International Conference on Game Theory

Stony Brook, NY, July 07 - 11, 2014

Schedule of Talks

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Monday, July 7

9:00 - 10:00

Michihiro Kandori  (University of Tokyo)
Labor union members play an OLG repeated game

10:00 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Auctions

Session B: Contracts

Session C: Industrial Organization

Session D: Repeated and Dynamic Games

Session E: Bayesian Games

Session F: Knowledge and Expectations

10:15 - 10:45

Cristian Troncoso-Valverde  (Universidad Diego Portales, Chile)
Heterogeneity in Competing Auctions  

Alice Peng-Ju Su  (University of Washington)
Information Acquisition and the Equilibrium Incentive Problem  

Nicolas Aguelakakis  (Washington University in St. Louis)
Collaborate or Consolidate: Assessing the Competitive E.ffects of Production Joint Ventures  

Bingchao Huangfu  (University of Rochester)
Stochastic games and reputation cycles  

Eiichiro Kazumori  (SUNY at Buffalo)
Bayesian Games with Generically Continuous Payoffs I: Theory  

Asha Sadanand  (University of Guelph)
Limitations of Guaranteed Renewability in Individual Life Insureance Markets  

10:45 - 11:15

Tom Truyts  (Saint-Louis University - Brussels)
Auctions with Prestige Motives  

Suvi Vasama  (Humboldt University of Berlin)
Real Options and Dynamic Incentives  

Barna Bako  (MTA TKI)
The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies  

Eduardo Faingold  (Yale University)
The Value of a Reputation under Imperfect Monitoring  

Sidartha Gordon  (Sciences Po)
Information Choice as Correlation Device  

Nora Szech  (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology)
Optimal Revelation of Life-Changing Information  

11:15 - 11:45

 

Chengli Zheng  (Huazhong Normal University, SBU)
Motivating innovation with a structured incentives scheme under continuous states  

Yong Chao  (University of Louisville)
All-Units Discount, Quantity Forcing, and Capacity Constraint  

Asen Kochov  (University of Rochester)
Repeated Games with Endogenous Discounting  

Ziv Hellman  (Bar Ilan University)
Bayesian Games with a Continuum of States  

Lawrence Amsel  (Columbia University)
Toward a Psychiatric Game Theory: Modeling OCD with Self Signaling  

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:30

Jonathan Weinstein  (Washington University in St. Louis)
The Dependence of Rationalizability on Risk Attitude

14:30 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Auctions

Session B: Contracts

Session C: Industrial Organization

Session D: Signaling Games

Session E: Applications

14:45 - 15:15

Peter Eccles  (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Simple and approximately optimal bidding rules for auctions  

Sofia Moroni  (Yale University)
Experimentation in Teams  

Eray Cumbul  (IESE Business School, Barcelona)
Non-supermodular Price setting games  

Daeyoung Jeong  (The Ohio State University)
Job Market Signaling with Imperfect Competition among Employers  

Brandon Jonathan Campbell  (Texas A&M University)
Eliciting Socially Optimal Rankings from Biased Jurors: Two Juror Case.  

15:15 - 15:45

Abdel-Hameed Nawar  (Cairo University)
Single-unit k-price auction revisited  

Andrea Canidio  (Central European University)
The Structure of Negotiations: Bargaining and the Focusing Effect.  

Gustavo Gudino  (Penn State University)
Barometric Price Leadership  

Andrea Maria Vittorio Venturini  (UNIPMN - UNITO)
Cheap Talk with Transfers  

Debapriya Sen  (Ryerson University)
Labour Policy and Multinational Firms: the "Race to the Bottom" Revisited  

15:45 - 16:15

Hanzhe Zhang  (University of Chicago)
The Optimal Sequence of Costly Mechanisms  

Heiko Karle  (ETH Zurich)
Incomplete Contracting, Renegotiation, and Expectation-Based Loss Aversion  

Fei Li  (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
revenue management without commitment  

Catherine Gendron Saulnier  (University of Montreal)
Reviews Manipulation and Online Commerce  

Daniel Stone  (Bowdoin College)
A few bad apples: Information transmission with honest types and strategic ideologues  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:30

