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Tuesday, July 16 |
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Theater
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LH1
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LH2
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9:30 - 10:15 |
Michihiro Kandori
(University of Tokyo)
Misperception and the Evolution of Cooperation
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Mehmet Ekmekci
(Boston College)
Informal Elections With Dispersed Information
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Eric Budish
(University of Chicago)
Will the Market Fix the Market? A Theory of Stock Exchange Competition and Innovation
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10:15 - 11:00 |
Jeffrey Ely
(Northwestern University)
Feedback Design in Dynamic Contests
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Itai Ashlagi
(Stanford University)
Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations
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Satoru Takahashi
(National University of Singapore)
Optimal Stress Tests: Information Design with Adversarial Equilibrium Selection in Supermodular Games
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11:00 - 11:30 |
Coffee Break
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Theater: Implementation
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LH1: Strategic Communication
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LH2: Matching
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Chapel: Mechanism Design
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101: Knowledge & Information
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102: Experimental Economics
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11:30 - 11:50 |
Chun-Ting Chen
(National Taiwan University)
Correlation with Forwarding
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David Rahman
(University of Minnesota)
Contractual Pricing with Incentive Constraints
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Marilda Sotomayor
(EPGE-FGV & USP-SP, Brazil)
Conflict-free and Pareto-optimal allocations in matching markets: A solution concept weaker than the core
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Andres Perlroth
(Stanford University)
Revenue maximization with heterogeneous discounting: Auctions and pricing
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Dean Jens
(University of Central Florida)
Risk Dominance, Beliefs, and Equilibrium
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Jordan Adamson
(Chapman University)
Agglomeration and the Extent of the Market
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11:50 - 12:10 |
Huiyi Guo
(Texas A&M University)
Coalition-Proof Mechanisms Under Correlated Information
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Tridib Sharma
(ITAM)
Sequential Expert Advice: Superiority of Closed Door Meetings.
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Kentaro Tomoeda
(University of Technology Sydney)
Sophistication and Cautiousness in College Applications
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Ady Pauzner
(Tel Aviv University)
Bilateral Trade With a Benevolent Intermediary
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Rohit Parikh
(City University of New York)
To What Extent is a Group an Individual?
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Paul J Healy
(The Ohio State University)
Epistemic Experiments: Utilities, Beliefs, and Irrational Play
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12:10 - 12:30 |
Xuesong Huang
(Rutgers University)
Incentive Compatible Self-fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations
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Isaac Swift
(University of Minnesota)
Reputation for Persuasion
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Akhil Vohra
(Stanford University)
Unraveling in the Presence of a Secondary Market
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Mihai Manea
(Stony Brook University)
Resource Destruction in Optimal Mechanisms for Bilateral Trade
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Peio Zuazo-Garin
(Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
Rationalizability, Observability and Common Knowledge
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Rene Levinsky
(Economics Institute of the Czech Academy od Sciences)
Preferences, Beliefs, and Strategic Plays in Games
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12:30 - 14:00 |
Lunch Break
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Theater
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LH1
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LH2
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14:00 - 14:45 |
Dilip Abreu
(New York University)
Equilibrium selection in Repeated Games with Patient Players
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Ran Shorrer
(Penn State University)
Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes
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Ehud Kalai
(Northwestern University)
Viable Nash Equilibria I
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14:45 - 15:15 |
Coffee Break
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Theater: Matching & Cooperative Games
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LH1: Bias & Polarization in Opinion Formation
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LH2: Dynamic Games & Reputations
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Chapel: Mechanism Design
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101: Bounded Rationality & Computation
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102: Experimental Economics
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201: Incomplete Information
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15:15 - 15:35 |
Satoshi Masuya
(Daito Bunka University)
The Shapley Value of the Lower Game for Partially Defined Cooperative Games
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Krishna Dasaratha
(Harvard University)
Belief Polarization and News on Social Media
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Daniel Clark
(MIT)
Robust Cooperation with First-Order Information
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Shurojit Chatterji
(Singapore Management University)
Probabilistic Generalized Median Voter Schemes: A Robust Characterization
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Mengke Wang
(Duke University, University of Sydney)
