International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 20 - 24, 2015

Schedule of Talks

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Monday, July 20

9:00 - 9:45

Jon Kleinberg  (Cornell University)
Long-Range Planning with Time-Inconsistency

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

LH1: Computation

101: Learning and Evolution

102: Information and Networks

201: Industrial Organization

301: Repeated Games

LH2: Dynamic Games

 

10:15 - 10:45

Hau Chan  (Stony Brook University)
Learning Game Parameters from MSNE: An Application to Learning IDS Games  

Ziv Hellman  (Bar Ilan University)
Sex and Portfolio Investment  

Liad Blumrosen  (Hebrew U)
Networks of Complements  

Barna Bako  (MTA TKI)
Strategic segmentation: creating monopolies can increase welfare  

Siddharth Pal  (University of Maryland)
A simple learning rule with monitoring leading to Nash Equilibrium under delays  

Chiara Margaria  (Yale University)
Dynamic Coordination and Learning  

 

10:45 - 11:15

Shikha Singh  (Stony Brook University)
Rational Proofs with Multiple Provers  

Jean Paul Rabanal  (Bates College)
A simulation on the evolution of markets: Call Market, Decentralized and Posted Offer  

Gaëtan FOURNIER  (Paris 1)
Hotelling Games on Networks: Efficiency of Equilibria  

Gaurab Aryal  (University of Chicago)
Empirical Contest Models  

Zhijian Wang  (Zhejiang University)
The social cycling in Fixed-Paired Matching Pennies Game  

Marco Scarsini  (LUISS)
Atomic Dynamic Network Games  

 

11:15 - 11:45

Richard E Stearns  (University at Albany)
Realization Plans for Extensive Form Games without Perfect Recall  

 

 

Yong Chao  (University of Louisville)
Nonlinear Pricing with Asymmetric Competition In the Absence of Private Information  

 

 

 

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:15

Costis Daskalakis  (MIT)
Auctions defying intuition

14:15 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

LH1: Finance

101: Auctions

102: Mechanism Design

201: Industrial Organization

301: Contracts

LH2: Social and Political Models

Chapel: Experimental Economics

14:45 - 15:15

Abhinav Anand  (University College Dublin)
Foster-Hart Risk and the Too-big-to-Fail Banks  

Yangguang Huang  (University of Washington)
Hybrid Mechanism: Structural Model and Empirical Analysis  

Esat Doruk Cetemen  (University of Rochester)
Dynamic Revenue Maximization on a Network  

Jooyong Jun  (Bank of Korea)
Entry of non- financial fi rm and competition in the retail payments market  

Alex Smolin  (Yale University)
Optimal Feedback and Wage Policies  

Jacopo Perego  (New York University)
Media Competition and the Source of Disagreement  

 

15:15 - 15:45

Matthias Leiss  (ETHZ - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)
The Option-Implied Foster-Hart Riskiness  

Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen  (London School of Economics)
Spying in Contests  

Philip N. Brown  (The University of Colorado at Boulder)
Optimal Mechanisms for Robust Coordination in Congestion Games  

Filomena Garcia  (Indiana University and ISEG/UECE)
Strategic Complementarities and substitutabilities in R&D networks  

Alice Peng-Ju Su  (National Taipei University)
Information Revelation in the Property Right Theory of the Firms  

Artyom Jelnov  (Ariel University, Israel)
Attacking the Unknown Weapons of a Possible Provocateur: How Intelligence A ects the Strategic Interaction  

Ernest Lai  (Lehigh University)
Meaning and Credibility in Experimental Cheap-Talk Games  

15:45 - 16:15

Zhe Wang  (Stanford University)
Initiation of Merger and Acquisition Negotiation with Two-Sided Private Information  

Joyce Delnoij  (Utrecht University)
Competing first price and second price auctions  

 

 

Venky Venkateswaran  (NYU Stern School of Business)
Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets  

Jiabin Wu  (University of Oregon)
The Political Roots of Inequality and Inefficiency: An Evolutionary Model Under Political Institutions  

Heinrich Harald Nax  (ETH Zurich)
Meritocracy Can Dissolve the Efficiency-Equality Tradeoff: the Case of Voluntary Contributions Games  

