao</b> (Soochow University) A Geometric Interpretation of the Shapley value for TU Games	<b>Andrey Meshalkin</b> (Maastricht University) Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Majoritarian Bargaining	<b>Joosung Lee</b> (Penn State University) Bargaining and Buyout	<b>Ragavendran Gopalakrishna</b> n (Caltech) Potential games are necessary to ensure pure Nash equilibria in cost sharing games	<b>Alex Barrachina</b> (University Carlos III de Madrid) Entry with Two Correlated Signals	<b>Marius-Ionut Ochea</b> (University of Amsterdam) Evolution of Reciprocity in Asymmetric Social Dilemmas
11:15 - 11:45	<b>Rosemarie Nagel</b> (UPF Barcelona, visiting NYU) The agencies method for coalition formation in experimental games	<b>Onur Cobanli</b> (Humboldt University Berlin) Pipeline Power	<b>Karl Robert L. Jandoc</b> (University of Hawai'i) Stable Coalitions with Power Accumulati on	<b>Marc Schröder</b> (Maastricht University) A non-cooperativ e analysis of the estate division problem	<b>Dávid Kopányi</b> (University of Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute) Price-Quantity Competition with Risk-averse Firms	<b>Jason Marden</b> (University of Colorado at Boulder) Selecting Efficient Coarse Correlated Equilibria Through Distributed Learning

11:45 - 12:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
12:00 - 12:45	<b>Ehud Kalai</b> (Northwestern University) Compressed Equilibrium in Large Repeated Games of Incomplete Information					
12:45 - 14:15	<i>Lunch Break</i>					
14:15 - 15:00	<b>Robert John Aumann</b> (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Collectives as Individuals					
15:00 - 15:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
	Session A: <i>Cooperative Games</i>	Session B: <i>Auctions</i>	Session C: <i>Dynamic Games</i>	Session D: <i>Experimental Economics</i>	Session E: <i>Learning/ Evolution</i>	Session F: <i>Bargaining</i>
15:15 - 15:45	<b>Elena Inarra</b> (University of the Basque Country) The von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets for 2x2 games	<b>Eiichiro Kazumori</b> (SUNY at Buffalo) Information Aggregation in Double Auction Markets with Interdependent Values	<b>Fei Li</b> (University of Pennsylvania) Revenue Management without Commitment: Dynamic Pricing and Periodic Fire Sales	<b>Walter Yuan</b> (MobLab Inc) Learning by Playing: Interactive games for game theory classroom	<b>Daniel Wood</b> (Clemson University) Cognitive Biases in Stochastic Coordination Games and Their Evolution	<b>Cheng-Zhong Qin</b> (UC Santa Barbara) A Unification of Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
15:45 - 16:15	<b>Tomasz Michalak</b> (University of Oxford) The Marginality Approach for the Shapley Value in Games with Externalities	<b>XiaoGang Che</b> (University of Alberta, Canada) Entry Deterrence in Dynamic Second-Price Auctions	<b>Saeed Mohammadian Moghayer</b> (University of Amsterdam, and TNO Delft) Stock-dependent discrete-time dynamic pollution games	<b>Nora Szech</b> (University of Bonn) Morals and Markets		<b>Todd Stambaugh</b> (CUNY Graduate Center) Coincidence of Two Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
16:15 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
16:30 - 17:15	<b>Sergiu Hart</b> (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Two(!) Good To Be True					

