International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 17 - 21, 2016

Schedule of Talks

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Sunday, July 17

9:00 - 9:45

Tristan Tomala  (HEC Paris)
On Revision Games

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Repeated Games

101:Dynamic Games

102:Information and Networks

201:Auctions

301:Incomplete Information

LH2:Conflict-Games

10:15 - 10:45

Daniel Hauser  (University of Pennsylvania)
Promoting a Reputation for Quality  

Iryna Topolyan  (University of Cincinnati)
A Characterization of Sequential Equilibrium in Games of Simple Information Type  

Arko Chatterjee  (Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay)
Who To Attack: Stability Perspectives on Coordination Games on Networks  

Brian Baisa  (Amherst College )
Efficient Multi-unit Auction Design without Quasilinear Preferences  

Mostafa Beshkar  (Indiana University)
Pretrial Settlement with Imperfect Private Monitoring  

Yang-Ming Chang  (Kansas State University)
Insecure Resources, Trade, and National Defense: Will Greater Trade Openness Reduce Conflict?  

10:45 - 11:15

Dong Wei  (New York University)
A Model of Trust Building with Anonymous Re-match  

Eunmi Ko  (University of Rochester)
Stationary Bayesian-Markov Equilibria in Bayesian stochastic games with periodic revelation  

Chun-Ting Chen  (National Taiwan University)
Coordination in Social Networks: Communication by Actions  

Yizhaq Minchuk  (Shamoon College of Engineering)
Prebidding vs. Postbidding in First-Price Auctions with and without Head-starts  

Richard Ishac  (Queen's University)
Tournaments and the Optimal Organizational Structure  

Timothy Mathews  (Kennesaw State University)
Conflict without an Apparent Cause  

11:15 - 11:45

Bruno Salcedo  (Cornell)
Pricing Algorithms and Tacit Collusion  

 

Norma Olaizola  (University of the Basque Country)
A marginalist model of network formation  

 

Maxim Ivanov  (McMaster University)
When does simple mediation improve upon cheap talk?  

Zijun Luo  (Sam Houston State University)
A Theory of Rivalry with Endogenous Strength  

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:15

Eddie Dekel  (Northwestern University and Tel Aviv University)
Evidence and Mechanism Design: Robustness and the Value of Commitment

14:15 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Learning and Evolution

101:Finance

102:Mechanism Design

201:Solution Concepts

301:Social and Political Models

LH2:Bargaining

14:45 - 15:15

 

Ziv Hellman  (Bar Ilan University)
Indexing Gamble Desirability by Extending Proportional Stochastic Dominance  

Humberto Moreira  (Fundacao Getulio Vargas)
Robust Selling Mechanism  

Kuiying Deng  (HeBei University; Peking University)
Environment-dependent Rational Strategy  

Anne Marie Go  (University of Bath)
Incumbent Competition and Private Agenda  

Joaquin Coleff  (Universidad Nacional de La Plata)
Can Cheap Talk Overcome Information Disclosure in Buyer-Seller Communication?  

15:15 - 15:45

Suvi Vasama  (Humboldt University of Berlin)
Dynamics of Innovation: Cooperation and Retardation  

Vasileios Tsiropoulos  (Stony Brook University)
The Effects of Eurobonds  

Chih-Chun Yang  (Academia Sinica)
Weak Robust (Virtual) Implementation  

Inkee Jang  (Washington University St. Louis)
Social norms and the tragedy of the commons  

Cheng Li  (Mississippi State University)
Clueless Politicians  

Nikhil Vellodi  (New York University)
Cheap Talk in Multi-Product Bargaining  

15:45 - 16:15

Arjada Bardhi  (Northwestern University)
Sequential group persuasion  

Matthias Blonski  (Goethe University Frankfurt am Main)
Moral Hazard with Excess Returns  

Andrew Mackenzie  (University of Rochester)
Centralized production and liberty: an axiomatic analysis of club goods  

Marek Hudik  (Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University)
Strategic Games with Goal-Oriented Strategies  

Steven Stong  (University of Iowa)
Strategic Budgets in Sequential Elimination Contests  

Bingchao Huangfu  (University of Rochester)
A Tale of Two Lemons: A Multi-Good Dynamic Adverse Selection  

16:15 - 16:45

 

Sunanda Roy  (Iowa State University)
Entry in quota-managed industries: A global game with placement uncertainty  

Sergii Golovko  (Penn State University)
Optimal Auctions with Ex-Post Verification and Limited Punishments  

Steven Brams  (New York University)
Making the Rules of Sports Fairer  

 

 

16:45 - 17:15

Coffee Break

17:15 - 18:00

Sanjeev Goyal  (University of Cambridge)
The game of risk: Geography, resources and conflict

 

Monday, July 18

9:00 - 9:45

Elon Kohlberg  (Harvard University)
The Nash-Shapley Solution of Strategic Games and Stochastic Games

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Experimental Economics

101:Dynamic Games

102:Mechanism Design

201:Auctions

301:Incomplete Information

LH2:Solution Concepts

10:15 - 10:45

Penelope Hernandez  (ERI-CES University of Valencia)
Can Expertise Close the Experience-Description Gap?  