Self-Similar Beliefs in Games with Strategic Substitutes
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Kirby Nielsen
(Stanford University)
A Systematic Test of the Independence Axiom
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Siyu Ma
(Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya)
Attacking a nuclear facility with a noisy intelligence and Bayesian agents
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15:35 - 15:55 |
T.E.S. Raghaven
(University of Illinois at Chicago)
Measuring the power of the dominant partner among married couple
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Rahmi Ilkilic
(Universidad de Chile)
Opinion Polarization under Search for Peers
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Mehmet Ekmekci
(Boston College)
Reputation and Screening in a Noisy Environment with Irreversible Actions
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Arthur Dolgopolov
(George Mason University)
Mechanism Design with Memory and no Money
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Sakshi Upadhyay
(Virginia Polytechnic Institute)
To Join or not to Join: Coalition Formation in Public Good Games
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Chloe Tergiman
(PSU)
Preferences for Power
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Yuehui Wang
(University of California San Diego)
Cheaper Talk
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15:55 - 16:15 |
Isa Hafalir
(UTS)
Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment
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Suraj Malladi
(Stanford University)
Learning Through the Grapevine: The Impact of Message Mutation, Transmission Failure, and Deliberate Bias
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Harry Pei
(Northwestern University)
Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment
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Eiichiro Kazumori
(The University of Massachusetts)
Games Where Players Offers Games to Play: A Foundation of Market Design
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Bahman Kalantari
(Rutgers University)
Approximating Nash Equilibrium Via Multilinear Minimax
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Qichao Shi
(Lehigh University)
Shuffling as a Sales Tactics: An Experimental Study of Selling Expert Advice
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Wenhao Wu
(University of Arizona)
Persuasive Disclosure
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16:15 - 16:35 |
Aram Grigoryan
(Duke University)
Efficient and Envy Minimal Assignment
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Pooya Molavi
(MIT)
Media Capture: A Bayesian Persuasion Perspective
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Jian Sun
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Reputation Concerns Under At-Will Employment
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Andrew Mackenzie
(Maastricht University)
Strategy-proofness and perfect mechanisms
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Chun Leung Lau
(Rutgers University)
The Multilinear Minimax Relaxation of Bimatrix Games and Comparison with Nash Equilibria via Lemke-Howson
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Yoshifumi Yokota
(Boston University)
Preference, Rationalizability and Robustness in Games with Incomplete Information
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16:35 - 17:00 |
Coffee Break
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17:00 - 17:45 |
Al Roth
(Stanford University)
Market Design and Game Theory in a Large World
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18:00 - 22:00 |
Conference Dinner at Three Village Inn
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Wednesday, July 17 |
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Theater
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LH1
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LH2
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9:30 - 10:15 |
Matthew Jackson
(Stanford University)
Network Structure, Coordination Games, and Behavioral Communities
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Jacob Leshno
(University of Chicago)
An Economic Analysis of the Bitcoin Payment System
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Annie Liang
(University of Pennsylvania)
Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Coffee Break
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Theater: Repeated Games
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LH1: Networks
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LH2: Matching
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Chapel: Knowledge & Information
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101: Market Games
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102: Industrial Organization & Finance
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201: Continuation Session by Ehud Kalai
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10:45 - 11:05 |
Zirou Chen
(University of Rochester)
Middlemen and Reputation
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Krishna Dasaratha
(Harvard University)
Social Learning and Innovation
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Kartik Ahuja
(UCLA)
Dynamic Matching and Allocation of Tasks
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Wioletta Dziuda
(University of Chicago)
Communication with Detectable Deceit
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Heinrich Harald Nax
(ETH Zurich)
Feedback effects in the experimental double auction with private information
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Dana María Pizarro
(Universidad de Chile)
Bounding the Value of Observability in a Dynamic Pricing Problem
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Viable Nash Equilibria II
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11:05 - 11:25 |
Xin Gao
(University of Mannheim)
Reputational Cheap Talk vs. Reputational Delegation
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Ben Golub
(Harvard University)
Targeting Interventions in Networks
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Ahmet Altinok
(Arizona State University)
May-to-One Dynamic Matching
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Ziv Hellman
(Bar Ilan University)
Valuing Information by Repeated Signals
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Yan Wang
(Stony Brook University)
How the market structure affects the r&d decision when acquisition is possible?