## Tuesday, July 9

9:00-9:45	<b>Olivier Gossner</b> (Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics) The Appeal of Information Transactions					
9:45-10:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
	Session A: <i>Experimental Economics</i>	Session B: <i>Finance</i>	Session C: <i>Industrial Organization</i>	Session D: <i>Information and Networks</i>	Session E: <i>Matching</i>	Session F: <i>Mechanism Design</i>
10:15 - 10:45	<b>Daniel Cracau</b> (Univ. of Magdeburg) Firm behaviour in price-quantity oligopolies: An experimental study of the mixed strategy equilibrium	<b>Liad Wagman</b> (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern, and IIT) Price Commitments, Screening Incentives, and Privacy Protection: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis	<b>Felipe Zurita</b> (Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile) Competitive pressure and incentives in the quality game: The reputational mechanism	<b>CANCELLED</b>	<b>Emiliya A Lazarova</b> (University of Birmingham) Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty	<b>Yu Chen</b> (Indiana University) Centralization or Decentralization in Multi-Agency Contracting Games?
10:45 - 11:15	<b>J. Stephen Judd</b> (U. Penn CIS) Conflict Begets Cooperation in Socialized KingPawn	<b>Maryam Sami</b> (Stony Brook University) Financial Contagion and Reputational Concerns of Fund Managers in Diversified Funds	<b>Barna Bako</b> (MTA TKI) Exclusive contracts with product differentiation in successive oligopolies	<b>Rupei Xu</b> (University of Minnesota--Twin Cities) Altruism in Local and Global Network Topologies: A Game Theoretic Study of Resource Allocation in Social Networks	<b>Sofya Kiselgo</b> (NRU Higher School of Economics) Matching with interval order preferences: stability and Pareto-efficiency	<b>Heng Liu</b> (University of Rochester) Efficient mechanism design in interdependent-valuation environments
11:15 - 11:45	<b>Lu Dong</b> (Uni. of Nottingham) Trying to Overcome Coordination Failure in a Tough Environment	<b>Yan Liu</b> (Stony Brook University) Bank Competition and Lending Policy over Business Cycles	<b>Robert Somogyi</b> (Ecole Polytechnique) Bertrand-Edgeworth competition with substantial product differentiation	<b>Amparo Urbano</b> (Univ. of Valencia) Local Coordination and Global Congestion in Random Networks	<b>Umut Dur</b> (University of Texas at Austin) Sequential Assignment Problems and Two Applications	<b>Jung You</b> (Rice University) Optimal VCG Mechanisms to Assign Multiple Bids

11:45 - 12:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
12:00 - 12:45	<b>Nicolas Vieille</b> (HEC Paris) Stochastic games: a quick overview				
12:45 - 14:15	<i>Lunch Break</i>				
	<b>MERTENS AFTERNOON</b> (In memory of Jean-Francois Mertens)				
14:15 - 15:00	<b>Francoise Forges</b> (Universite Paris Dauphine) Bayesian repeated games				
15:00 - 15:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
	Session A: <i>Refinements</i>	Session B: <i>Incomplete Information</i>	Session C: <i>Knowledge Expectations</i>	Session D: <i>Stochastic games</i>	Session E: <i>Learning and Evolution</i>
15:15 - 15:45	<b>Matias Nunez</b> (CNRS-Cergy) Hybrid Procedures	<b>Eran Shmaya</b> (Northwestern University) Compressed equilibrium in large repeated games with incomplete information	<b>Alexander Funcke</b> (Stockholm University) Making empathy obsolete: Enforcing equilibrium selection despite path-dependency	<b>Gijs Schoenmakers</b> (Maastricht University) Algorithms for finding subgame perfect equilibria in recursive games with perfect information	<b>Steven Perkins</b> (University of Bristol) Stochastic Fictitious Play with Continuous Action Sets
15:45 - 16:15	<b>Asha Sadanand</b> (University of Guelph) Signalling Games with Multiple Senders	<b>Gregory Pavlov</b> (University of Western Ontario) Correlated equilibria in zero-sum games with incomplete information	<b>Peio Zuazo-Garin</b> (University of the Basque Country) Incomplete Imperfect Information and Backward Induction	<b>János Flesch</b> (Maastricht University) Refinements of subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibrium in games with perfect information	<b>Zibo Xu</b> (Stockholm School of Economics) Convergence of best response dynamics in extensive-form games
16:15 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
16:30 - 17:15	<b>Sylvain Sorin</b> (Université Pierre et Marie Curie - Paris 6) On Reversibility and Oscillations in Zero-sum Discounted Stochastic Games				
18:00 - 22:00	<b>Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)</b>				