Thomas Mariotti  (Université Toulouse 1 Capitole)
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

 

Tuesday, July 8

8:00 - 9:00

Fuhito Kojima  (Stanford University)
Stable Matching in Large Economies

9:00 - 9:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Evolution and Learning

Session B: Industrial Organization

Session C: Repeated and Dynamic Games

Session D: Mechanism Design

Session E: Social and Political Models

9:15 - 9:45

Mario Bravo  (Universidad de Chile & ISCI)
Reinforcement learning with restrictions on the action set  

Maximilian Conze  (University of Bonn)
The Recommendation Effect in the Hotelling Game - How Consumer Learning Leads to Differentiation  

János Flesch  (Maastricht University)
Subgame-perfect epsilon-equilibria in perfect information games with common preferences at the limit  

Liad Blumrosen  (Hebrew U)
Reallocation Mechanisms  

James Boudreau  (University of Texas-Pan American)
Stag Hunt Contests and the Alliance Formation Puzzle  

9:45 - 10:15

Man Wah Cheung  (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Pairwise Comparison Dynamics for Games with Continuous Strategy Space  

Niko Jaakkola  (Ifo Institut)
Economies of scale and the development of market structure  

Kimmo Berg  (Aalto University School of Science)
Mixed-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in repeated games  

Eiichiro Kazumori  (SUNY at Buffalo)
Bayesian Games with Generically Continuous Payoffs II: Applications  

Yuke Li  (Yale University)
A Network Theory of Military Alliances  

10:15 - 10:45

Dai Zusai  (Temple University)
Aggregate dynamics under payoff heterogeneity: status-quo bias and non-aggregability  

Felipe Zurita  (Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile)
Entrants' reputation and industry dynamics  

Juan Escobar  (University of Chile)
The Dynamics of Cooperation in Repeated Interactions  

Zhuoqiong Chen  (London School of Economics)
Spying in Contests  

Mark Rahmes  (Harris Corporation)
A Bayesian Game Theory Decision Model of Resource Optimization for Emergency Response  

10:45 - 11:00

Coffee Break

11:00 - 12:00

Mehmet Ekmekci  (Boston College)
Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation

12:00 - 13:00

Lunch Break

 

Session A: Auctions

Session B: Evolution and Learning

Session C: Industrial Organization

Session D: Repeated and Dynamic Games

Session E: Mechanism Design

Session F: Voting

13:00 - 13:30

Biligbaatar Tumendemberel  (Stony Brook University)
Third-price Auctions with Affiliated Signal  

Samuel Haefner  (University of Basel)
On the Evolution of Beliefs  

Talia Bar  (University of Connecticut)
Project Selection: Commitment and Competition  

Juan Ignacio Block  (Washington University in St. Louis)
Timing and Codes of Conduct  

Mehdi Ayouni  (University of Cergy-Pontoise (France))
On the role of cheap talk in persuasion games  

Jin Yeub Kim  (The University of Chicago)
A Theory of Transferable Sincere Voting  

13:30 - 14:00

Brian Baisa  (Amherst College and University of Michigan)
Bid Behavior in the Uniform Price and Vickrey Auctions on a General Preference Domain  

Heinrich Harald Nax  (ETH Zurich)
Meritocratic matching stabilizes public goods provision.  

James Fisher  (University of Arizona)
Rivalry and Professional Network Formation: The Struggle for Access  

Bruno Ziliotto  (Université Toulouse 1 Capitole)
Hidden stochastic games and limit equilibrium payoffs  

Hau Chan  (Stony Brook University)
Multi-unit Procurements with Budgets, and An Optimal Truthful Mechanism for Bounded Knapsack  

SunTak Kim  (National Taiwan University)
Information Acquisition and Voting Mechanisms: Theory and Evidence  

14:00 - 14:30

Wiroy Shin  (The Pennsylvania State University)
Simultaneous Auctions for Complementary Goods  

Jiabin Wu  (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
The Evolution of Preferences in Political Institutions  

Wouter Vergote  (CEREC, FUSL, CORE, U.C. Louvain)
Forming coalitions through R&D networks in oligopoly  