16:15 - 16:45

Coffee Break

16:45 - 17:30

Michael Kearns  (University of Pennsylvania)
Privacy, Game Theory, and Terrorism

 

Tuesday, July 21

9:00 - 9:45

Philip J. Reny  (University of Chicago)
Sequential Equilibria of Multistage Games with Infinite Sets of Actions and Types

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

LH1: Applications

101: Dynamic Games

102: Information and Networks

201: Bargaining

301: Signalling

LH2: Learning and Evolution

Chapel: Cost Allocation

10:15 - 10:45

Jin Yeub Kim  (The University of Nebraska-Lincoln)
The Economics of the Right To Be Forgotten  

Stefan Terstiege  (University of Bonn)
Gathering information before signing a contract: the case of imperfect information  

Dominik Karos  (University of Oxford)
Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks  

Chang Zhao  (Stony Brook University)
Bargaining Over Property Right Sale with Credible Threat  

Sneha Gaddam  (University of Leicester)
Delegation of Authority in Non-contractible Cost Setting  

TAO Wang  (SUNY Stony Brook)
Information Acquisition, Signaling and Learning in Duopoly  

Luis Ortiz  (Stony Brook University)
Graphical Potential Games  

10:45 - 11:15

Moshe Hoffman  (Harvard)
Cooperate without looking: Why we care what people think and not just what they do  

Thomas Edward Wiseman  (University of Texas at Austin)
Too Good to Fire: Non-Assortative Matching to Play a Dynamic Game  

Christian Kellner  (Uni Bonn)
Endogenous ambiguity in cheap talk  

 

Tobias Gesche  (University of Zurich)
De-biasing strategic communication?  

Zibo Xu  (Singapore University of Technology and Design)
Best-response Dynamics in Zero-sum Stochastic Games  

Eric Bahel  (Virginia Tech)
Stable cost sharing in production allocation games  

11:15 - 11:45

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Yuke Li  (Yale University)
A Network Approach to International Relations  

Younghwan In  (KAIST)
A new interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution: fictitious play  

Russell Golman  (Carnegie Mellon University)
Good Manners: Signaling Social Preferences  

Dai Zusai  (Temple University)
Best response dynamic in a multitask environment  

Sneha Bakshi  (University of Texas at Dallas)
Cost Enabled Choice of Pricing Rule when Buyers' Information is Private  

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:15

Jason Hartline  (Northwestern University)
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions

14:15 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

LH1: Solution Concepts

101: Auctions

102: Mechanism Design

201: Industrial Organization

301: Incomplete Information

LH2: Voting

Chapel: Cooperative Games

14:45 - 15:15

Dov Samet  (Tel Aviv University)
The sure thing principle  

Eiichiro Kazumori  (SUNY at Buffalo)
Building the Auction Markets for the World's Premier Risk-Free Securities: A Structural Analysis of the Primary Dealer System in the United States Treasury Auctions.  

Alia Gizatulina  (University of St. Gallen)
Betting on Others' Bets: Unions of Surplus Extraction Mechanisms  

Johannes Meya  (Goettingen University)
Dynamics of Yardstick Regulation: Historical Cost Data and the Ratchet Effect  

Yizhou Xiao  (Stanford University)
Information and Dynamic Trade  

Yaron Azrieli  (Ohio State University)
On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules  

Francesc Llerena  (Rovira i Virgily University (Spain))
On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games  

15:15 - 15:45

Mantas Radzvilas  (London School of Economics and Political Science)
Team Reasoning and a Rank-Based Function of Team's Interests  

Adi Vardi  (Tel Aviv University)
Truthful Secretaries with Budgets  

Yu Chen  (Nanjing University)
On Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation  

Ting Liu  (Stony Brook University)
Using clients' rejection to build trust  

Till Florian Kauffeldt  (University of Heidelberg (Germany))
Games with exogenous uncertainty played by ”Knightian” players  

Christian Basteck  (Technical University of Berlin)
The Borda Count and dominance solvable voting games  

Tamas Solymosi  (Corvinus University of Budapest)
Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs in assignment games  

15:45 - 16:15

 