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Ayan Bhattacharya
(City University of New York, Baruch College)
Hardness of Learning in Rich Environments and Some Consequences for Financial Markets
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Viable Nash Equilibria II
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11:25 - 11:45 |
Mikhail Panov
(New York University)
Observable Actions in Continuous Time:
Costly Transfers in Repeated Cooperation
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Pellumb Reshidi
(Princeton University)
Sequencing Naive Social Learning
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Deniz Dizdar
(University of Montreal)
Competing Pre-match Investments Revisited: A Precise Characterization of the Limits of Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Large Markets
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Kohei Iwasaki
(University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Rational Bubbles and Middlemen
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Weiwei Zheng
(George Mason University)
Competition with Indivisibilities and Few Traders
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Sang-Ha Yoon
(Stony brook University)
Firm Entry Decline, Market Structure and Dominant Firm’s Productivity
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Viable Nash Equilibria II
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11:45 - 13:15 |
Lunch Break
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Theater
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LH1
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LH2
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13:15 - 14:00 |
Drew Fudenberg
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Player Compatible Equilibrium
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Abraham Neyman
(Hebrew University)
Optimization with Limited Memory in Stochastic Games
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Rakesh Vohra
(Northwestern University)
Instability of Centralized Markets
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Theater: Applications
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LH1: Networks
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LH2: Finance
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Chapel: Mechanism Design
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101: Learning & Evolution
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102: Information Economics
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14:10 - 14:30 |
Xingwei Hu
(IMF)
College Ranking by Revealed Preference From Big Data: An Authority-Distribution Analysis
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Anastas Tenev
(Maastricht University)
Stronger bonds with less connected agents in stable resource sharing networks
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Martin Szydlowski
(University of Minnesota)
Monitor Reputation and Transparency
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Yangwei Song
(Humboldt University Berlin)
Efficient Design With Small Informational Size and Maxmin Agents
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Kimberly Gannon
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
An Evolutionary Justification for Overconfidence
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Nasimeh Heydaribeni
(University of Michigan)
Characterizing non-myopic information cascades in Bayesian learning
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14:30 - 14:50 |
Brian Reed Powers
(Arizona State University)
N-Player Final-Offer Arbitration: Harmonic Numbers in Equilibrium
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Wenji Xu
(The University of Chicago)
Social Learning under Information Control
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Zafer Kanik
(Massachusetts Institute of Technology)
Can Rescues by Banks Replace Costly Bail-Outs in Financial Networks?
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Constantine Sorokin
(Glasgow University)
Adverse implementation
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Tatiana Mayskaya
(Higher School of Economics)
When Should We Care About Privacy? Information Collection in Games
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Svetlana Boyarchenko
(University of Texas, Austin)
Strategic exit with information and payoff externalities
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14:50 - 15:10 |
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Manuel Foerster
(University of Hamburg)
Shadow links
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Hanzhe Zhang
(Michigan State University)
Overcoming Borrowing Stigma: The Design of Lending-of-Last-Resort Policies
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Wojciech Olszewski
(Northwestern University)
A result on convergence of sequences of iteration, with applications to best-response dynamics
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Vasudha Jain
(University of Texas at Austin)
Competing to persuade a rationally inattentive agent
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15:10 - 15:30 |
Coffee Break
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Theater: Voting & Political Models
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LH1: Sharing in Networks
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LH2: Matching
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Chapel: Mechanism Design
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101: Learning & Evolution
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102: Information Economics
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201: Bargaining
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15:30 - 15:50 |
Steven Brams
(New York University)
The Excess Method: A Multiwinner Approval Voting Procedure to Allocate Wasted Votes
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Lining Han
(Wuhan University)
Truthful Intermediation with Monetary Punishment
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Maciej H. Kotowski
(Harvard University)
A Perfectly Robust Approach to Multiperiod Matching Problems
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Qinggong Wu
(Chinese University of Hong Kong)
Getting Information from Your Enemies
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Tao Wang
(Nanjing Audit University)
Strong Stochastic Dominance
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Daniel Monte
(Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV)
Information Design with Recommender Systems
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Heng Liu
(University of Michigan)
Robust Predictions in Bargaining with Incomplete Information
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15:50 - 16:10 |
Marie Thea How Choon
(Boston University)
Very Biased Political Experts: Cheap Talk, Persuasion and the Political Extremes
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Ruben Juarez
(University of Hawaii)
Incentive-Compatible Simple Mechanisms
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Andy Luchuan Liu
(South University of science & technology)
Multipartite Games And Evolutionary Stable Matching
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Renkun Yang
(Ohio State University)
Termination fee as a sequential screening device
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Erik Lillethun
(Colgate University)
Optimal Information Design for Reputation Building
