International Conference on Game Theory
Stony Brook, NY, July 16 - 20, 2018
Schedule of Talks
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Monday, July 16
9:30 - 10:15
10:15 - 11:00
11:00 - 11:30
11:30 - 11:50
Deepal Basak (Indian School of Business) Gambling over Public Opinion
Cedric Wasser (University of Bonn) Buyer-Optimal Robust Information Structures
Daniel Graydon Stephenson (Chapman University) Multi-battle rent seeking contests over complementary battlefields`
Steven Brams (New York University) Stabilizing Cooperative Outcomes in Two-Person Games: Theory and Cases
Ziv Hellman (Bar Ilan University) No Trade and Yes Trade Theorems for Heterogeneous Priors
Xingwei Hu (IMF) A Dichotomous Analysis of Unemployment Welfare
11:50 - 12:10
Zizhen Ma (University of Rochester) Majority Bargaining and Reputation
Alejandro Melo Ponce (Stony Brook University) Information Design in Contests
PULKIT KUMAR NIGAM (University of South Carolina) Asymmetric Contests and the Effects of a Cap on Bids
Haldun Evrenk (Istanbul Sehir University) War and Fiscal Centralization
Aaron Bodoh-Creed (University of California) Base-Rate Neglect: Foundations and Implications
Mehmet Ismail (King's College London) Catch-Up: A Rule That Makes Service Sports More Competitive
12:10 - 12:30
Mantas Radzvilas (Sidney M. Edelstein Center, Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Dynamic Offer Proportional Beliefs in Sequential Bargaining with Uncertain Offer-Relative Values of Outside Options
Alfonso Montes (Ecole Polytechnique) A Purification Result for Games with Endogenous Information Structures
Chih-Chun Yang (Academia Sinica) Rationality and Common Strong Belief of Rationality in Second-price Auction and English Auction
Liuchun Deng (Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH)) A Tale of Two Decentralizations: Volatility and Economic Regimes
Jian Li (McGill University ) Information order in monotone decision problems under ambiguity
Alessandro Del Ponte (Stony Brook University) Spending Too Little in Hard Times
12:30 - 14:00
14:00 - 14:45
14:45 - 15:15
15:15 - 15:35
Yong Chao (University of Louisville) Nonlinear Pricing under Competition
Brian Baisa (Amherst College ) Efficient Ex Post Implementable Auctions and English Auctions for Bidders with Non-Quasilinear Preferences
Heinrich Harald Nax (ETH Zurich) Nash Equilibria of Dictator Games: a New Perspective
Anastas Tenev (Maastricht University) Naive Imitation and Partial Cooperation in a Local Public Good Model
Peter Coughlin (University of Maryland) What if a figure skating team event had been held at past Winter Olympic Games?
Liang Dai (Shanghai Jiao Tong University and SIIFE) Organizations and Coordination in a Diverse Population
15:35 - 15:55
Adriana Gama (El Colegio de México) On Cournot's theory of oligopoly with perfect complements
Yi Chen (Cornell University) Dynamic Communication with Commitment
Duk Gyoo Kim (University of Mannheim) Multilateral Bargaining with Proposer Selection Contest
Soham Rajesh Phade (UC Berkeley) Learning in Games with Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Preferences
Miguel Vargas (CIMAT) Profit-Sharing and Efficient Time Allocation
Elena Inarra (University of the Basque Country) Rationing rules and stable coalition structures
15:55 - 16:15
Sang-Ha Yoon (Stony brook University) Firm Entry Decline and Market Structure
Artur Gorokh (Cornell University) When Bribes are Harmless: The Power and Limits of Collusion-Resilient Mechanism Design
Quyen Nguyen (Utah State University) Bayesian Persuasion: Evidence from the Laboratory
Antonio Carlos Mercer (Pontifical Catholic University of Parana) Analyzing selfish and altruistic behaviors in an ultimatum game with asymmetric information
Michael Kramm (Technical University Dortmund) Information Design in Multi-Task Contests - Whom to Inform When the Importance of Tasks Is Uncertain
Dominik Karos (Maastricht University) Farsighted Rationality and the Equilibrium Stable Set
16:15 - 16:35
Ken C. Ho (University of Washington, Seattle) Dynamic Price Competition for Supply
Siyu Ma (Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya ) Patent Licensing of a Differentiated Product Innovation with a Hotelling- Cournot Setting
Foteini Tzachrista (University of South Carolina) Sequential Contests: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Jan Auerbach (University of Exeter) Preordered Service in Contract Enforcement
Xiao Luo (National University of Singapore) Bayesian Coalitional Rationality
16:35 - 17:00
17:00 - 17:45
Tuesday, July 17
Kyungmin Kim (University of Miami) Competitive Advertising and Pricing
Dan Levin (The Ohio State University) Misbehavior in Common-Value Auctions
Hee Chun Kim (Korea Information Society Development Institute) Mixing Propensity and Strategic Decision Making
Jinhee Jo (Kyung Hee University) Why polls can be wrong but still informative
Philippe Bich (Paris 1 and Paris School of economics) On the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in discontinuous perfect information games
Joaquin Coleff (Universidad Nacional de La Plata) Can Consumer Complaints Reduce Product Reliability? Should We Worry?