Jun Xiao  (University of Melbourne)
Awarding Scarce Ideas in Innovation Contests  

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Bruno Salcedo  (Pennsylvania State University)
Identification of solution concepts for semi-parametric discrete games with complete information  

 

Peter Coughlin  (University of Maryland)
Probabilistic Voting in Models of Electoral Competition  

Yuan Tian  (University of Chicago)
Strategy-proof and Efficient Fair Scheduling  

16:15 - 16:45

Coffee Break

16:45 - 17:30

Kevin Leyton-Brown  (University of British Columbia)
TBA

 

Wednesday, July 22

9:00 - 9:45

Tim Roughgarden  (Stanford University)
When Do Simple Mechanisms Suffice

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

LH1: Applications

101: Bounded Rationality

102: Information and Networks

201: Matching

301: Signalling

Theater: Risk

10:15 - 10:45

Maxim Nikitin  (Higher School of Economics)
Financially Constrained Lawyers  

Anna Rubinchik  (University of Haifa)
Impulsive decisions: nature or nurture? A stochastic approximation approach  

Alexander Matros  (University of South Carolina)
Contests on Networks  

Nicholas Arnosti  (Stanford University)
Short Lists In Centralized Clearinghouses  

Jonas Hedlund  (University of Heidelberg)
Bayesian signaling  

PULKIT KUMAR NIGAM  (University of South Carolina)
Optimal Lottery for Fundraising: The Organizer’s Problem  

10:45 - 11:15

Igor Letina  (University of Zurich)
Designing Institutions for Diversity  

Mark Schneider  (University of Connecticut)
Frame Dependent Utility Theory  

Norma Olaizola  (University of the Basque Country)
A unifying model of strategic network formation  

Ata Atay  (University of Barcelona)
Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core and competitive prices  

Daeyoung Jeong  (The Ohio State University)
Cheap Talk and Collective Decision-Making: Voting Rules and Informed Decision Makers  

Tomer Siedner  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Risk of Monetary Gambles: An Axiomatic Approach  

11:15 - 11:45

Ryan Scott Penning  (Energid Technologies)
Game Theory-Inspired Evaluation of Ground Vehicle Autonomy  

Daniel Wood  (Clemson University)
Vague Messages in Biased Information Transmission: Experiments and Theory  

 

Sophie Bade  (Royal Holloway, U of London)
Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only.  

Jeffrey Mensch  (Northwestern University)
Monotone Persuasion  

Jose Francisco Tudon Maldonado  (University of Chicago)
Price dispersion with ex ante homogeneity: A reassessment of the Diamond paradox  

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:15

Susan Athey  (Stanford University)
The Internet and the News Media

14:15 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

LH1: Computation

101: Auctions

102: Mechanism Design

201: Knowledge and Expectations

301: Incomplete Information

Theater: Voting

14:45 - 15:15

Hau Chan  (Stony Brook University)
Resource Allocation with Budgets: Optimal Stable Allocations and Optimal Lotteries  

Tomasz Michalak  (University of Oxford)
Spiteful Bidding in the Dollar Auction  

Alia Gizatulina  (University of St. Gallen)
The Genericity of the McAfee-Reny Condition for Full Surplus Extraction in Models with a Continuum of Types  

Can Baskent  (University of Bath, England)
Non-Classical Approaches to the Brandenburger-Keisler Paradox  

Yonggyun Kim  (Korea Military Academy)
Stochastic Dominance of Signals and Reparametrization in Adverse Selection Model  

Frank Huettner  (HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management)
Potential, voting, and power  

15:15 - 15:45

Amy Greenwald  (Brown University)
Solving for Best-Responses and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games with Reinforcement Learning Methods  

Mariann Ollar  (Univeristy of Pennsylvania, Department of Economics)
Privacy Preserving Market Design  

Nima Haghpanah  (MIT)
Reverse Mechanism Design  

Pedro Jara-Moroni  (Universidad de Santiago de Chile)
Rationalizability and Mixed Strategies in Large Games  

Wolfgang Kuhle  
Observing Each Other's Observations in the Electronic Mail Game  

Ritesh Jain  (The Ohio State University)
On the (ir)relevance of anonymity constraints in mechanism design  

15:45 - 16:15

Mohammad T. Irfan  (Bowdoin College)
Causal Inference in Game-Theoretic Settings with Applications to Microfinance Markets  

