International Conference on Game Theory

Zoom Webinar

July 20 - 24, 2020

All times in Eastern Time (GMT -4)

Click on the paper title for more information and the talk recording.

Monday, July 20
Session Chairs: Marina Halac, Navin Kartik

09:30 - 10:15

Éva Tardos  (Cornell University)
Stability and Learning in Strategic Queuing Systems

10:15 - 11:00

Tilman Börgers  (University of Michigan)
Learning Simplicity

11:00 - 11:15

Break

11:15 - 12:00

Plenary Address
Daron Acemoglu  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets

12:00 - 12:45

Break

12:45 - 13:30

Plenary Address
Yuliy Sannikov  (Stanford Graduate School of Business)
Moral Hazard in Stochastic Differential Games: Beyond Markov Equilibrium

13:30 - 13:45

Break

13:45 - 14:30

John Geanakoplos  (Yale University)
Money and Status: How to Incentivize Work in a Meritocracy

14:30 - 15:15

Alexander Frankel  (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
Information Hierarchies

15:15 - 16:00

Andreas Blume  (University of Arizona)
Information Processing: Contracts versus Communication

 

Tuesday, July 21
Session Chairs: Yair Tauman, Pradeep Dubey

09:30 - 10:15

Ran Spiegler  (Tel Aviv University )
Cheating with (Recursive) Models

10:15 - 11:00

Kareen Rozen  (Brown University)
Bad Repetition

11:00 - 11:15

Break

11:15 - 12:00

Plenary Address
Robert J. Aumann  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
A Synthesis of Behavioral and Mainstream Economics

12:00 - 12:45

Break

12:45 - 13:30

J. Aislinn Bohren  (University of Pennsylvania)
Inaccurate Statistical Discrimination: An Identification Problem

13:30 - 14:15

Ignacio Esponda  (University of California Santa Barbara)
Asymptotic Behavior of Bayesian Learners with Misspecified Models

14:15 - 14:30

Break

14:30 - 15:15

Dirk Bergemann  (Yale University)
Search, Information and Prices

15:15 - 16:00

Hector Chade  (Arizona State University)
Screening in Vertical Oligopolies

 

Wednesday, July 22
Session Chairs: Sandro Brusco, Ting Liu

09:30 - 10:15

Myrna Wooders  (Vanderbilt University)
Non-Cooperative Team Formation and a Team Formation Mechanism

10:15 - 11:00

George J. Mailath  (University of Pennsylvania)
Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing Under Frictions

11:00 - 11:15

Break

11:15 - 12:00

Plenary Address
Oliver Hart  (Harvard University)
Prosocial Corporate Governance

12:00 - 12:45

Break

12:45 - 13:30

Vasiliki Skreta  (UT Austin and University College London)
Test Design Under Unobservable Falsification

13:30 - 14:15

Kyungmin Kim  (Emory University)
Competition under Moment Conditions

14:15 - 14:30

Break

14:30 - 15:15

Juan Ortner  (Boston University)
Bargaining with Evolving Private Information

15:15 - 16:00

Marcin Pęski  (University of Toronto)
Bargaining under Incomplete Information

 

Thursday, July 23
Session Chairs: Eran Shmaya, Mihai Manea

09:30 - 10:15

Jörgen Weibull  (Stockholm School of Economics)
John Nash Meets Immanuel Kant: Moral Motivation in Strategic Interactions

10:15 - 11:00

Aviad Heifetz  (The Open University of Israel)
Liberal Parentalism

11:00 - 11:15

Break

11:15 - 12:00

Plenary Address
Parag Pathak  (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing

12:00 - 12:45

Break

12:45 - 13:30

Plenary Address
Matthew Gentzkow  (Stanford University)
Ideological Bias and Trust in Information Sources

13:30 - 13:45

Break

13:45 - 14:30

Marzena Rostek  (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Decentralized Market Design

14:30 - 15:15

Yeon-Koo Che  (Columbia University)
Weak Monotone Comparative Statics

15:15 - 16:00

Leeat Yariv  (Princeton University)
Dominance Solvability in Random Games

 

Friday, July 24
Session Chairs: Marina Halac, Navin Kartik

09:30 - 10:15

Nicole Immorlica  (Microsoft Research New England)
Incentivizing Exploration with Selective Data Disclosure

10:15 - 11:00

Sven Rady  (Universitat Bonn)
Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games

11:00 - 11:15

Break

11:15 - 12:00

**CANCELLED**
Plenary Address
Jean Tirole  (Toulouse School of Economics)
Digital Dystopia

12:00 - 12:45

Break

12:45 - 13:30

S. Nageeb Ali  (Pennsylvannia State University)
Reselling Information

13:30 - 14:15

Rachel E. Kranton  (Duke University)
Social Networks and the Market for News

14:15 - 14:30

Break

14:30 - 15:15

Hülya K. K. Eraslan  (Rice University)
Efficiency with Political Power Dynamics and Costly Policy Change

15:15 - 16:00

Lones Smith  (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
The Behavioral SIR Model with Applications to COVID-19 and the Swine Flu Pandemics

 

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