Andre Speit (University of Bonn) Common-Value Auctions With an Uncertain Number of Bidders
Laurent Mathevet (New York University) AttentionManagement
Jamie Tucker-Foltz (Amherst College) A Cut-And-Choose Mechanism to Prevent Gerrymandering
Tarun Sabarwal (University of Kansas) Strategic Complements in Two Stage, 2x2 Games
Yangguang Huang (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) Supervisory Efficiency, Collusion, and Contract Design
David Wettstein (Ben-Gurion University) Two-Stage Contests with Preferences over Style
Jeevant Rampal (Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad) Limited Foresight Equilibirum
Ori Haimanko (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) Composition Independence in Compound Games: a Characterization of the Banzhaf Power Index and the Banzhaf Value
Andrew Kosenko (University of Pittsburgh) Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information
Mark Whitmeyer (University of Texas at Austin) Information Provision in a Sequential Search Setting
Pedro Jara-Moroni (Universidad de Santiago de Chile) Social Movements in Democratic Regimes
Itai Agur (International Monetary Fund) Monetary and Macroprudential Policy Coordination Among Multiple Equilibria
Alexey Kushnir (Carnegie Mellon University Tepper School of Business) Optimal Income Taxation with Endogenous Prices
Satoshi Masuya (Daito Bunka University) An Extension of the Shapley Value for Partially Defined Cooperative Games
Miklos Pinter (University of Pécs) Which belief hierarchies are important?
Ashwin Kambhampati (University of Pennsylvania) Matching to Produce Information
Kirill Rivkin Historical dynamics and country size in geopolitical model.
Cheng-Kuang Wu (Zhejiang Industry & Trade Vocational College, China) A Game Theory Approach for Assessing Threat Value and Deploying MAS Resources against Multiple Coordinated Attacks
Sonali Sen Gupta (Lancaster University) Tax Evasion, Embezzlement and Public Good Provision
Satoshi Nakada (Tokyo University of Science) Generalized Potentials, Value, and Core
Daehong Min (Korea Information Society Development Institute (KISDI)) Screening for Experiments
Miho Maylyn Hong (Yonsei University) Core and Top Trading Cycles in a Market with Indivisible Goods and Externalities
Manuela Mischitelli (La Sapienza University of Rome) Unconventional policies in the EMU: a policy game approach
Haiyun (Kevin) Chen (Grinnell College) Cooperation, Competition and Linguistic Diversity
Youngseok Park (Colby College) The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict: Comment
Nobusumi Sagara (Hosei University) Coalitional Preferences in Large Economies with an Infinite-Dimensional Commodity Spaces
Rafael Veiel (Ecole Polytechnique ) Strategic Type Spaces
Ming Yang (Duke University) The Coordination of Intermediation
Yiman Sun (University of Texas at Austin) A Dynamic Model of Censorship
Tadashi Hashimoto (Yeshiva University) Aggressive Boards and CEO Turnover
Zhe Yang (University of Alabama) Free Riders and Public Good Provision in Morgan's Lottery
Wednesday, July 18
Benjamin Casner (The Ohio State University) Going the Last Mile: Access Regulation and Vertical Integration
Raghul Srinivasan Venkatesh (Aix-Marseille University) Communication and Commitment with Resource Constraints
Flora Li (Virginia Tech) Promises and Punishment
Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University) Fair Competition Design
Marcos Fernandes (Stony Brook University) Categorization in Social Networks and the Folly of Crowds
Oscar Volij (Ben Gurion University and Iowa State University) The Measurement of Income Segregation
Estefania Vergara (Stony Brook University) Disappearance of the multiple equilibria problem in entry models