Johannes Hörner  (Yale University)
Multi-stage unmediated communication in a sender-receiver model  

Yuan Tian  (University of Chicago)
Strategy-proof and Efficient Scheduling  

Anne-Katrin Roesler  (University of Bonn)
Preference Uncertainty and Conflict of Interest in Committees  

14:30 - 14:45

Coffee Break

14:45 - 15:45

Timothy Van Zandt  (INSEAD)
Reclassification risk, health insurance flexibility, and multi-dimensional screening

16:00 - 18:00

World Cup (Theater)

18:00 - 22:00

Reception Dinner (Three Village Inn)

 

Wednesday, July 9

8:00 - 9:00

Peyton Young  (University of Oxford)
Contagion in Financial Networks

9:00 - 9:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Auctions

Session B: Evolution and learning

Session C: Industrial Organization

Session D: Repeated and Dynamic Games

Session E: Coalition Formation

Session F: Game Primitives

9:15 - 9:45

Marco Serena  (Carlos III University)
Information in contests  

Erik Mohlin  (University of Oxford)
Co-Evolution of Deception and Preferences.  

Jean-Francois Mercier  (McGill University)
Using a Sequential Game to Distribute Talent in a Professional Sports League  

Rohan Dutta  (McGill University)
Coordinating by Not Committing: Efficiency as the Unique Outcome  

Anna Klis  (University of Texas at Austin)
Minimum Participation Clauses as Exclusion Mechanisms in Public Good Agreements  

Ran Shorrer  (Harvard University)
Consistent Indices  

9:45 - 10:15

Sergio Parreiras  (The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions, Monotone and Non-Monotone Equilibrium  

Bary S.R. Pradelski  (University of Oxford)
The Dynamics of Social Influence  

Frank Rosar  (University of Bonn)
Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement  

Yingni Guo  (Yale University)
Dynamic Delegation of Experimentation  

Ryoji Sawa  (University of Aizu)
Stochastic stability in coalitional bargaining problems  

Peter Streufert  (University of Western Ontario)
Specifying nodes as sets of actions  

10:15 - 10:45

 

 

Priyanka Sharma  (IIT Stuart School of Business)
The 80/20 Rule: Corporate Support for Innovation by Employees  

Svetlana Boyarchenko  (University of Texas, Austin)
Preemption games under Levy uncertainty  

 

Bryan Bruns  (Independent Scholar)
Names for Games: A Binomial Nomenclature for 2x2 Ordinal Games  

10:45 - 11:00

Coffee Break

11:00 - 12:00

Amanda Friedenberg  (Arizona State University)
Bargaining Under Strategic Uncertainty

12:00 - 13:00

Lunch Break

 

Session A: Networks

Session B: Evolution and Learning

Session C: Industrial Organization

Session D: Repeated and Dynamic Games

Session E: Cooperative Games

13:00 - 13:30

Michael Koenig  (University of Zurich)
Network Formation with Local Complements and Global Substitutes: The Case of R&D Networks  

William Sandholm  (University of Wisconsin)
Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability in the Small Noise Double Limit  

Bruno Badia  (Stony Brook University)
On the Licensing of a Technology with Unknown use  

Tom Potoms  (ULB)
Symbols and segregation  

Ching-jen Sun  (Deakin University)
The Bargaining Correspondence  

13:30 - 14:00

Ana Mauleon  (Université Saint-Louis)
Stability of Networks under Limited Farsightedness  

Zibo Xu  (Singapore University of Technology and Design)
Stochastic Stability of Backward-induction Equilibrium in Adaptive Play with Mistakes  

Somdeb Lahiri  (IFMR and PDPU)
A Simple Model of Production and Trade in an Oligopolistic Market: Back to basics  

Thomas Edward Wiseman  (University of Texas at Austin)
When Does Predation Dominate Collusion? Bankruptcy and (Joint) Monopolization  

Dotan Persitz  (Tel Aviv University)
Negotiation across Multiple Issues  

14:00 - 14:30

Federico Valenciano  (University of the Basque Country)
A unifying model of strategic network formation  

 