Aditya V Kuvalekar  (New York University)
Job Insecurity  

Mikhail Safronov  (University of Cambridge)
Efficient Coalition-Proof Full Implementation  

 

Ming Li  (Concordia University)
Benefits of conflict in delegation  

Peter Wikman  (Toulouse School of Economics)
Tenable Strategy Blocks and Evolutionary Stability  

10:45 - 11:15

Evan Friedman  (Columbia University)
Rational QRE: Endogenizing the Noise Parameter  

Svetlana Boyarchenko  (University of Texas, Austin)
Exit game with information externalities  

Ville Korpela  (University of Turku)
Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry  

Gagan Pratap Ghosh  (California State University Fullerton)
Sequential Second Price Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders  

Wolfgang Kuhle  (Max Planck Institute, Bonn)
Thinking Ourselves into Recession  

Todd Stambaugh  (CUNY Graduate Center)
Rationalizability in Epistemic Games with Asynchronous Messages  

11:15 - 11:45

Howard Rachlin  (Stony Brook U.)
Social discounting and the prisoner's dilemma game  

Daria Khromenkova  (University of Mannheim)
Restless Strategic Experimentation  

Yunan Li  (University of Pennsylvania)
Mechanism Design with Financially Constrained Agents and Costly Verification  

Guillem Martinez-Canovas  (University of Valencia)
Incentives in Crowdsourcing: Cooperation and Success  

 

Jon Eguia  (Michigan State University)
m-Proper Equilibria  

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:15

Abraham Neyman  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Additive valuations of infinite streams of payoffs that satisfy the time-value of money principle: Characterization, robust optimization, and properties.

14:15 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Cooperative Games

101:Repeated Games

102:Bounded Rationality

201:Signalling

LH2:Conflict-Security

14:45 - 15:15

Reinoud Joosten  (University of Twente)
More on linear-potential values and extending the `Shapley family' for TU-games  

Ghislain Herman Demeze Jouatsa  (University of Bielefeld)
On Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Finitely Repeated Games  

Andy Luchuan Liu  (South University of Science & Technology)
Structures of Freedom and Rationality:On Theory of Choice  

Filippo Pavesi  (University of Verona & Stevens Institute of Technology)
Good Lies  

Roman Sheremeta  (Case Western Reserve University)
The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks  

15:15 - 15:45

Ilya Katsev  (National Research University Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation)
The SD-prenucleolus and the SD-prekernel  

Vijay Kamble  (Stanford )
Regret-optimal Strategies for Playing Discounted Repeated Games  

Jun Zhang  (California Institute of Technology)
Stochastic Choice with Subjective Categorization  

Daehong Min  (University of Arizona)
Bayesian Persuasion under Partial Commitment  

Liuchun Deng  (Johns Hopkins University)
Criminal network formation and optimal detection policy: the role of cascade of detection  

15:45 - 16:15

Coffee Break

16:15 - 17:00

Pradeep Dubey  (Stony Brook University)
Money as Minimal Complexity (In Honor of Lloyd Shapley)

17:00 - 17:45

Sergiu Hart  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Smooth Calibration, Leaky Forecasts, Finite Recall, and Nash Dynamics

 

Tuesday, July 19

9:00 - 9:45

Rosemarie Nagel  (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
De-Framing the Rules to (De)-Anchor Beliefs in Beauty Contest Games

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Learning and Evolution

101:Dynamic Games

102:Information and Networks

201:Signalling

301:Voting

LH2:Industrial Organization

10:15 - 10:45

Sofia Moroni  (University of Pittsburgh)
Preference for mates and the evolution of social norms  

Felipe Balmaceda  (DIego Portales University)
Ignoring Experts' Honest Advice  

 

Anastasios Dosis  (ESSEC Business School)
Signalling, Productivity and Investment  

Antonin Mace  (Aix-Marseille School of Economics)
Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants  

Filomena Garcia  (Indiana University)
Price competition with diferentiated goods and incomplete product awareness  

10:45 - 11:15

Peter Wagner  (UNI BONN)
Who goes first?  