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Jack Anthony Fanning
(Brown University)
Bargaining over Contingent Contracts Under Incomplete Information
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16:10 - 16:30 |
Guillermo Flores
(Universidad del Pacífico)
Game Theory and the Law: Legal Rationality (Legal Interpretation)
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Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
(Universidad Pablo de Olavide)
Optimal Management of Evolving Hierarchies
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Ali Polat
(Carnegie Mellon University)
Accommodating Cardinal, Ordinal and Mixed Preferences: An Extended Preference Domain for the Assignment Problem
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Seung Han Yoo
(Korea University)
Membership Mechanism
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Jiabin Wu
(University of Oregon)
Intergenerational Transmission of Preferences and the Marriage Market
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Nikolaus Robalino
(Rochester Institute of Technology)
Selling Reputational Information
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Dominik Karos
(Maastricht University)
The Midpoint Constrained Egalitarian Bargaining Solution
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16:30 - 16:50 |
Dinko Dimitrov
(Saarland University)
Probabilistic manipulation of sequential voting procedures
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Miguel Vargas
(Santigo de Cali University)
Robust Equilibria in Tournaments with Externalities
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Simon Mauras
(Université Paris Diderot, IRIF)
Incentives in Popularity-based Random Matching Markets
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Mark Whitmeyer
(University of Texas at Austin)
Bayesian Elicitation
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Zibo Xu
(Singapore University of Technology and Design)
Convergence of the Best-response Dynamic in Potential Games
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Alexander Rodivilov
(School of Business, Stevens Institute of Technology)
Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production
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Kirill Evdokimov
(Rice University)
Legislative bargaining with coalition and proposer-dependent surplus
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16:50 - 17:15 |
Coffee Break
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Theater
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LH1
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LH2
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17:15 - 18:00 |
Larry Samuelson
(Yale University)
Model-Based Inference
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Itay Fainmesser
(John Hopkins University)
The Market for Online Influence
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Erik Madsen
(New York University)
Leaks, Sabotage, and Information Design
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Thursday, July 18 |
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Theater
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LH1
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LH2
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9:30 - 10:15 |
Peyton Young
(LSE and University of Oxford)
The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks
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Juan Escobar
(University of Chile)
Delegating Learning
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Bryony Reich
(Northwestern University)
Coordination, Communication Networks, and Modular Organization
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10:15 - 10:45 |
Coffee Break
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Theater: Finance
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LH1: Networks
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LH2: Matching & Search
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Chapel: Dynamic Games
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102: Incomplete Information
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201: Industrial Organization
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10:45 - 11:05 |
Michael Gofman
(University of Rochester)
Interbank Trading, Collusion, and Financial Regulation
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George Charlson
(University of Oxford)
Price Competition in Buyer-Seller Networks
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Congyi Zhou
(New York University)
Early Selections and Affirmative Actions in the High School Admission Reform in China
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Yanling Chang
(Texas A&M University)
Worst-Case Analysis for a Leader-follower Partially Observable Stochastic Game
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Deepal Basak
(Indian School of Business)
Timely Persuasion
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Benjamin Casner
(The Ohio State University)
Seller Curation in Platforms
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11:05 - 11:25 |
Kebin Ma
(University of Warwick)
Banking Competition and Stability: The Role of Leverage
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Ezra Einy
Strong Robustness to Incomplete Information and The Uniqueness of Correlated Equuilibrium
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Naomi M Utgoff
(United States Naval Academy)
What's Love Got To Do With It? Random Search, Optimal Stopping, and Stable Marriage
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Yen-Lin Chiu
(Johns Hopkins University)
Competitive Equilibrium Fraud in Markets for Credence-Goods
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Costas Cavounidis
(University of Warwick)
When Does Information Determine Market Size? Search and Rational Inattention
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Daniel Habermacher
(University of Warwick)
Authority and Information Acquisition in Cheap Talk with Informational Interdependence
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11:25 - 11:45 |
Fenghua Song
(Penn State University)
Ethics and Talent in Banking
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Toomas Hinnosaar
(Collegio Carlo Alberto)
Price Setting on a Network
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Hanzhe Zhang
(Michigan State University)
Pre-Matching Gambles
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Christopher M Li
(Cowles Foundation)
Dynamic Obstruction
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Mayuri Chaturvedi
(Columbia University)
A model of rent seeking and inequality
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Shota Ichihashi
(Bank of Canada)
Non-Competing Data Intermediaries
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11:45 - 13:15 |
Lunch Break
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Theater
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LH1
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LH2
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13:15 - 14:00 |
Sergiu Hart
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
An Integral Approach to Calibration
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Joel Watson
(University of California, San Diego)
Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement
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Olivier Gossner
(CNRS- Ecole Polytechnique Paris and LSE)
Attention, please!