Raluca Mihaela Ursu  (University of Chicago)
The Consumer Never Rings Twice: Firms Compete for Search Share before Competing for Market Share  

Romeo Balanquit  (University of the Philippines)
Equilibrium Restoration in a Class of Tolerant Strategies  

Giorgos Stamatopoulos  (University of Crete)
The core of aggregative cooperative games  

14:30 - 14:45

Coffee Break

14:45 - 15:45

Daniel Friedman  (UCSC)
Continuous Population Game Dynamics: Theory, Experiment, and Applications

16:00 - 18:00

World Cup (Theater)

 

Thursday, July 10

9:00 - 10:00

J?rgen Weibull  (Stockholm School of Economics)
Tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria

10:00 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Networks

Session B: Evolution and Learning

Session C: Information

Session D: Repeated and Dynamic Games

Session E: Cooperation and Markets

Session F: Solution Concepts

10:15 - 10:45

Pritha Dev  (ITAM)
Networks of Information Exchange: Theory and Evidence  

Quanyan Zhu  (New York University)
Dynamic Control of Influenza Epidemic Model with Evolutionary Virus Mutations  

Chang-Koo(CK) Chi  (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
The Value of Information and Dispersion  

Rene Levinsky  (Max Planck Institute for Economics, Jena, Germany)
Should I remember more than you? - On the best response to factor-based strategies  

Sneha Bakshi  (University of Texas at Dallas)
Price matching in Imperfect information  

Mehmet Ismail  (Maastricht University)
Maximin equilibrium  

10:45 - 11:15

Michael Koenig  (University of Zurich)
Technology Cycles in Dynamic R&D Networks  

Holly Borowski  (University of Colorado)
Fast Convergence in Semi-Anonymous Potential Games  

Ina Taneva  (University of Edinburgh)
Information Design  

Nagarajan Krishamurthy  (Indian Institute of Management Indore)
Algorithmic and Complexity Theoretic Aspects of Stochastic Games and Polystochastic Games  

Valerio Capraro  (University of Southampton)
Group size effect on cooperation in social dilemmas  

Irit Nowik  (Jerusalem College of Technology)
On the risk in deviating from Nash equilibrium  

11:15 - 11:45

Nizar Allouch  (Queen Mary, University of London)
The cost of segregation in social networks  

Yeochang Yoon  (The Ohio State University)
Social Learning with Rating Model  

Silvana Krasteva  (Texas A&M University)
Information Acquisition and Strategic Sequencing in Bilateral Trading: Is Ignorance a Bliss?  

Tadashi Hashimoto  (Yeshiva University)
Public versus Private Negotiations with Differentially Informed Buyers  

Eray Cumbul  (IESE Business School, Barcelona)
Stackelberg versus Cournot Oligopoly with Private Information  

 

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:30

Tadashi Sekiguchi  (Kyoto University)
Repeated Games with Recursive Utility: Cournot Duopoly under Gain/Loss Asymmetry

14:30 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Networks

Session B: Evolution and Learning

Session C: Information

Session D: Signaling Games

Session E: Cost Sharing

Session F:Decision Theory

14:45 - 15:15

Norma Olaizola  (University of the Basque Country)
Unilateral vs. Bilateral link-formation: Bridging the gap  

Nikolaos Askitas  (IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor)
Selfish Altruism, Fierce Cooperation and the Emergence of Cooperative Equilibria from Passing and Shooting  

Thomas Joseph Rivera  (HEC Paris)
Mediated Coordination with Restricted Private Communication  

Noam Tanner  (Yale University)
Two-Sided Persuasion  

Regis Deloche  (Paris Descartes University)
Cost Sharing in a Condo Under Law's Umbrella  

Fatemeh Borhani  (Pennsylvania State University)
Long-run implications of maximizing posterior expected utility  

15:15 - 15:45

Vincent Vannetelbosch  (CORE)
Bargaining and Delay in Trading Networks  

Daniel Wood  (Clemson University)
The Evolution of Behavior in Biased Populations  

JI Hee Yoon  (University of Wisconsin Madison)
Inference Design  

Xin Zhao  (University of Toronto)
How to Persuade a Group: Simultaneously or Sequentially?  