## Wednesday, July 10

9:00 - 9:45	<b>Tristan Tomala</b> (HEC Paris) Approximate Implementation In Markovian Environments					
9:45 - 10:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
	Session A: <i>Bargaining</i>	Session B: <i>Mechanism Design</i>	Session C: <i>Solution Concepts</i>	Session D: <i>Voting</i>	Session E: <i>Auctions</i>	Session F: <i>Applications</i>
10:15 - 10:45	<b>Jin Yeub Kim</b> (The University of Chicago) Endogenous Choice of a Mediator	<b>William Phan</b> (University of Rochester) Economies with Replicable Objects	<b>Bruno Salcedo</b> (PennState) Implementation without commitment in moral hazard environments	<b>Javier Rivas</b> (University of Leicester) Deliberation, Leadership and Information Aggregation	<b>Songzi Du</b> (Simon Fraser University) Ex Post Equilibria in Double Auctions of Divisible Assets	<b>Timothy Mathews</b> (Kennesaw State University) A Sequential Choice Model of Family Business Succession
10:45 - 11:15	<b>Paolo Turrini</b> (Imperial College London) Non-cooperative games with preplay negotiations	<b>Philip N. Brown</b> (The University of Colorado at Boulder) Social Coordination in Unknown Price-Sensitive Populations	<b>CANCELLED</b>	<b>Yaron Azrieli</b> (The Ohio State University) The optimal sovereignty partition	<b>Brian Baisa</b> (Yale University) Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences	<b>Georgy Lukyanov</b> (Toulouse School of Economics) Coordination Frictions and Public Communication
11:15 - 11:45		<b>Guy Arie</b> (University of Rochester) Dynamic Costs and Moral Hazard: A Duality Based Approach	<b>Marilda Sotomayor</b> (Universidade de São Paulo) Modeling Cooperative Decision Situations: The Deviation Function Form and The Equilibrium Concept	<b>SunTak Kim</b> (National Taiwan University) Information Acquisition and Voting Mechanisms	<b>Alexander Matros</b> (University of South Carolina) Common Value Mechanisms with Private Information	<b>Timothy Lambie-Hanson</b> (Suffolk University) Shared Risk in n-player Games

11:45 - 12:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
12:00 - 12:45	<b>Philip J. Reny</b> (University of Chicago) Sequential Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games with Infinite Sets of Types and Actions					
12:45 - 14:15	<i>Lunch Break</i>					
14:15 - 15:00	<b>Alvin Roth</b> (Stanford University) Kidney Exchange: Where We've Been and Where We May Be Headed					
15:00 - 15:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
	Session A: <i>Bounded Rationality</i>	Session B: <i>Contracts</i>	Session C: <i>Dynamic Games</i>	Session D: <i>Experimental Economics</i>	Session E: <i>Learning and Evolution</i>	Session F: <i>Computation</i>
15:15 - 15:45	<b>Adrian Marple</b> (Stanford University) Equilibria in Finite Games with Imperfect Recall	<b>Renato Gomes</b> (Toulouse School of Economics) Experimentation and Project Selection: Screening and Learning	<b>Yingni Guo</b> (Yale University) Experimentation with Delegation	<b>Frederic Moisan</b> (University of Toulouse) The Behavioral Effects of Social Ties: an Experimental Study	<b>Yi Zhang</b> (Singapore Management University) Robust Information Cascade with Endogenous Ordering	<b>Marek Jerzy Szopa</b> (University of Silesia) Nash Equilibria of the Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma
15:45 - 16:15	<b>Kota Murayama</b> (Hitotsubashi University) Robust Predictions under Finite Depth of Reasoning	<b>Evangelia Chalioti</b> (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) Team members' ability matters for career concerns	<b>Marco Scarsini</b> (SUTD) Dynamic Congestion Games: The Price of Seasonality	<b>Yun Wang</b> (University of Pittsburgh) An Experimental Investigation on Belief and Higher-Order Belief in the Centipede Games	<b>Ed Hopkins</b> (Edinburgh University) Inequality and Risk Taking Behavior	<b>Yuke Li</b> (Yale University) A Computational Model of Conflict and Cooperation
16:15 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
16:30 - 19:30	<b>Roundtable Discussion: The Present and Future of Game Theory</b>					



