

International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 12-16, 2010

Schedule of Talks

Monday, July 12				
9:00-9:45	Muhamet Yildiz (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) TBA			
9:45-10:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
	Session A: <i>Computation</i>	Session B: <i>Industrial Organization</i>	Session C: <i>Bargaining</i>	Session D: <i>Auctions</i>
10:00 - 10:30	Alex Fabrikant (Princeton University) On the Structure of Weakly Acyclic Games	Gregor Zoettl (University of Munich) Investment decisions in Liberalized Electricity Markets: A Framework of Peak Load Pricing with strategic Firms	Duozhe Li (Chinese University of Hong Kong) One-to-Many Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol	Ram Orzach (Oakland University) Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
10:30 - 11:00	Alberto Motta (University of New South Wales) Collusion and Selective Supervision	Joana Resende (cef.up, University of Porto) Conformity based behavior and the dynamics of price competition: a new rationale for fashion shifts	Toshiji Miyakawa (Osaka University of Economics) Noncooperative Foundation of Nash Bargaining Solution in n-Person Games with Incomplete Information	Federico Weinschelbaum (Universidad de San Andres) On favoritism in auctions with entry
11:00-11:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
	Session A: <i>Cooperative Games</i>	Session B: <i>Industrial Organization</i>	Session C: <i>Social Political Models</i>	Session D: <i>Implementation</i>
11:15 - 11:45	José Manuel Zarzuelo (The Basque Country University) The Consistency of the Harsanyi NTU solution	Romeo Mathew Balanquit (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) Stable Commitment in an Intertemporal Collusive Trade	Doru Cojoc (Stanford University) Running on Policies or on Values? The Choice of Rhetoric In Electoral Competitions	Akira Yokotani (University of Rochester) Knowledge-Belief Space Approach to Robust Implementation
11:45 - 12:15	Matías Alvarado (Centre of Research and Advanced Studies, CINVESTAV) Base Ball sacrifice play strategies: towards the Nash Equilibrium based strategies		SangMok Lee (California Institute of Technology) Strategic Voting in a Jury Trial with Plea Bargaining	Nicolas Alexandre Klein The Importance of Being Honest

12:15-13:45	Lunch Break			
13:45 - 14:30	Dov Samet (Tel Aviv University) What if Achilles and the tortoise were to bargain? An argument against interim agreements			
14:30 - 14:45	Coffee Break			
	<i>Session A: Networks</i>	<i>Session B: Auctions</i>	<i>Session C: Market Games</i>	<i>Session D: Learning Evolution</i>
14:45 - 15:15	Norma Olaizola (University of the Basque Country) Information, stability and dynamics in networks under institutional constraints	Eiichiro Kazumori (University of Tokyo) A Strategic Theory of Markets	Nicholas Ziros (University of Cyprus) Market Games and the Bargaining Set	Bary S.R. Pradelski and Peyton Young (University of Oxford) Efficiency and Equilibrium in Trial and Error Learning
15:15 - 15:45	Vincent Vannetelbosch (CORE) A characterization of farsightedly stable networks	Vijay Krishna (Penn State University) Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections	Francesco Nava (London School of Economics) Quantity Competition in Networked Markets	Zhengzheng Pan (Virginia Tech) Naive Learning and Game Play in a Dual Social Network Framework
15:45 - 16:15	Alison Watts (Southern Illinois University) Fund-Raising Games Played on a Network		Sertac Oruc (TU Delft) An electricity market incentive game based on time-of-use tariff	Andriy Zapechelnyuk (Queen Mary University of London) Decision Making in Uncertain and Changing Environments
16:15 - 16:30	Coffee Break			
16:30 - 17:15	William Sandholm (University of Wisconsin) Evolutionary game theory: overview and recent results			