Chiara Margaria  (Yale University)
Queueing to learn  

Ce Huang  (Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China)
Information Provision in a Directed Search Model  

Alex McLeod  (Queen's University)
Confidence Signalling Games  

Daniel Quigley  (University of Oxford)
The roles of transparency in regime change: Striking when the iron's gone cold  

Talia Bar  (University of Connecticut)
Patent Term, Entry and Product Choice  

11:15 - 11:45

 

Sinem Hidir  (University of Warwick)
Contracting for Experimentation and the Value of Bad News  

Lining Han  (University of Hawaii at Manoa)
Money-Sharing and Intermediation in Networks  

Qiaoxi Zhang  (Caltech)
Vagueness in Multi-Issue Proposals  

David Wettstein  (Ben-Gurion University)
Values for Environments with Externalities - The Average Approach.  

Tao Wang  (Stony Brook University)
Espionage and Disclosure of Cost Information in Cournot Duopoly  

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:15

Nicolas Vieille  (HEC Paris)
On the Speed of Learning: Do Actions Really Speak Louder?

14:15 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Experimental Economics

101:Repeated Games

102:Mechanism Design

201:Auctions

301:Applications

LH2:Conflict-Security

14:45 - 15:15

Lu Dong  (University of Nottingham)
Fair share and social efficiency: a mechanism in which peers can decide on the payoff division  

Ron Peretz  (Bar Ilan University)
Limits of Correlation with Bounded Complexity  

Yaron Azrieli  (Ohio State University)
Symmetric mechanism design  

Sergio Parreiras  (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions  

Jian Li  (McGill University )
Ambiguous Persuasion  

Brian Roberson  (Purdue University)
The Optimal Defense of Network Connectivity  

15:15 - 15:45

James Tremewan  (University of Vienna)
An offer you can refuse: the effect of transparency with endogenous confllict of interest  

Yasuyuki Miyahara  (Kobe University)
Finitely Repeated Games with Automatic and Optional Monitoring  

Thomas Joseph Rivera  (HEC Paris)
Mechanism Design and Hidden Information  

Yannai Aharon Gonczarowski  (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Microsoft Research)
The Menu-Size Complexity of Revenue Approximation  

Allen Io Kuan Vong  (Yale University)
Strategic Manipulation in Tournament Games  

Petros Sekeris  (University of Portsmouth)
Contests With General Preferences  

15:45 - 16:15

Manuel Munoz-Herrera  (University of Valencia)
Words that Bind: How Communication Facilitates Trust but Limits Market Competition  

 

 

 

Mark Rahmes  (Harris Corporation)
Mine Drift Prediction Tactical Decision Aid  

Aniruddha Bagchi  (Kennesaw State University)
Role of Intelligence Inputs in Defending against Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism  

16:15 - 16:45

Coffee Break

16:45 - 17:30

Takuo Sugaya  (Stanford University)
On the Minmax Value of Dynamic Games With Incomplete Information

18:30 - 22:00

Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)

 

Wednesday, July 20

9:00 - 9:45

Vianney Perchet  (Universite Paris Diderot)
Online Learning in Repeated Auctions

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Experimental Economics

101:Dynamic Games

102:Bargaining

301:Applications

LH2:Industrial Organization

10:15 - 10:45

Aurora Garcia-Gallego  (Universitat Jaume I)
Words and actions as communication devices  

Esat Doruk Cetemen  (University of Rochester)
Equity Financing of Innovation  

Gabor Virag  (University of Toronto)
Dynamic adverse selection with many types  

Joe Lesica  (McMaster University)
Lobbying for Minimum Wage  

Tilsa Ore Monago  (Stony Brook University)
Dynamic price competition with endogenous switching costs  

10:45 - 11:15

Yue Liu  (University of South Carolina)
Experimental Investigation of Different Public Good Mechanisms  

George Loginov  (UW Madison )
Building Trust in Cooperative Relationships.  

Deepal Basak  (NYU)
Transparency and Delay in Bargaining  

Bharat Goel  (Indian Institute of Management Calcutta)
Contests with Foot-Soldiers  

 

11:15 - 11:45

Ala Avoyan  (NYU)
What It Takes to Coordinate: Road to Efficiency Through Communication and Commitment  

Marcin Waniek  (University of Warsaw)
Shubik's Dollar Auction with Spiteful Players  

 

Estefania Vergara  (Stony Brook University)
Fare Structure and Seller Fraud in Credence Goods Markets: An Empirical Analysis of NYC Taxi Rides  

Hodaya Lampert  (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
When to Patent - A War of Attrition Perspective  

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:15

János Flesch  (Maastricht University)
Subgame perfect (epsilon-)equilibrium in perfect information games

14:15 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Knowledge and Expectations