# Thursday, July 11

9:00 - 9:45	<b>Eilon Solan</b> (Tel Aviv University) Stopping games				
9:45 - 10:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
	Session A: <i>Experimental Economics</i>	Session B: <i>Mechanism Design</i>	Session C: <i>Voting</i>	Session D: <i>Auctions</i>	Session E: <i>Applications</i>
10:15 - 10:45	<b>Melayne McInnes</b> (University of South Carolina) Lake Wobegon: Experimental Tests of Learning and the “Better than Average Effect”	<b>Andreas Reischmann</b> (AWI, Heidelberg University) A conditional contribution mechanism for the provision of public goods	<b>Boris Ginzburg</b> (University College London) Collective Preference for Ignorance	<b>Frank Rosar</b> (University of Bonn) Optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries	<b>Guocheng Wang</b> (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) Game Modeling and Strategic Behavior Analysis of Stakeholders in Public Goods Provision
10:45 - 11:15	<b>Ernest Lai</b> (Lehigh University) Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response	<b>Ryan Tierney</b> (University of Rochester) Strategy-proofness and Asymptotic Efficiency in Exchange Economies	<b>Ling Yang</b> (University of Pittsburgh) Partisan Voting and Uncertainty	<b>Ram Orzach</b> (Oakland University) Common-Value All-Pay Auctions with Asymmetric Information	<b>Bernhard Ganglmair</b> (University of Texas at Dallas) Framing Games: Evidence-Based Decision Making in an Adversarial Setting
11:15 - 11:45	<b>Heinrich Harald Nax</b> (PSE, Ecole Normale Supérieure) Learning in a Black Box	<b>Abhinav Anand</b> (Stony Brook University) Quotas versus Handicaps: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Armative Action Policies in India	<b>Zhengjia Jiang</b> The Lobbying Game with Asymmetric Information	<b>Sergio Parreiras</b> (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) A Tortoise And A Hare Race, Part I: Finite Horizon	<b>Steven Brams</b> (New York University) Inducible Games: Using Tit-for-Tat to Stabilize Outcomes

11:45 - 12:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
12:00 - 12:45	<b>Amrita Dhillon</b> (University of Warwick) Status incentives and corruption				
12:45 - 14:15	<i>Lunch Break</i>				
	<b>MERTENS AFTERNOON</b> <b>(In memory of Jean-Francois Mertens)</b>				
14:15 - 15:00	<b>Abraham Neyman</b> (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Robust equilibria of continuous-time stochastic games				
15:00 - 15:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
	Session A: <i>Solution Concepts</i>	Session B: <i>Incomplete Information</i>	Session C: <i>Knowledge and Expectations</i>	Session D: <i>Learning and Evolution</i>	Session E: <i>Repeated Games</i>
15:15 - 15:45	<b>Joseph M. Abdou</b> (Paris 1 and PSE) The structure of board games	<b>Andrei Barbos</b> (University of South Florida) Project Screening with Tiered Evaluation	<b>Nuh Aygun Dalkiran</b> (Bilkent University) Common Knowledge and State-dependent Equilibria	<b>Yehuda Levy</b> (Hebrew University) Stochastic Eventual Perfect Monitoring	<b>Yu Awaya</b> (Penn State University) Communication in a Dynamic Prisoner's Dilemma with Incomplete Information
15:45 - 16:15	<b>Vladyslav Nora</b> (Université catholique de Louvain, CORE) Saddle Functions and Robust Sets of Equilibria	<b>Shih En Lu</b> (Simon Fraser University) Robust Almost Fully Revealing Equilibria in Multi-Sender Cheap Talk	<b>Ben Wang</b> (National University of Singapore) An Epistemic Characterization of RSCE	<b>Seung Han Yoo</b> (Korea University) Learning a Population Distribution	<b>Ting Liu</b> (Stony Brook University) Reputation building in credence good markets
16:15 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
16:30 - 17:15	<b>Shmuel Zamir</b> (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Representations of constitutions under incomplete information				