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Theater: Solution Concepts
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LH1: Networks
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LH2: Matching
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Chapel: Stochastic Games
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101: Finance
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102: Incomplete Information
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201: Industrial Organization
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14:10 - 14:30 |
Eugene Feinberg
(Stony Brook University)
Solutions for Zero-Sum Two-Player Games with Noncompact Decision Sets
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Shaofei Jiang
(The University of Texas at Austin)
Disclosure of Sequential Evidence
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Jaimie W. Lien
(The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
Strategic Post-exam Preference Submission in the School Choice Game
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Georgy Lukyanov
(École Polytechnique)
Reputation and Social Learning
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Ragnar Juelsrud
(Norges Bank)
Dividend Payouts and Rollover Crises
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Wolfgang Kuhle
(University of Economics Prague)
Observing Actions in Bayesian Games
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Jidong Zhou
(Yale University)
Information Structure and Price Competition
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14:30 - 14:50 |
John Hillas
(University of Auckland)
Strategic Games from an Observer's Perspective
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Sunjin Kim
(Virginia Tech)
Equilibrium configurations in the heterogeneous model of signed network formation
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Zeky Ahmed Murra Anton
(Brown University)
Determinants of the College Early Admissions Market Configuration
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Miquel Oliu-Barton
(University Paris Dauphine)
A solution for stochastic games
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Caio Machado
(PUC Chile)
Optimal investment and capital structure under feedback effects
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Emilien Macault
(HEC Paris)
Learning in Repeated Routing Games with Symmetric Incomplete Information
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Amparo Urbano
(University of Valencia)
Demand for Privacy, selling consumer information, and consumer hiding vs. opt-out.
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14:50 - 15:10 |
Frank Huettner
(ESMT Berlin)
Marginality, dividends, and the value in games with externalities
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Fen LI
(Bielefeld University; University of Paris 1)
Anti-conformism in the threshold model of collective behavior
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Xingye Wu
(Tsinghua University)
College Admission with Flexible Major Quotas
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Deepanshu Vasal
(University of Texas, Austin)
Signaling in mean-field games
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Juan Passadore
(EIEF)
Robust Predictions in Dynamic Policy Games
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15:10 - 15:30 |
Coffee Break
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Theater: Solution Concepts
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LH1: Networks
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LH2: Information
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Chapel: Industrial Organization
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101: Implementation
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102: Incomplete Information
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15:30 - 15:50 |
Mehmet Ismail
(King's College London)
One for all, all for one—von Neumann, Wald, Rawls, and Pareto
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Kota Murayama
(Northwestern University)
Social Value of Information in Networked Economies
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Zhonghong Kuang
(Tsinghua University)
Hierarchical Bayesian Persuasion
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Vladyslav Nora
(Nazarbayev University)
Harmful Screening in Competitive Markets
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Ritesh Jain
(Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica)
Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms:Complete information
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Ludmila Matyskova
(University of Bonn)
Bayesian Persuasion With Costly Information Acquisition
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15:50 - 16:10 |
Xiang Sun
(Wuhan University)
Perfect and proper equilibria in large games
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Norma Olaizola
(University of the Basque Country)
Characterization of efficient networks in a connections model with decreasing returns technology
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Jian Li
(McGill University)
Comparative Statics of Product Disclosure Statements
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Sougata Poddar
(Argyros School of Business and Economics & Chapman University)
Innovation, Diffusion and Shelving
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Takashi Kunimoto
(Singapore Management University)
Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima
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Paul Muench
(US Army)
Noisy and Silent Games of Timing with Detection Uncertainty and Numerical Estimates
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16:10 - 16:30 |
Joel Watson
(University of California, San Diego)
Plain Consistency and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
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Mohammad T. Irfan
(Bowdoin College)
The Power of Context in Game-Theoretic Models of Networks: Ideal Point Models with Social Interactions
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Hangcheng Zhao
(The University of Chicago)
Perception Bias in Tullock Contest
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Salah Salimian
(Urmia University)
Locating the Sale Agents in Spoke Model through Uniform Distribution of Consumers
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Cheng-Kuang Wu
(School of Computer Science and Software, Zhaoqing University, China)
A Game Theory Approach for Evaluating and Assigning Suppliers in Supply Chain Management
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Rafael Veiel
(Ecole Polytechnique)
Complexity of Strategic Thinking and Robustness of Interim Rationalizability
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16:30 - 16:50 |
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Fanqi Shi
(Peking University)
Screening with Network Externalities
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Jie Zheng
(Tsinghua University)
Information Design in Simultaneous All-pay Auction Contests
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Shuo Xu
(The Ohio State University)
(Cost-of-) Information Design
|
Takashi Ui
(Hitotsubashi University)
LQG Information Design
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16:50 - 17:15 |
Coffee Break
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Theater
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LH1
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LH2
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17:15 - 18:00 |
Alessandro Pavan
(Northwestern University)
Searching for Arms
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Navin Kartik
(Columbia University)
A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications to Communication Games
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Yash Kanoria
(Columbia University)
Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms
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