Sergio Parreiras  (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Drop-out in Small and Large Contests  

Holger Herbst  (University of Bonn)
Pricing Heterogeneous Goods under Ex Post Private Information  

Evan Piermont  (University of Pittsburgh)
Rationalization and Robustness in Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information  

Yiming Liu  (University of Pittsburgh)
Is Reputation Bad?—Loyalty and Competence Trade-off  

 

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:15

Sergiu Hart  (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)
Evidence Games: Right to Remain Silent, Left to Disclose

 

John Nash: Commemoration

17:15 - 17:30

Pradeep Dubey  (SUNY at Stony Brook)
John Nash: Some Personal Reminiscences

17:30 - 18:00

John Milnor  (Stony Brook University)
About John Nash (Slides: http://www.math.stonybrook.edu/~jack/Nash-print.pdf)

18:30 - 22:00

Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)

 

Thursday, July 23

9:00 - 9:45

Rachel Kranton  (Duke University)
Games Played on Networks

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Theater: Applications

101: Auctions

102: Information and Networks

201: Matching

301: Contracts

LH1: Experimental Economics

10:15 - 10:45

Jorg Spenkuch  (Northwestern University)
Backward Induction in the Wild: Evidence from the U.S. Senate  

Nora Szech  (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)
Revenues and Welfare in Auctions with Information Release  

Alexandros Rigos  (University of Leicester)
A Beauty Contest with Flexible Information Acquisition  

Garth Baughman  (Federal Reserve Board)
Deadlines and Matching  

Najmeh Rezaei Khavas  (visiting graduate researcher at UCLA)
The optimal group size in microcredit contracts  

Kathleen Ngangoue  (DIW Berlin)
Learning from unrealized versus realized prices  

10:45 - 11:15

Tsz Ning Wong  (Pennsylvania State University)
Free Riding and Duplication in R&D  

Andrey Malenko  (MIT Sloan School of Management)
Auction Design with Advised Bidders  

Federico Valenciano  (University of the Basque Country)
The impact of negotiable cost-paying on basic models of network formation  

Patrick Harless  (University of Rochester)
The Importance of Learning in Market Design  

Elliot Lipnowski  (NYU Stern)
Repeated Delegation  

Tahereh Rezaei Khavas  (Utrecht university)
Cultural Differences in Prisoner's Dilemma Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis  

11:15 - 11:45

Cagil Tasdemir  (The Graduate Center of CUNY)
The Strategy of Campaigning  

Biligbaatar Tumendemberel  (Hebrew University)
Generalized Third-price Auctions  

 

 

 

 

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:15

Ehud Kalai  (Northwestern University)
Stability Cycles in Big Games

14:15 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

Theater: Applications

101: Voting

102: Mechanism Design

201: Knowledge and Expectations

301: Incomplete Information

 

14:45 - 15:15

Aaron Bodoh-Creed  (U. of California, Berkeley)
Affirmative Action as a Large Contest  

Hao Hong  (The Pennsylvania State University)
Authoritarian Election as an Incentive Scheme  

Irina Kirysheva  (Nazarbayev University)
Optimal Prize Allocation in Contests with Sabotage  

Ling Yang  (University of Pittsburgh)
When Monitoring Hurts: Endogenous Information Acquisition in a Game of Persuasion  

Jean-Francois Mercier  (McGill University)
Rent-Seeking Group Contests with Private Information  

 

15:15 - 15:45

Jörg Franke  (TU Dortmund)
Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests  

José Manuel Zarzuelo  (The Basque Country University)
An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index  

Justin Merrill Peterson  (University of South Carolina)
Blind Stealing Games  

Roee Teper  (University of Pittsburgh)
Learning the Krepsian State: Exploration through Consumption  

Lars Peter Metzger  (Dortmund University)
Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information  

 

15:45 - 16:15

Guy Arie  (University of Rochester)
Intermediary Bargaining for Price-Insensitive Consumers  

Xin Zhao  (University of Toronto)
Information Acquisition in Heterogeneous Committees  

Benjamin Schickner  (University of Bonn)
Dynamic Formation of Teams: When Does Waiting for Good Matches Pay Off?  