Tuesday, July 13

9:00 - 9:45	Philip J. Reny (University of Chicago) Further Results on the Existence of Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games			
9:45- 10:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
	<i>Session A: Industrial Organization</i>	<i>Session B: Voting</i>	<i>Session C: Repeated Games</i>	<i>Session D: Social Choice</i>
10:00 - 10:30	Margarita Gladkova (Graduate school of management, St. Petersburg state university) Game-theoretical model of service quality indicators choice: mobile service market	Steven Brams (New York University) Satisfaction Approval Voting	Axel Bernergård (Stockholm School of Economics) Repeated Games with Time-Inconsistent Preferences	Guillermo Flores (Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú) Game Theory and the Law: The Legal-Rules-Acceptability Theorem (A rationale for non-compliance with legal rules)
10:30 - 11:00	Elina Zhukova (Saint-Petersburg State University (Russia)) The quality-price competition models' analysis: equilibrium solutions and cooperation	Santiago Oliveros (Haas School of Business-University of California, Berkeley) Combinatorial Voting	Kimmo Berg (Aalto University School of Science and Technology) Equilibrium Paths in Discounted Supergames	Fernando Tohme (Universidad Nacional del Sur - Argentina) Fixed Points of Choice-Improving Correspondences on the Space of Direct Mechanisms and Implementability
11:00 - 11:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
	<i>Session A: Learning Evolution</i>	<i>Session B: Repeated Games</i>	<i>Session C: Auctions</i>	<i>Session D: Auctions</i>
11:15 - 11:45	Jonathan Charles Scott Newton (University of Cambridge) Non-cooperative convergence to the core in Nash demand games without random errors or convexity assumptions	Tadashi Sekiguchi (Kyoto University) Finitely Repeated Games with Monitoring Options	Omer Biran (Université Paris-Dauphine) Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities	Nicholas Shunda (University of Redlands) All-Pay Auctions with Regret
11:45 - 12:15	Reinoud Joosten (University of Twente) Paul Samuelson's critique and equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theory	Yuichiro Kamada (Harvard University) Asynchronous Revision Games with Deadline: Unique Equilibrium in Coordination Games	Rafael Tenorio (DePaul University) Listing attributes and seller competition in internet auctions	Gabor Virag (University of Rochester) First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders

12:15 - 13:45	<i>Lunch Break</i>			
13:45 - 14:30	Wojciech Olszewski (Northwestern University) Attributes			
14:30 - 14:45	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
	Session A: <i>Repeated/Stochastic Games</i>	Session B: <i>Mechanism Design</i>	Session C: <i>Applications</i>	Session D: <i>Experimental Economics</i>
14:45 - 15:15	Yuval Heller (School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel-Aviv University) Sequential correlated equilibria in stopping games	Anqi Li (Stanford University) Selling Storable Goods to a Dynamic Population of Buyers: A Mechanism Design Approach	Regis Deloche (Paris Descartes University) On the Optimality of a Duty-to-Rescue Rule and the Bystander Effect	Matthew Patrick Haney (JHU) T.V.'s "Jeopardy!": A Rich Empirical Data Set for Behavioral Economics
15:15 - 15:45	Yves Gueron (University College London) On the Folk Theorem with One-Dimensional Payoffs and Different Discount Factors	Yutaka Suzuki (Hosei University) Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision: A Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types, including Applications to Organizational Design	Andreas Blume (University of Pittsburgh) Language Barriers	Ernest Lai (Lehigh University) Authority and Communication in the Laboratory
15:45 - 16:15	Xavier Venel (University Toulouse 1 Capitole) Commutative stochastic games	Fabrizio Germano (Northwestern University) Dynamic Information Aggregation with Biased Experts	Shi Chen (Pennsylvania State University) A game theory model for predator-prey dynamics	Tyson Hartwig (Rutgers-Camden) An Experimental Investigation of Costly and Discrete Communication
16:15 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
16:30 - 17:15	Sergiu Hart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Comparing Risks by Acceptance and Rejection			