## Friday, July 12

9:00 - 9:45	<b>Drew Fudenberg</b> (Harvard University) Recursive Stochastic Choice				
9:45 - 10:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>				
	Session A: <i>Mechanism Design</i>	Session B: <i>Mechanism Design</i>	Session C: <i>Social and Political Models</i>	Session D: <i>Fairness</i>	Session E: <i>Signalling</i>
10:15 - 10:45	<b>Greg Plaxton</b> (University of Texas at Austin) A Simple Family of Top Trading Cycles Mechanisms for Housing Markets with Indifferences	<b>Daniel Ferguson Garrett</b> (Toulouse School of Economics) Competitive Screening and Search	<b>Bernhard Von Stengel</b> (London School of Economics) Game Theory Explorer - Software for the Applied Game Theorist	<b>Lorini Emiliano</b> (IRIT-CNRS) When the Group Matters: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Team Reasoning and Social Ties	<b>Bernhard Ganglmair</b> (University of Texas at Dallas) Conversation with Secrets
10:45 - 11:15	<b>Christoph Mueller</b> (Carnegie Mellon University) Robust Implementation in Weakly Rationalizable Strategies	<b>Sina Litterscheid</b> (University of Bonn) Sequential, multidimensional Screening	<b>Yi Zhang</b> (Singapore Management University) Anonymous Matching and Group Reputation	<b>Stefania Minardi</b> (HEC Paris) Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish	<b>Sander Heinsalu</b> (Yale University) Continuous time noisy signalling
11:15 - 11:45	<b>Rahul Deb</b> (University of Toronto) Implementation with Securities	<b>Brandon Jonathan Campbell</b> (Texas A&M University) Theory on the Design of Experiments.	<b>Ethem Akyol</b> (The Pennsylvania State University) Welfare Comparison of School Choice Mechanisms under Incomplete Information	<b>Alan Daniel Miller</b> (University of Haifa) A Behavioral Arrow Theorem	<b>Maria Goltsman</b> (University of Western Ontario) On the optimality of diverse expert panels in persuasion games

11:45 - 12:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
12:00 - 12:45	<b>Johannes Horner</b> (Yale University) Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games					
12:45 - 14:15	<i>Lunch Break</i>					
14:15 - 15:00	<b>Rida Laraki</b> (CNRS and Ecole Polytechnique) Higher Order Game Dynamics					
15:00 - 15:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
	Session A: <i>Contracts</i>	Session B: <i>Repeated Games</i>	Session C: <i>Matching</i>	Session D: <i>Auctions</i>	Session E: <i>Bounded Rationality</i>	Session F: <i>Signalling</i>
15:15 - 15:45	<b>Martin Pollrich</b> (Humboldt University Berlin) On the benefits of mediation in contracting problems with limited commitment	<b>Tadashi Sekiguchi</b> (Kyoto University) Multimarket Contact under Demand Fluctuations: A Limit Result	<b>Ahmad Peivandi Karizbodaghi</b> (Northwestern University) Random allocation of bundles	<b>Hanzhe Zhang</b> (University of Chicago) Reserve Price Auctions in a Dynamic Heterogeneous Goods Market	<b>Tatiana Kornienko</b> (University of Edinburgh) A Cognitive Basis for Adaptive Utility	<b>Farishta Satari</b> (CUNY Graduate Center) Cheap Talk in the Presence of an Audience
15:45 - 16:15	<b>Noam Tanner</b> (Yale University) Optimal Delegation Under Uncertain Bias	<b>Juan Ignacio Block</b> (Washington University in St. Louis) Codes of Conduct and Bad Reputation	<b>Peter Troyan</b> (Stanford University) Implementing Diversity in School Choice	<b>Elon Kohlberg</b> (Harvard University) Shapley Value of Stochastic Games	<b>Zsombor Zoltan Meder</b> (Maastricht University) Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency	<b>Jae Kang</b> (University of Pittsburgh) Multiple Experts Informing a Constrained Decision-maker
16:15 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>					
16:30 - 17:15	<b>Larry Samuelson</b> (Yale University) Investment and Matching					