Omer Edhan  (The University of Manchester)
Cost Sharing with Dependencies and Fixed Costs  

Dov Samet  (Tel Aviv University)
Non-Bayesian Rationality  

15:45 - 16:15

Junjie Zhou  (SHUFE)
Targeted Information Release in Social Networks  

Rachid Elazouzi  (CERI/LIA , University of Avignon)
Group Evolutionary Stable Strategy  

 

 

Christina Aperjis  (Power Auctions)
Efficient Division Given Private Preferences: Using the Expected Externality Mechanism  

Yaron Azrieli  (Ohio State University)
The price of 'One Person, One Vote'  

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:30

Jeffrey Ely  (Northwestern University)
Beeps

 

Friday, July 11

9:00 - 10:00

Ehud Lehrer  (Tel-Aviv University)
Exchange economy as a mechanism

10:00 - 10:15

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Matching

Session B: Bargaining

Session C: Decision Theory

Session D: Signaling Games

Session E: Experiments

Session F: Finance

10:15 - 10:45

Sushil Bikhchandani  (University of California, Los Angeles)
Two-sided Matching with Incomplete Information  

Yuichiro Kamada  (UC Berkeley, Haas School of Business)
Pre-Play Communication with Limited Specifiability  

Alejandro Francetich  (Bocconi)
Dynamic Choice over Menus  

Francesc Dilme  (University of Bonn)
Slowing Learning Down  

Yun Wang  (WISE, Xiamen University)
An Experimental Investigation on Belief and Higher-Order Belief in the Centipede Games  

Po-Keng Cheng  (Stony Brook University)
Speculative bubbles and Crashes: Fundamentalists and Positive-Feedback Trading  

10:45 - 11:15

Dinko Dimitrov  (Saarland University)
Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty  

Sebastian Kodritsch  (Humboldt-University Berlin and WZB Berlin Social Science Center)
On Time Preferences and Bargaining  

Bruno Salcedo  (Pennsylvania State University)
Ordinal dominance and risk aversion  

Sander Heinsalu  (University of Queensland)
Noisy signalling over time  

Jose Santiago Arroyo  (Santiago of Cali University)
Studying Economics Reduces Overexploitation in a Common Resource Experiment  

Yan Liu  (Stony Brook University)
Low Risk-free Rates, Competition, and Bank Lending Booms  

11:15 - 11:45

Sangram Kadam  (Harvard University)
Unraveling and Interviewing in Matching Market  

Anton Tsoy  (MIT)
Sequential Bargaining with the Global Games Information Structure  

 

 

Alan Gelder  (University of Iowa)
Fight or Surrender: Experimental Analysis of Last Stand Behavior  

 

11:45 - 13:30

Lunch Break

13:30 - 14:30

Roland Strausz  (Humboldt Universit?t zu Berlin)
Ex post information rents in sequential screening

14:30 - 14:45

Coffee Break

 

Session A: Matching

Session B: Ambiguity Aversion

Session C: Global Games

Session D: Fairness

14:45 - 15:15

Sangram Kadam  (Harvard University)
Multi-period Matching  

Jian Li  (McGill University )
Preference for Information and Ambiguity  

Jin Yeub Kim  (The University of Chicago)
Why Forecasters Disagree? A Global Games Approach  

Steven Brams  (New York University)
An Algorithm for the Proportional Division of Indivisible Items  

15:15 - 15:45

Qinggong Wu  (University of Michigan)
Marriage Games  

Gaurab Aryal  (University of Chicago)
Trembles in Extensive Games with Ambiguity Averse Players  

Wolfgang Kuhle  
A Global Game with Heterogenous Priors  

Ching-jen Sun  (Deakin University)
Fairness in Tiebreak Mechanisms  

15:45 - 16:15

 

Min Suk Lee  (Virginia Tech)
In Dempster-Shafer Equilibrium, Types Should Be Ambiguous  

Nora Wegner  (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)
Scalable Games  

 

16:15 - 16:30

Coffee Break

16:30 - 17:30

Marcin P?ski  (University of Toronto)
Local Stability of Stationary Equilibria

 

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