101:Search

102:Mechanism Design

201:Contracts

301:Applications

LH2:Matching

14:45 - 15:15

Sergei Artemov  (CUNY Graduate Center)
Syntactic Epistemic Logic and Games  

Thomas Lidbetter  (London School of Economics)
The expanding search ratio of a graph  

Yangwei Song  (University of Rochester)
Mechanism Design with Ambiguity and Interdependent Valuations  

Colin Von Negenborn  (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany)
Collusion Prevention via Asymmetric Information  

Lawrence Amsel  (Columbia University)
Towards a Mathematical Psychiatry: Using Decision Theory and Game Theory to Model Complicated Grief  

Naomi M Utgoff  (United States Naval Academy)
Mitigating Matching Externalities Via The “Old Boys’ Club”  

15:15 - 15:45

Henrique De Oliveira  (Penn State University)
Blackwell's informativeness theorem using category theory  

Ignacio Monzon  (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
Frictions Lead to Sorting: a Partnership Model with On-the-Match Search  

Patrick Harless  (University of Rochester)
From behind the veil: Evaluating allocation rules by ex-ante properties  

Adriana Alventosa  (University of Valencia)
Who Guards the Guardians? Centralized Sanctioning and Cooperation  

 

James Fisher  (University of Arizona)
Matching with Continuous Bidirectional Investment  

15:45 - 16:15

Yunqi Xue  (CUNY Graduate Center)
Strategic Influence in Different Social Structures  

Elham Nikram  (University of Exeter)
Inspection game with Partial Inspections  

Jing Chen  (Stony Brook University)
From Bayesian to Crowdsourced Bayesian Auctions: When Everything is Known by Somebody  

Alexander Rodivilov  (University of Washington)
Experimentation, Private Observability, and the Timing of Monitoring  

 

Urmee Khan  (University of California, Riverside)
Planning for the Long Run: Programming with Patient, Pareto Responsive Preferences  

16:15 - 16:45

Rohit Parikh  (City University of New York)
An Epistemic Generalization of Rationalizability  

 

Alexander Heczko  (RWTH Aachen University)
Partnership Dissolution, Auctions and Differences between Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept  

Asha Sadanand  (University of Guelph)
Guaranteed Renewable Insurance under Demand Uncertainty  

Vitor Farinha Luz  (University of British Columbia)
Characterization and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance  

Ken C. Ho  (University of Washington, Seattle)
Dynamic College Admissions Problem  

16:45 - 17:15

Coffee Break

17:15 - 18:00

Yakov Babichenko  (Caltech)
Private Bayesian Persuasion

 

Thursday, July 21

9:00 - 9:45

Olivier Gossner  (CNRS- Ecole Polytechnique Paris)
Dynamic Bank Runs

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

LH1:Learning and Evolution

101:Other

201:Auctions/Social Choice

301:Social and Political Models

LH2:Industrial Organization

10:15 - 10:45

Zibo Xu  (Singapore University of Technology and Design)
Evolution in Coordination Games with Cheap Talk  

Amnon Schreiber  (Bar Ilan University, Israel)
Decision Functions, Local Risk, and Local Risk Aversion  

Leonard Tchuindjo  (George Washington University)
Informational Advantage in US Treasury Auctions  

Nicholas Janetos  (University of Pennsylvania)
Changing tastes and imperfect information  

Sushil Bikhchandani  (University of California, Los Angeles)
Intermediated Surge Pricing  

10:45 - 11:15

Mario Bravo  (Universidad de Santiago de Chile)
Learning and convergence to Nash in network games with continuous action set  

Najmeh Rezaei Khavas  (Utrecht University)
Screening Loss Averse Consumers  

Liwen Chen  (University of South Carolina)
What do You Choose for Public Good Provision: VCM or Lottery?  

Shweta Jain  (CUNY)
Modeling Plural Identities and Their Interactions  

Jungju Yu  (Yale University)
The benefit of collective reputation  

11:15 - 11:45

Dai Zusai  (Temple University)
Evolution in potential games over connected populations  

Francesco Trevisan  (University of Edinburgh)
Optimal Prize Allocations in Group Contests  

Zhe Yang  (University of Alabama)
Risk Attitudes and Heterogeneity in Simultaneous and Sequential Contests  

Marcos Ross Fernandes  (Stony Brook University)
Social Polarization: A network approach.  

Yong Chao  (University of Louisville)
What Drives Price Dispersion and Market Fragmentation Across U.S. Stock Exchanges?  

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:15

Johannes Horner  (Yale University)
Motivational Ratings

14:15 - 15:00

Mamoru Kaneko  (Waseda University)
Expected Utility Theory with Bounded Probability Nets

15:00 - 15:30

Coffee Break

 

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