Wednesday, July 14

9:00 - 9:45	Larry Samuelson (Yale University) Common Learning			
9:45 - 10:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
	<i>Session A: Industrial Organization</i>	<i>Session B: Solution Concepts</i>	<i>Session C: Voting</i>	<i>Session D: Information Networks</i>
10:00 - 10:30	Massimo De Francesco (University of Siena) Bertrand-Edgeworth games under oligopoly with a complete characterization for the triopoly	Yaron Azrieli (The Ohio State University) Pure equilibria in non-anonymous large games	Yong Sui (Shanghai Jiao Tong University) A Contest Theoretical Study of Class Action	Hideki Fujiyama (Dokkyo University) Network Centrality and Activities in Small Social Networking Sites (SNS)
10:30 - 11:00	Pei-yu (Melody) Lo (The University of Hong Kong) Reputation and Competition for Information Intermediaries	Chang-Koo(CK) Chi (University of Wisconsin-Madison) Relational Executive Contact with Capital Investment	Takuo Sugaya (Princeton University) Policy Announcement Game: Valence Candidates and Ambiguous Policies	
11:00 - 11:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
	<i>Session A: Industrial Organization</i>	<i>Session B: Cooperative Games</i>	<i>Session C: Matching</i>	<i>Session D: Information Networks</i>
11:15 - 11:45	Ming Gao (London Business School) Games with Rational Inattention-- Coordination with Endogenous Information	Gabriel Julio Turbay (Fundacion para la cooperacion internacional) N-Person Cooperative Games Strategic-Equilibrium	Flip Klijn (Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC)) Farsighted House Allocation	Britta Hoyer (Utrecht University) Strategic Network Disruption
11:45 - 12:15	Jaesoo Kim (IUPUI) Price Discrimination for Bayesian Buyers	Lars Peter Raahave Østerdal (University of Copenhagen) Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results		Alan Daniel Miller (California Institute of Technology) Rules for Aggregating Information

12:15 - 13:45	<i>Lunch Break</i>			
13:45 - 14:30	Eran Shmaya (Northwestern University) Describable tests need not be manipulable			
14:30 - 14:45	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
	<i>Session A: Cooperative Games</i>	<i>Session B: Mechanism Design</i>	<i>Session C: Stochastic Models</i>	<i>Session D: Auctions</i>
14:45 - 15:15	Silvia De la Sierra (Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México) Factors Contribution to Poverty Index : 2FGT	Juan Carlos Carbajal (University of Queensland (Australia)) Implementation and revenue equivalence without differentiability	Salomon Antoine (LAGA Université Paris 13) Correlated Bandit Game	Chien Liang Chen (Shin Hsin University) Bid or Wait? Theory and Evidence of Auctions for Foreclosed
15:15 - 15:45	Miklos Pinter (Corvinus University of Budapest) Young's axiomatization of the Shapley value - a new proof	Vikram Manjunath (University of Rochester) When too little is as good as nothing at all: Rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds	Jerome Renault (TSE (GREMAQ), University Toulouse 1) Dynamic Sender-Receiver Games	Brennan Platt (Brigham Young University) Auctions for Priority Access
15:45 - 16:15	Jean-François Caulier (Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis, Bruxelles, Belgium) Coalitional Network Games	Aaron Bodoh-Creed (Stanford University) The Simple Behavior of Large Mechanisms	Takashi Shimizu (Kansai University) Cheap Talk with an Exit Option: A Model of Exit and Voice	Guido Maretto (ECARES - Université Libre de Bruxelles) Contracts with Aftermarkets - Hidden Actions
16:15 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
16:30 - 17:15	Johannes Horner (Yale University) Selling information			
18:00 - 22:00	Reception Dinner (Jasmine, Charles B. Wang Center)			