Meichen Chen (Washington University in St. Louis) Global Games with Interim Information Acquisition
Talbot M Andrews (Stony Brook University) High Risk and High Reward Decision-Making for Climate Change Mitigation
ZEHRA VALENCIA (University of South Carolina) New Type of Contests
Tatiana Mayskaya (Higher School of Economics) Cognitive Hierarchical Model in Networks
Helene Mass (Centre for European Economic Research) Strategies under distributional and strategic uncertainty
Mian Farrukh Raza (Kansas State University) Dumping on Free Trade, Optimal Antidumping Duties, and Price Undertakings: Welfare Implications in a Two-Market Equilibrium Analysis
Francesc Dilme (University of Bonn) Skewed Communication
David Rietzke (Lancaster University) Robust Comparative Statics in Contests
Norma Olaizola (University of the Basque Country) Effiency in a generalized connections model
Asha Sadanand (University of Guelph) Ideal Reactive Equilibrium
Alexander Rodivilov (School of Business, Stevens Institute of Technology) Learning from Failures
Toomas Hinnosaar (Collegio Carlo Alberto) Robust pricing with refunds
Aditya Aradhye (Maastricht University) Sender-receiver stopping games with finite horizon
Kimmo Berg (Aalto University School of Science) Computing all the mixed-strategy equilibria in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma
Itay Kavaler (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology) ON COMPARISON OF EXPERTS
Eloisa Campioni (University of Rome Tor Vergata) On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
Xiaosheng Mu (Harvard University) Informational Robustness in Intertemporal Pricing
Calvin Thomas Cochran (University of California-Irvine) Hierarchical Models for the Evolution of Compositional Language
Brian Swenson (Carnegie Mellon University) On best-response dynamics in potential games
Ghislain Herman Demeze Jouatsa (University of Bielefeld) A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games
Marco Lambrecht (University of Heidelberg) Measuring skill and chance in games
Byeong-Hak Choe (University of Wyoming) Climate Finance under Conflicts and Renegotiations: A Dynamic Contract Approach
Kai Hao Yang (University of Chicago) Selling Advertisement: Non-linear Pricing on Information Structure
Nicolas Riquelme (University of Rochester) Competing Auctions with Informed Sellers
Weijie Zhong (Columbia University) Time preference and dynamic learning
Lars Peter Metzger (Dortmund University) Repeated Contests With Draws
David Lagziel (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) Reputation and Cycles
Omer Tamuz (California Institute of Technology) Stochastic Dominance Under Independent Noise
Alexandros Rigos (Lund University) Broken Tyres and Flat Engines: Signalling Expertise in Markets for Credence Goods
Zhijian Wang (Zhejiang University) Algorithmic Collusion in Cournot Duopoly Market: Evidence from Experimental Economics
Anna Zseleva (Higher School of Economics) On the equivalence of mixed and behavior strategies in finitely additive decision problems
Sneha Bakshi Monopoly Pricing in Meta-Cycles
18:30 - 22:00
Thursday, July 19
Ting Liu (Stony Brook University) Optimal Licensing in Markets with Quality Innovation
David Ruiz (University of Minnesota) Critical Types in Dynamic Games
Eiichiro Kazumori (The University of Massachusetts) On the Virtue of Being Regular and Predictable: A Structural Analysis of the Primary Dealer System in the United States Treasury Auctions
Noam Tanner (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston) Screening Bias with Discretion
Simon Schopohl (Saint-Louis University - Brussels and CORE, University of Louvain) Who matters in coordination problems on networks?