Chih-Chun Yang  (Academia Sinica)
Strong belief and weak assumption  

Miklos Pinter  (Corvinus University of Budapest)
A new epistemic model  

 

16:15 - 16:45

Coffee Break

16:45 - 17:30

Matthew Jackson  (Stanford University)
Repeated Favor Exchange and the Structure of Social Networks

 

Friday, July 24

9:00 - 9:45

Nicole Immorlica  (Microsoft Research New England)
The impact of status concerns in social interactions

9:45 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

LH1: Fairness

101: Auctions

102: Cooperative Games

201: Bargaining

301: Matching

LH2: Social and Political Models

10:15 - 10:45

Steven Brams  (New York University)
How to Divide Things Fairly  

Nicholas Arnosti  (Stanford University)
Auctions, Adverse Selection, and Internet Display Advertising  

Josune Albizuri  (Basque Country University)
A common axiom for classical division rules for claims problems  

Jack Anthony Fanning  (Brown University)
Polarization and delay: uncertainty in reputational bargaining  

Britta Hoyer  (University of Paderborn)
Matching Strategies of Heterogeneous Agents in a University Clearinghouse  

Pere Timoner  (Universitat de Barcelona)
Rationing problems with ex-ante conditions  

10:45 - 11:15

Wiroy Shin  (The Pennsylvania State University)
Discrimination in Organizations  

Brian Baisa  (Amherst College )
A Detail-Free and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders  

Gabriela Delgadillo  (National Polytechnic Institute (I.P.N.))
Computing the Strong Nash Equilibrium For Conforming Coalitions  

Ilwoo Hwang  (University of Miami)
A Theory of Bargaining Deadlock  

Francisco Robles  (Universitat de Barcelona)
One-seller assignment market with multi-unit demands  

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu  (Public University of Navarre, Spain.)
Strategy-proof location of public facilities  

11:15 - 11:45

 

XiaoGang Che  (Durham University Business School, UK)
Auctions versus Sequential Mechanism When Resale is Allowed  

Josep M. Izquierdo  (Universitat de Barcelona)
The core and the bargaining set for convex games  

Dongkyu Chang  (Yale University)
The Role of Commitment and Outside Options in Bargaining  

 

 

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:15

Drew Fudenberg  (Harvard University)
Communication Cooperation and Credibility in Repeated Games

14:15 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

LH1: Solution Concepts

102: Mechanism Design

201: Learning and Evolution

301: Incomplete Information

LH2: Dynamic Games

 

14:45 - 15:15

Yannai Aharon Gonczarowski  (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Microsoft Research)
Cascading to Equilibrium: Hydraulic Computation of Equilibria in Resource Selection Games  

Albert Xin Jiang  (Trinity University)
Resource Graph Games: A Compact Representation for Games with Structured Strategy Spaces (Extended Abstract)  

Holly Borowski  (University of Colorado)
Understanding the Influence of Adversaries in Distributed Systems  

Thomas Joseph Rivera  (HEC Paris)
Regulation and the Structure of Information: The Effects of Peer Monitoring on Capital Adequacy Regulation  

Ayca Kaya  (University of Miami)
Trading dynamics in the market for lemons  

 

15:15 - 15:45

Yehuda Levy  (University of Oxford)
Projections and Functions of Nash Equilibria  

Ran Shorrer  (Harvard University)
A Model of Mechanism Design in the Presence of a Pre-Existing Game  

Svetlana Boyarchenko  (University of Texas, Austin)
Strategic exit with random observations  

Jiemai Wu  (Washington University in St. Louis)
Learning in Persuasion with Multiple Advisors  

Yi Chen  (Yale University)
Strategic Experimentation On A Common Threshold  

 

15:45 - 16:15

Anna Zseleva  (Maastricht University)
Zero-sum games with charges  

Cedric Wasser  (University of Bonn)
Dissolving Partnerships Optimally  

Liwen Chen  (University of South Carolina)
Equilibrium Selection of Public Good Provision Mechanisms  

Peter Orman  (UNC Chapel Hill)
On Bayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders  

Daria Khromenkova  (University of Mannheim)
Collective Experimentation with Breakdowns and Breakthroughs  

 

 

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