Thursday, July 15

9:00 - 9:45	Olivier Gossner (Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics) The robustness of incomplete codes of law
9:45 - 10:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>
10:00 - 10:30	Alfredo Di Tillio (Bocconi University) Reasoning about Conditional Probability and Counterfactuals
10:30 - 11:00	Eduardo Faingold (Yale University) The strategic impact of higher-order beliefs
11:00 - 11:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>
11:15 - 11:45	Marco Scarsini (LUISS) On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games
11:45 - 12:15	Todd Kaplan (University of Haifa) The Benefits of Costly Voting
12:15 - 13:45	<i>Lunch Break</i>
13:45 - 14:30	Robert John Aumann (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) TBA
14:30 - 14:45	<i>Coffee Break</i>
14:45 - 15:30	Abraham Neyman (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) TBA
15:30 - 16:15	Shmuel Zamir (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) On Bayesian-Nash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case
16:15 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>
16:30 - 17:15	Al Roth (Harvard University) Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets
18:00 - 21:30	Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)

Friday, July 16

9:00 - 9:45	Philippe Jehiel (University College London and PSE) On Transparency in Organizations			
9:45 - 10:00	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
	Session A: <i>Learning Evolution</i>	Session B: <i>Incomplete Information</i>	Session C: <i>Bargaining</i>	Session D: <i>Networks</i>
10:00 - 10:30	Fernando Louge (Bielefeld University) On The Stability Of CSS Under The Replicator Dynamic With Strategic Complements	Ming Yang (Princeton University) Global Games with Endogenous Information Structure-- A Rational Inattention Approach	Daniele Condorelli (Northwestern University) Dynamic Bilateral Trading in Networks	Elias Tsakas (Maastricht University) On consensus through communication without a commonly known protocol
10:30 - 11:00		In-Uck Park (University of Bristol, UK) Seller Reputation and Trust in Pre-Trade Communication	Selcuk Ozyurt (Sabanci University) Searching a Bargain: Play it Cool or Haggle	Matthew P. Johnson (City University of New York) The Bridge Policy Problem
11:00 - 11:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
	Session A: <i>Learning Evolution</i>	Session B: <i>Incomplete Information</i>	Session C: <i>Repeated Games</i>	Session D: <i>Coalition Formation</i>
11:15 - 11:45	Russell Golman (Carnegie Mellon University) Why Learning Doesn't Add Up: Equilibrium Selection with a Composition of Learning Rules	Ori Haimanko (Ben-Gurion University) Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change	Alexander Wolitzky (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Repeated Public Good Provision	Vincent Vannetelbosch (CORE) Coalition formation among farsighted agents
11:45 - 12:15	Yi Zhang (Singapore Management University) Robust Information Cascade with Endogenous Ordering	Ziv Hellman (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Almost Common Priors	Ayca Ozdogan (University of Minnesota) Reputation Effects in Two-Sided Incomplete- Information Games	Ana Mauleon (Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis) Contractually Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities

12:15 - 13:45	<i>Lunch Break</i>			
13:45 - 14:30	Michael Kearns (University of Pennsylvania) Behavioral Game Theory in Social Networks			
14:30 - 14:45	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
	<i>Session A: Contracts</i>	<i>Session B: Mechanism Design</i>	<i>Session C: Bargaining</i>	<i>Session D: Solution Concepts</i>
14:45 - 15:15	Hassan Faghani Dermi (Washington University in St. Louis) Cognition Investment, Accuracy Significance and Contracts' Incompleteness	Pinghan Liang (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona) Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy	Rohan Dutta (Washington University in St. Louis) Bargaining with Revoking Costs	William Geller (Indiana U-Purdue U Indianapolis) Robust equilibria and epsilon-dominance
15:15 - 15:45	Wolf Gick (Harvard University) Auditing the Intermediary	Maria Polukarov (University of Southampton) Linear Mechanisms for Single-Parameter Domains: Characterization, Existence, and Construction	Stephan Laueremann (University of Michigan) Adverse Selection with Search	Sambuddha Ghosh (Boston University) Games with Real Talk
15:45 - 16:15		Guilherme Freitas (Caltech) Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences		Noah Stein (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) A fixed point free proof of Nash's Theorem via exchangeable equilibria
16:15 - 16:30	<i>Coffee Break</i>			
16:30 - 17:15	M. Utku Ünver (Boston College) A Theory of House Allocation and Exchange Mechanisms			