Svetlana Boyarchenko (University of Texas, Austin) Strategic experimentation with humped bandits
Hodaya Lampert (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev) Fees versus Royalties: The Case of a Product Improvement
Svetlana Kosterina (Princeton university) Persuasion with Unknown Beliefs
Alexander Heczko (RWTH Aachen University) The Performance of Core-Selecting Auctions: An Experiment
Friederike Bloennigen (TU Dortmund) Club Good Provision and Nested Contests
Egor Starkov (Northwestern University) Bad News Turned Good: Reversal Under Censorship
Senran Lin (University of Arizona) Regret Games
Anzhou Zhang (Stony Brook University) R&D Race, Patent Licensing and the Social Value of Innovation
Paul Muench (US Army) Game of Timing with Detection Uncertainty
George Loginov (UW Madison ) Ordinal Imitative Dynamics
Basak Horowitz (Stony Brook University) A Strategic Model of Network Formation with Endogenous Link Strength
Jin Hyuk Choi (Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology) To disconnect or not: a cybersecurity game
Constantine Sorokin (NRU Higher School of Economics) Pure Information Design in Classical Auctions
Ryan Tierney (University of Southern Denmark) Incentives in a Job-market Clearinghouse
Eeva Mauring (University of Vienna) Informational Cycles in Search Markets
Arthur Dolgopolov (George Mason University) Revealed Markov Strategies
Makoto Hagiwara (Tokyo Institute of Technology) Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex Post Equilibria with Private Values
Alex Smolin (University of Bonn) Disclosure and Pricing of Attributes
Ran Shorrer (Penn State University) Need vs. Merit: The Large Core of College Admissions Markets
Arjada Bardhi (Northwestern University / Duke University) Optimal Discovery and Influence Through Selective Sampling
Lei Gao (Shandong University, China) Equilibrium Characterization of Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
Xinyang Wang (Yale University) Second Order Secret Love
Anna Bykhovskaya (Yale University) Stability in matching markets with peer effects
Ignacio Monzon (Collegio Carlo Alberto) Observational Learning in Large Anonymous Games
Ayca Ozdogan (TOBB University of Economics and Technology) When is it possible to prevent deception by reputation?
Nikhil Addleman (University of California Irvine) Equilibrium Miscoordination in Coordination Games Played on Metric Spaces
Ayan Bhattacharya (City University of New York, Baruch College) On Algorithms That Approach Correlated Equilibrium
Geyu Yang (Washington University in St Louis) Robustness of Reputation Effects under Uncertain Monitoring
Friday, July 20
9:30 - 9:50
Ichiro Obara (University of California, Los Angeles) Controlling Cultivation of Taste
Jan Knoepfle (University of Bonn) Costly Verification and Correlated Information
Alexander Matros (University of South Carolina) Experimental Test of “Better than Average” Effect and Excess Entry.
Rohit Parikh (City University of New York) Campaigning Strategies
Eugene Feinberg (Stony Brook University) Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Perfect Information, Unbounded Payoffs and Weakly Continuous Transition Probabilities
9:50 - 10:10
Nikhil Vellodi (New York University) Ratings Design and Barriers to Entry
Vi Thi Lan Cao (University of Rochester) Constrained-efficient profit division in a dynamic partnership
Shane Auerbach (University of Wisconsin) Myopia in dynamic spatial games
Laura Karpuska (Stony Brook University) Political Turnover and Property Rights
Jasmine Maes (Maastricht University) Subgame maxmin strategies in zero-sum stochastic games with tolerance levels
10:10 - 10:30
Bart Taub (University of Glasgow) Self-enforcement via strategic investment
James F. Ring (Fair Outcomes, Inc.) A Simple System for Managing & Resolving Monetary Claims
Zahra Gambarova (University of Leicester) Experimental Evidence on the Use of Information in K-beauty Contest Game
Anne Marie Go (University of Bath) Vying for Support: Lobbying a Legislator with Uncertain Preferences
Gijs Schoenmakers (Maastricht University) Dynamic Matrix Games
10:30 - 10:50
Atara Oliver (Rice University) Online News and Editorial Standards
Xiao Zhou (Boston University) Learning in Parrondo’s Paradox
10:50 - 11:20
11:20 - 12:05