Stony Brook Center for Game Theory

International Conference on Game Theory

Zoom Webinar

July 20 - 24, 2020

All times in Eastern Time (GMT -4)

Click on the paper title for more information and the talk recording.

Monday, July 20 Session Chairs: Marina Halac, Navin Kartik
09:30 - 10:15	Éva Tardos (Cornell University) Stability and Learning in Strategic Queuing Systems
10:15 - 11:00	Tilman Börgers (University of Michigan) Learning Simplicity
11:00 - 11:15	Break
11:15 - 12:00	Plenary Address Daron Acemoglu (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets
12:00 - 12:45	Break
12:45 - 13:30	Plenary Address Yuliy Sannikov (Stanford Graduate School of Business) Moral Hazard in Stochastic Differential Games: Beyond Markov Equilibrium
13:30 - 13:45	Break
13:45 - 14:30	John Geanakoplos (Yale University) Money and Status: How to Incentivize Work in a Meritocracy
14:30 - 15:15	Alexander Frankel (University of Chicago Booth School of Business) Information Hierarchies
15:15 - 16:00	Andreas Blume (University of Arizona) Information Processing: Contracts versus Communication

Tuesday, July 21 Session Chairs: Yair Tauman, Pradeep Dubey
09:30 - 10:15	Ran Spiegler (Tel Aviv University ) Cheating with (Recursive) Models
10:15 - 11:00	Kareen Rozen (Brown University) Bad Repetition
11:00 - 11:15	Break
11:15 - 12:00	Plenary Address Robert J. Aumann (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) A Synthesis of Behavioral and Mainstream Economics
12:00 - 12:45	Break
12:45 - 13:30	J. Aislinn Bohren (University of Pennsylvania) Inaccurate Statistical Discrimination: An Identification Problem
13:30 - 14:15	Ignacio Esponda (University of California Santa Barbara) Asymptotic Behavior of Bayesian Learners with Misspecified Models
14:15 - 14:30	Break
14:30 - 15:15	Dirk Bergemann (Yale University) Search, Information and Prices
15:15 - 16:00	Hector Chade (Arizona State University) Screening in Vertical Oligopolies

Wednesday, July 22 Session Chairs: Sandro Brusco, Ting Liu
09:30 - 10:15	Myrna Wooders (Vanderbilt University) Non-Cooperative Team Formation and a Team Formation Mechanism
10:15 - 11:00	George J. Mailath (University of Pennsylvania) Coalition-Proof Risk Sharing Under Frictions
11:00 - 11:15	Break
11:15 - 12:00	Plenary Address Oliver Hart (Harvard University) Prosocial Corporate Governance
12:00 - 12:45	Break
12:45 - 13:30	Vasiliki Skreta (UT Austin and University College London) Test Design Under Unobservable Falsification
13:30 - 14:15	Kyungmin Kim (Emory University) Competition under Moment Conditions
14:15 - 14:30	Break
14:30 - 15:15	Juan Ortner (Boston University) Bargaining with Evolving Private Information
15:15 - 16:00	Marcin Pęski (University of Toronto) Bargaining under Incomplete Information

Thursday, July 23 Session Chairs: Eran Shmaya, Mihai Manea
09:30 - 10:15	Jörgen Weibull (Stockholm School of Economics) John Nash Meets Immanuel Kant: Moral Motivation in Strategic Interactions
10:15 - 11:00	Aviad Heifetz (The Open University of Israel) Liberal Parentalism
11:00 - 11:15	Break
11:15 - 12:00	Plenary Address Parag Pathak (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing
12:00 - 12:45	Break
12:45 - 13:30	Plenary Address Matthew Gentzkow (Stanford University) Ideological Bias and Trust in Information Sources
13:30 - 13:45	Break
13:45 - 14:30	Marzena Rostek (University of Wisconsin-Madison) Decentralized Market Design
14:30 - 15:15	Yeon-Koo Che (Columbia University) Weak Monotone Comparative Statics
15:15 - 16:00	Leeat Yariv (Princeton University) Dominance Solvability in Random Games

Friday, July 24 Session Chairs: Marina Halac, Navin Kartik
09:30 - 10:15	Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research New England) Incentivizing Exploration with Selective Data Disclosure
10:15 - 11:00	Sven Rady (Universitat Bonn) Overcoming Free-Riding in Bandit Games
11:00 - 11:15	Break
11:15 - 12:00	CANCELLED Plenary Address Jean Tirole (Toulouse School of Economics) Digital Dystopia
12:00 - 12:45	Break
12:45 - 13:30	S. Nageeb Ali (Pennsylvannia State University) Reselling Information
13:30 - 14:15	Rachel E. Kranton (Duke University) Social Networks and the Market for News
14:15 - 14:30	Break
14:30 - 15:15	Hülya K. K. Eraslan (Rice University) Efficiency with Political Power Dynamics and Costly Policy Change
15:15 - 16:00	Lones Smith (University of Wisconsin-Madison) The Behavioral SIR Model with Applications to COVID-19 and the Swine Flu Pandemics

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